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This thesis consists of four essays centred around the issue of decision-making in fiscal
policy. Chapter 2 studies the preferences of European politicians towards corporate tax
harmonisation by means of minimum taxes. Chapter 3 analyses the political determi-
nants of corporate tax setting in Europe over the past 30 years. In Chapter 4, the focus
is shifted to the local level and questions related to policy interactions of local govern-
ments are studied. In Chapter 5, the political consequences of fiscal policy decisions are
disclosed; in particular, the effects of regional policy transfers of the European Union
(EU) on the public opinion are studied.
The thesis’ main objective is to study the positive foundations of decisions in fiscal
policy, in particular corporate taxation. Fiscal policy decisions are made by individuals
who pursue their specific objective functions and who process information based on a
variety of external influences. The economic literature has identified and studied three
major (broadly defined) determinants of decision-making, which are a common theme
in the following chapters: (i) self-interest, (ii) political ideology and (iii) individual
characteristics (for extensive reviews of the literature, see Persson and Tabellini, 2000;
Mueller, 2003). In addition, the literature has increasingly emphasised the fact that, in
integrated markets, decisions are rarely made in isolation; thus, politicians’ perceptions
of external pressures and the resulting strategic interactions with other governments
have to be added to this list. Although they can hardly be regarded as a goal in its own
right as will be shown below, they have motivated a further specific strand of literature.
In essence, all chapters of this dissertation are centred around these broad categories of
policy determinants and intend to deepen our understanding of these influences.
In the following chapters, these determinants are tackled differently with regard to con-
tent and methodology. In the political economic literature, a great importance is ascribed
to the influence of individual self-interest on political decision-making, in particular in
the public choice theory. This first motivation of politicians is summarised by Persson
and Tabellini (2000: 10) as follows: “politicians [can be assumed] to be purely self-
1
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interested: they care about being in office per se, or about the rents they receive. They
choose policy so as to further these goals, but otherwise do not care about what policy is
implemented. In this case, we say that politicians are opportunistic”. Lots of empirical
evidence has already confirmed that politicians make their decisions along these lines so
that they reflect the median voter’s preferences, in particular in order to increase their
probability of reelection. This political self-interest is a central theme of all chapters.
For example, the empirical evidence presented in Chapter 2 suggests that the preferences
of politicians at the European level concerning the limitation of corporate tax compe-
tition are driven by their electorates’ interests. Yet, there is one important element of
this literature which has received significantly less attention in the empirical literature:
the link between – possibly opportunistic – political actions and the actual effect on the
electorate’s opinion. This link is studied in Chapter 5 in greater detail for the case of the
allocation of regional transfers – which is considered a prime example of opportunistic
policy in the literature – and their effect on the citizens’ attitude towards the EU.
The second prominent perspective on politicians’ motivation comes from partisan theory
(see, e.g., Hibbs, 1977). Persson and Tabellini (2000: 10) summarise that “we can assume
that politicians care about the well-being of particular groups in society and choose pol-
icy so as to maximise a social welfare function that puts disproportionate weight on these
groups”. This partisan view suggests that politicians are motivated by the outcome of
their policy which is reflected in an important influence of ideological preferences on their
decision-making. The main innovation of this thesis concerning the consideration of po-
litical ideology in fiscal policy decision-making is mainly methodological. The empirical
partisan politics literature from economics almost thoroughly approximates the ideology
of politicians by the simple use of dummy variables which differentiate between left-
wing and right-wing. In the chapters of this thesis, several more advanced approaches
to the measurement of ideology are presented and employed. These measures reflect the
fast progress in the estimation of policy preferences of political actors which has been
made in the political science literature (see, e.g., the overview in Debus, 2009). As will
be demonstrated, such innovative measures offer specific advantages depending on the
respective research question. In Chapter 2, data from individual roll-call votes in the
European Parliament (Hix and Noury, 2009) as well as from expert surveys (Benoit and
Laver, 2006) is applied in order to appraise the ideological positions of the parliamen-
tarians. In Chapter 3, an innovative measure of ideology derived from content analysis
of party manifestos (Klingemann et al., 2006) is used to assess the ideological positions
of national legislatures in Europe. In Chapter 5, individual left-right self-placement of
citizens is used in order to appraise the ideological preferences of European regions. In
all these cases, strong evidence for an important role of ideological preferences can be
found, thus underlining the relevance of partisan theory for fiscal policy decision-making.
Only in recent years, the literature has begun to study individual characteristics as a
further possible determinant of economic policy decision-making. There is some empiri-
3cal evidence which suggests that the identity of political leaders affects policy outcomes
(see, e.g., Jones and Olken, 2005). In particular, the literature has identified – in very
different settings – a certain role of individual characteristics, such as the politician’s
gender (Chattopadhyay and Duflo, 2004), the gender of his children (Washington, 2008),
his educational and professional background (Dreher et al., 2009; O’Roark and Wood,
2011) and his service length in the parliament (Stratmann, 2000). The findings in this
thesis give further empirical support to the relevance of such individual characteristics.
In Chapter 2, it is demonstrated that the educational background as well as the sociali-
sation in the European Parliament – i.e., the adoption of more pro-European positions
in the course of the term in office – affects the politicians’ preferences for corporate tax
harmonisation. In Chapter 3, some evidence is found that the educational background
of the heads of European governments influences their corporate tax setting behaviour.
Another explanation of political actions which has attracted increasing interest in the
past years is the strategic interaction between governments. Such interactions are obvi-
ously not a motivation of political decisions for their own sake, but have to be regarded
as the result of further constraints which limit the room to manoeuvre for decision-
makers. These constraints can be created by increasing factor mobility, which typically
leads to self-reinforcing processes, such as the often discussed “race to the bottom” in
taxation, or by a high degree of attentiveness of the own electorate to the situation in
other constituencies (“yardstick competition”). Both kinds of influences induce oppor-
tunistic politicians to take decisions in other constituencies into account; such behaviour
typically leads to spatial policy interdependencies, which have mainly attracted the in-
terest of the empirical literature (see, e.g., Revelli, 2005). One prominent example is
the strategic interaction of European governments in the choice of corporate tax rates
(Devereux et al., 2008), which is taken up in Chapter 3. Another main issue in the
empirical literature is the interaction of local governments, which is studied in Chapter
4 in greater detail. The thesis extends this literature in two directions. First, it points
out the econometric problems related to the disregard of boundaries in the empirical
analyses of spatial policy interdependence in local public policies. Second, it studies
the “true” structure of local competition, which can be shown to be quite distinct from
the structure which is typically assumed in the theoretical literature on corporate tax
competition. Based on our findings, a theoretical model is developed which incorporates
the specific characteristics of local tax competition and, thus, introduces a theoretical
perspective to the so far largely “empirical-based” literature on local fiscal interactions.
In the remainder of this introduction, I give a short overview over the objectives and
results of the four remaining chapters of my thesis.
Chapter 2 studies the preferences of European politicians towards corporate tax har-
monisation by means of minimum tax rates.1
1This chapter is based on the paper “The Political Economy of Corporate Tax Harmonization —Why
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Political representatives repeatedly argue that globalisation might lead to a destructive
competition, which would result in a “race to the bottom” of corporate tax rates and
an insufficient financial endowment of the public authorities. Setting minimum tax
rates is a way of mitigating this pressure from tax competition. In this chapter, we
explore the factors which shape the support of politicians with respect to corporate tax
coordination in the EU. While there exists a vast literature on the controversial issue
whether corporate tax coordination is capable of improving welfare or not as compared
to unrestricted competition (see, e.g., Wilson and Wildasin, 2004), the positive question
on the driving forces of harmonisation processes has largely been ignored. This chapter
contributes to filling this gap.
In a first step, a number of hypotheses are derived mainly from the theoretical tax com-
petition literature and different approaches from political science. Individual factors can
be derived from ideological preferences towards the role of the government and national
sovereignty as well as from the personal background, such as education. Country-specific
factors mainly arise from different national preferences as well as from the extent to which
a country can benefit from the autonomy to pursue an independent tax policy.
In our empirical approach, we focus on a particularly interesting group, namely the
Members of the European Parliament (MEP) and make use of a self-conducted survey
among MEP, which included a question dealing directly with the desirability of EU-wide
obligatory minimum corporate tax rates. Moreover, this study makes additional use of a
similar survey of the Bundestag to analyse differences between the attitudes of national
and European representatives. The results confirm an important role of ideology: left-
wing and pro-European politicians tend to favour minimum tax rates. But we also
demonstrate that both further individual characteristics as well as national interests are
important determinants for the politicians’ attitudes towards reducing tax competition
by means of minimum tax rates. Individual characteristics, such as education and the
length of membership in the EP, show the expected effect. National interests play an
important role as well, which is most notably the case for the current national level of
corporate taxation. Moreover, the citizens’ preference for social equality transpires to
have an impact on the politicians’ attitude towards tax competition, while some other
predictions from tax competition models seem to play a minor role. Our EP-Bundestag
comparison shows that German politicians on the national level do not show different
preferences towards tax rate harmonisation.
Chapter 3 studies the effects of political factors, mainly partisanship, on corporate taxes
over the past 30 years — a period of intensifying competitive pressure in Europe.2
The broad literature focussing on the effects of globalisation and strategic interactions
Do European Politicians (Dis)like Minimum Tax Rates?” which is joint work with Friedrich Heinemann.
2This chapter is based on the paper “Partisan Politics in Corporate Taxation” and is joint work with
Marc Debus.
5on corporate tax competition (e.g., Slemrod, 2004; Devereux et al., 2008; Overesch and
Rincke, forthcoming) has widely neglected an impact of political factors. In this chapter,
we analyse the effects of political factors on corporate taxation and, in particular, the
impact of partisanship.
In a first step, we show in a simple theoretical framework based on Zodrow and Miesz-
kowski (1986) how political ideologies can impact on decisions on corporate tax rates.
Assuming heterogeneous decision-makers driven by self-interest in the political outcome
and a probabilistic voting model, two channels can be identified which point at different
tax reaction functions of left-wing and right-wing politicians: differences in public good
preferences as well as ideological or personal biases in the perception of capital mobility
(Heinemann and Janeba, 2011). Both channels imply that right-wing incumbents set
lower corporate tax rates. Moreover, the prediction can be made that an increasing
intensity of competition reduces the partisan bias in corporate tax setting.
In the empirical section, we make use of highly innovative data on ideological positions.
These positions are derived from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data set,
which is based on the content analysis of party manifestos (Klingemann et al., 2006).
This data enables much more sophisticated analyses of partisan politics than the data
usually applied in public finance. Applying panel data for 32 European countries since
1979, we can detect a significant positive effect of left-wing legislatures on corporate tax
rates. This effect, however, is diminishing over time. Beyond this ideological effect, we
identify two further political factors which interfere with the general pressure on cutting
tax rates: the fragmentation of government as well as the educational background of
the respective head of government. Moreover, our analysis by means of disaggregated
ideology measures reveals that especially the parties’ attitudes towards the welfare state
are a most relevant factor which has a strong positive effect on corporate tax rates.
Chapter 4 focuses on fiscal competition at the local level. It covers two questions related
to the literature on spatial policy interdependence: first, the consideration of bound-
aries in empirical analyses; and second, the structure of competition in the theoretical
modelling of local corporate tax competition.3
Many studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) fiscal policies – such as Brueck-
ner and Saavedra (2001) or Buettner (2003) – concentrate on the relations between ju-
risdictions within a single region. These works usually disregard possible extra-regional
effects. In the first part of the chapter, we evaluate the validity of such restrictions by
focusing on competition for mobile capital. With respect to local corporate tax com-
3The content of this chapter is based on two separate papers. Section 4.2 and 4.3 are based on
the paper “Politicians’ Opinions on Rivals in the Competition for Firms: An Empirical Analysis of
Reference Points Near a Border” which is joint work with Benny Geys. Section 4.4 and 4.5 are based on
the paper “Tax and the City – A Theory of Local Tax Competition and Evidence for Germany”, which
is joint work with Eckhard Janeba.
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petition, the intensity of competition for mobile capital between jurisdictions should
determine their intensity of strategic interactions in business tax policy. Yet, as the
underlying reality (i.e., competitive forces) is hard to measure objectively, politicians’
beliefs about what is real are especially likely to become of crucial importance. For
this purpose, we study German local politicians’ assessments of their jurisdictions’ main
competitors in the struggle to attract firms.
Our empirical results are based on both OLS and natural spline regressions using survey
data from over 700 German municipal leaders in the state of Baden-Württemberg. They
show that most politicians perceive other municipalities within their own state as the
strongest competitive force. Yet, a crucial caveat to this finding concerns municipali-
ties ‘near’ a border, in which politicians also perceive a strong competitive threat from
across the border. This corroborates the idea that municipalities near a border have a
broader reference group than is commonly assumed in the existing literature. Moreover,
the importance of borders as a dividing line varies depending on the type of border.
First, ceteris paribus, their effect is weaker (i.e., less constraining) for national than for
international borders: this means decision-makers in municipalities up to roughly 20km
from the border take competition with jurisdictions beyond the border into considera-
tion when a national, inter-regional border is concerned, while the equivalent effect of
an international border ceases after approximately 12.5km. Second, in our sample the
French-German border is shown to have a stronger effect than the Swiss-German border.
One tentative explanation is that politicians perceive the cultural dimension of these re-
spective borders (i.e., language) to be more important than the institutional dimension
(EU versus non-EU). Alternatively, it could reflect Switzerland’s more aggressive cor-
porate tax policy. Overall, our findings suggest that geographically close municipalities
perceive each other as competitors for mobile capital regardless of the state or country
where they are located.
These findings imply a likelihood of obtaining biased estimates in studies of local policy
interactions if one refrains from taking these inter-border links into account. This prob-
lem is known as the ‘boundary value problem’ or ‘edge effect’ and has been discussed
extensively in the early theoretical spatial econometrics literature (see, e.g., Anselin,
1988), but has widely been neglected in applied works. We suggest a need to refine
the commonly used contiguity- and distance-based neighbourhood matrices by treating
border-municipalities differently from in-land ones to avoid biased estimations of spatial
interactions.
In the second part of the chapter, we again use the survey responses to study the “true”
spatial structure of local tax competition. Based on these responses, we can empiri-
cally identify the reference group for local business tax policy decisions. The size of the
jurisdiction and, in particular, its economic function turn out to be the important deter-
minants of the decision-maker’s perception of the intensity of competition. In particular,
respondents from urban centres perceive a much higher intensity of competition for firms
7with respect to competing jurisdictions which are distant or even located in other coun-
tries. Our empirical findings confirm the assumption of the empirical literature about
the importance of neighbourhood competition, but it also shows that another important
factor is missing. In particular, the assumption of the empirical literature that com-
petition takes place only among neighbours is at odds with the theoretical approaches
where all jurisdictions compete simultaneously. The existing standard models, however,
are incapable of explaining the empirical particularities of local competition.
These empirical findings motivate our sequential tax competition model, which builds
on Borck (2003), but extends this model by considering a rich competition structure.
Essentially, we assume a number of metropolitan regions which each consist of one city
centre and a number of surrounding (rural) jurisdictions. The model has two levels of
competition for mobile capital: first, cities simultaneously compete for mobile capital
by setting their tax policies (which can be interpreted as competition for large scale
investments, such as headquarters); second, rural areas compete simultaneously for cap-
ital within its metropolitan area (which corresponds to the neighbourhood competition).
We then compare the outcome of the model to a traditional tax competition model in
which all governments decide simultaneously.
We are especially interested in the effects of a rise in the number of metropolitan regions,
which represents the increase in competition, for example through globalisation, Eastern
enlargement of the EU or German unification. It is shown that in both types of models
the capital tax rates of the cities converge to zero, while for rural areas it only converges
to zero in the simultaneous model, but stays positive in the sequential model. Moreover,
in the sequential model, cities are more affected by an increase in external competition
than hinterlands, since they reduce capital tax rates more and shift more from mobile
capital to immobile labour taxation. In contrast to models like Bucovetsky (1991), our
results imply that larger jurisdictions do not necessarily rely more on capital taxes when
they face strong competition with more distant competitors. Based on tax data from
Baden-Württemberg, we show that several of the predictions from the sequential model
are in line with the development of tax rates in the past 20 years.
In Chapter 5, it is studied empirically whether the citizens reward politicians for receiving
regional transfers.4
The theoretical literature (e.g., Dixit and Londregan, 1996) suggests that upper-tier
governments have an incentive to strategically allocate regional transfers in order to affect
the electorate’s opinion. This implies that citizens in targeted regions are aware of this
intended benefit and that they reward the benefactor for it. In this chapter, the reaction
of the citizens is studied, which has not found much consideration in the empirical
4This chapter is based on my paper “Can Regional Transfers Buy Public Support? Evidence from
EU Structural Policy”.
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literature until now (with the exception of Levitt and Snyder, 1997). In particular,
the chapter focuses on the regional policy of the European Union as a special case of
regional transfer policies with an immense scope and regionally targeted benefits. In this
policy area, the European institutions, especially the Commission, act as benefactor and,
apparently, also intend to increase the public support for European integration (Begg,
2008). The effects of these targeted transfers on the public support for the EU are studied
by combining a rich data set on the regional allocation of structural funds payments with
opinion survey data.
In the empirical section, it is shown that the regional transfers have positive impact on
the public opinion which turns out to be sizeable. An increase of per capita transfers
by 100 Euro increases the probability of being supportive of the EU to the extent of
approximately 5 to 15%. Moreover, this is the first paper to be able to analyse the chain
of causation which leads from regional transfers to public opinion in a more detailed
way. In particular, the relevance of the individual’s awareness of being a beneficiary is
scrutinised. First, it is found that the awareness of being a beneficiary of transfers is
conditional on a number of further socio-economic characteristics. Education plays an
important role; higher educated peoples’ awareness reacts stronger to regional transfers
than lower educated people. Second, the awareness of being a beneficiary of transfers
is generally reflected in higher public support for the EU. Informed people have a 4%
higher probability of having a positive opinion of the EU. This effect, however, is also
heterogeneous and depends on the channel of information. A sizeable effect is mainly
detected for those citizens who are direct recipients of EU funds. Other information
sources (TV, information signs) also have a positive but much smaller effect whereas a
negative effect is found in those cases where the respondent is acquainted with other
people who are direct recipients of funds.
The thesis is organised in such a way that the chapters can be read independently of
each other. All references are collected in the bibliography.
Chapter 2
Political Preferences for Tax
Harmonisation
2.1 Introduction
Corporate tax harmonisation is a much discussed subject in politics. Supported by
the findings of neoclassical standard tax competition models, political representatives
repeatedly argue that globalisation might lead to a destructive competition which would
result in a “race to the bottom” of tax rates and an insufficient financial endowment of
the public authorities. However, an international coordination of corporate tax policies
is difficult in practice since individual actors may usually gain from a unilateral deviation
of their tax policy.
One existing supranational institution which could ensure a coordinated tax policy of a
subgroup of nations is the European Union. In Europe, there are pronounced concerns
about the consequences of corporate tax competition, especially since the accession of
Central and Eastern European countries with low corporate taxes to the EU. Although
the Ruding Report on Company Taxation (Commission of the European Communities,
1992) already proposed to introduce an EU-wide obligatory corporate tax rate of 30%
in the year 1992, European legislators have been remarkably calm regarding advances
in this direction in the past years. Nevertheless, both in the political debate and in the
economic literature, it is still a debated issue whether the European level should get
involved in this area and restrict tax competition by means of an obligatory minimum
corporate tax rate.
While there exists a vast theoretical and empirical literature on the controversial issue
whether corporate tax coordination is capable of improving welfare or not as compared
to unrestricted competition, the positive question on the driving forces of harmonisation
processes has largely been ignored. Despite the fact that a few authors have formulated
certain presumptions on the conditions under which harmonisation takes place as well
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as the probable view of decision makers in parliaments, rigorous empirical tests on such
hypotheses are missing. This chapter contributes to filling this gap. We want to explore
the preference-shaping factors of policy actors with respect to their position on corporate
tax coordination in general and on an EU-wide minimum tax in particular.
There are a number of factors which can be expected to influence attitudes in this regard,
both on the individual and on the country-specific level. Individual factors can mainly
be derived from ideological preferences, as it may be assumed that the attitudes towards
the role of the government and national sovereignty have an influence; however, they can
also be derived from personal background such as education. Country-specific factors
arise from different attitudes towards the size of the national welfare state and national
tax autonomy, as well as the extent to which a country can benefit from the autonomy
to pursue an independent tax policy.
In our approach, we rely on the use of an elite survey among parliamentarians1, an ap-
proach which is quite common in political science but has not been applied frequently
in public economics (e.g., Ashworth and Heyndels 1997, 2000; Heinemann and Janeba,
2011). As it is one of our prime concerns to identify aspects which are related to national
characteristics, we chose the Members of the European Parliament (MEP) as our target
group. Although these politicians do not have a direct say in the corporate tax policies of
today, they constitute an interesting subject of research. In contrast to national parlia-
ments, where all parliamentarians share the same national perspective and analyses can
only focus on differences in ideology and individual background of the parliamentarians,
in the EP perceptions from all 27 EU member states come together. Compared to anal-
yses involving representatives from several different national parliaments, the focus on
MEPs offers the advantage that they operate in the identical institutional environment.
For this reason, their attitudes cannot assumed to be biased due to specific character-
istics of national parliaments. Members of different national parliaments might have a
different degree of knowledge of the issue (whereas MEPs have similar levels of infor-
mation due to cooperation in supranational political groups and committees), different
national reelection concerns due to asynchronous legislative terms (whereas in the EP
elections take place simultaneously in all countries) and constituency-specific interests
(whereas all MEPs are elected under proportional representation from party lists, even
in countries such as the UK that apply a plurality voting system in national elections).
We make use of a unique data base: a self-conducted survey among MEPs, which asked
directly for the desirability of EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates. More-
over, this study makes additional use of an analogous survey, which was directed at
members of the German parliament, the Bundestag. This comparison is helpful, since
these parliamentarians have, in contrast to the MEPs, the competence to decide on cor-
1Elite surveys on members of the executive branch of government, such as heads of government or
ministers, are quasi unfeasible at the national level due to very low rates of response and econometrically
unhelpful due to too few observations.
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porate taxation issues. In order to draw more general conclusions which are not only
restricted to MEPs, one has to assume that politicians of a given country and party
are ‘similar’. The similarity of attitudes towards tax harmonisation will be analysed in
the empirical section for German politicians from these different parliaments. Based on
these databases our study is the first to shed light on the positive question of how to
comprehend the diversity of attitudes of politicians on corporate tax competition and to
understand the lack of harmonisation even in an integrated economic area such as the
EU.
The main results of this chapter can be summarised as follows. The important role
of ideology can be confirmed, but we also demonstrate that both further individual
characteristics as well as national interests proxied by country variables are important
determinants for the politicians’ attitudes towards limiting corporate tax competition by
means of minimum tax rates. It is mainly parliamentarians from countries which exhibit
a high corporate tax burden today who express their approval for minimum tax rates.
Several predictions of theory derived from tax competition models can be confirmed,
while others do not find support. However, no evidence can be found that the attitude
of German representatives of the Bundestag differs from that of their counterparts in
the European Parliament.
The structure of the chapter is as follows: in section 2.2, the theoretical background for
our analysis is presented, which is mainly based on the literature on tax competition and
on several approaches from the political science literature. On this basis, our testable
approach to preference formation is developed in section 2.3. In section 2.4, the surveys
of members of the European Parliament and the German Bundestag are described and
descriptive findings are presented. Section 2.5 presents the empirical analysis and the
estimation results. Section 2.6 concludes.
2.2 Theoretical background
2.2.1 Tax harmonisation
The theoretical literature on tax coordination in the European Union, such as Zodrow
(2003) or Oates (2001), has until now mainly focussed on the normative question whether
coordination of tax policies is welfare-increasing compared to competition. Although we
want to switch over to a positive perspective, this normative literature lays some of the
foundations for the subsequent hypotheses concerning the politicians’ attitudes towards
tax coordination. In this literature, which originated from the seminal contribution by
Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), tax coordination gets its support from the view which
regards corporate tax competition as being detrimental, as it is often described as a
“race to the bottom”. Following this view, countries underbid each other’s corporate tax
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rates in order to attract capital. An overall loss of welfare occurs where a coordinated
approach could yield a better result for all players. The typical result of these standard
tax competition models is a suboptimal low level of public expenditures, which puts
pressure on the welfare state and endangers its financing base. In its application to EU
tax policy, Zodrow (2003: 655) therefore concludes that “the standard tax competition
model suggests a potential role for tax rate harmonisation in a union”.
This unambiguously positive view towards tax competition is however contested by the
literature initiated by Brennan and Buchanan (1980). It does not have the premise
of benevolent governments as traditional tax models, but instead assumes governments
which are to a certain extent driven by the aim of budget maximisation. Then, tax
competition can counteract their tendency to overspend (see, e.g., Edwards and Keen,
1996), thus resulting in positive welfare effects. In contrast to the bulk of the theoretical
approaches which model harmonisation as a coordinated tax increase in all countries,
some further papers pay attention to the institutional design and consider minimum tax
rates as a specific – and in the EU probably the most feasible – form of tax policy coor-
dination.2 However, the welfare consequences of a minimum tax are not less ambiguous
than in case of the more general tax competition models. In the following section 2.3,
we will discuss some further aspects of seminal tax competition models which are of
importance to the derivation of our testable hypotheses, including the implications of
asymmetric tax competition and new economic geography models. Overall, the theo-
retical literature on the welfare effects of tax competition is so extensive that a more
comprehensive discussion would go beyond the scope of this contribution.3
One major difference between this normative literature on tax harmonisation and our
approach is the fact that in the former the group of (potentially) harmonising countries
is taken as exogenously given, while we want to identify the rationales behind the har-
monisation process. In our contribution, we confront these normative predictions with
the positive driving forces of tax harmonisation. A small strand of theoretical literature
explains this endogenous formation of groups of harmonising countries. Cardarelli et
al. (2002) and Itayaa et al. (2008) study this question in a repeated interactions model
and derive conditions under which countries coordinate their tax policies. In particular
they show that this coordination cannot prevail under the existence of strong regional
asymmetries. However, countries tend to stick to harmonisation if their citizens have a
high preference for public goods.
2Examples are Grazzini and van Ypersele (2003), López et al. (1998) and Fuest and Huber (1999).
3For more complete surveys of the overall literature, please refer to Wilson and Wildasin (2004) or
Fuest et al. (2005).
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2.2.2 Political actors
The literature surveyed so far looks at countries and their tax policy decisions in a highly
aggregate way and largely abstracts from individual political decision makers and their
actual interests and constraints. In this respect, our study follows a distinctly different
approach by trying to identify what shapes the tax harmonisation preferences of policy
makers. In the political-economic literature there are few related works. One notable
exception are Frey and Eichenberger (1996) who argue that members of parliament
generally have an interest in the harmonisation of tax policy, as it enables them to form
cartels in order to cement their importance and power.
With regard to parliamentary decision making, some special features of the European
Parliament are of interest as the group of MEPs is in the centre of our investigation in
order to disclose the role of national interests. The relevant empirical literature from
political science offers some first insights. This literature mainly centres on the question
whether MEPs vote along a (European) political group rather than along country lines.
Recent contributions in this area on past European Parliaments are mainly from Hix
and co-authors (see Hix, 2002; Hix et al., 2007). They empirically analyse roll-call votes
in the EP for different periods and find that group cohesion of voting behaviour in the
EP clearly exceeds national cohesion. The most recent analysis of voting behaviour
in the first half of the Sixth European Parliament (2004-2005) shows that this pattern
has hardly changed even after the accession of the new member states (see Hix and
Noury, 2009). Interestingly enough, the authors find that national cohesion is relatively
more important for budgetary votes which is a policy area with pronounced national
interests, while Aspinwall (2002) shows that the dominating role of group cohesion does
not hold for policy areas with strong and heterogeneously defined national interests such
as foreign policy.4 This receives further support from most recent findings by Kaniovski
and Mueller (2011). They show that national differences in citizens’ preferences have
some explanatory power for the voting patterns in the EP, but this is generally modest.
However, they conclude that “on issues that are likely to be particularly salient for EU
citizens, their representatives appear to be voting more in accordance with their citizens’
preferences than for other sorts of issues, and less in accordance with the representatives
own ideologies”. This suggests that in policy areas where a strong national interest
exists, a lower level of group cohesion in the EP may be expected. This finding is of
high relevance to the question at hand: as corporate tax policy is still regarded as an
unambiguous national instrument of policy, an intervention by the EU can easily conflict
with national interests.
Compared to the roll-call (i.e. recorded) vote literature, our direct survey of MEPs’
stated preferences has a clear advantage since it enables a more direct identification
of individual policy preferences, whereas actual voting can be a highly distorted signal
4Unfortunately, separate analyses for tax related votes do not exist because the EP has hardly any
say in tax issues.
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for preferences. It is quite customary for parties to impose informal sanctions on their
members for defecting votes. Since only non-anonymous votes are open for empirical
analysis, the resulting bias should be substantial. However, in contrast to the political
science literature where surveys of decision makers are quite customary, there are rarely
any works from public economics which use this method to analyse politicians’ attitudes
by this means. Notable exceptions are Ashworth and Heyndels (1997) and Ashworth and
Heyndels (2000), who analyse the preferences of Flemish local politicians, which they
stated in a survey, towards the level of taxation and tax reforms. In an accompanying
paper which also focuses directly on individually stated policy preferences in the Euro-
pean Parliament, Heinemann et al. (2009) make use of other items of the same survey
as this chapter and analyse the EU parliamentarians’ attitudes towards the conceivable
reform of the EU budget in general, and explicitly examine their attitudes towards the
introduction of an EU tax. This analysis shows that for this particular question, not
only ideology plays a role, but also country interests. Among these there is the financial
net payer position, the new versus old member dimension and a country’s tax compet-
itiveness (for corporate taxation). This intrinsic conflict for an MEP between national
interest and individual ideological position paves the way for the following analyses.
2.3 Tax policy attitude formation
The literature overview above gives us some first intuitions on the politicians’ attitudes
towards corporate tax coordination. The political economic perspective indicates that
there is a strong incentive to harmonise tax policies because – from that perspective
– politicians strive to form cartels in order to increase their room for manoeuvre. Ex-
emplary might be harmonisation of consumption taxes. At the EU level, minimum tax
rates already exist for excise taxes and the value added tax, which has been fixed since
its introduction in 1992 at a level of 15%.5 Its level is decided jointly every two years
by the Council after proposal of the European Commission and confirmation of the EP,
which shifts the competence in this area entirely from the national to the European
level. Similarly, and regardless of how the institutional arrangement would actually look
like, corporate tax coordination would undoubtedly mean a shift of competencies from
the national level to the European level. However, although it is usually assumed in the
political science literature that the EP tends to be more pro-integrationist than national
parliaments, empirical evidence by Scully (2005) refutes this view. Based on surveys of
European and national parliamentarians, he cannot find pronounced differences in the
attitudes towards European integration between these two groups of politicians. How-
5Minimum VAT rates are for two reasons hardly comparable with minimum corporate tax rates and
will not be discussed in this chapter in further detail: 1. tax competition is of minor importance for
consumption goods than for capital due to lower mobility, and 2., the minimum VAT rate is set in the
EU at a very low level and many exemptions are granted, so that it is barely restrictive for the member
states.
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ever, one might still object against a generalisation of the our findings that socialisation
in the EP might impact the results. The significance of this objection will be studied by
adding German parliamentarians at the federal level to our analysis.
We expect a considerable degree of heterogeneity among politicians on the issue of tax
harmonisation. As the theoretical literature shows, it is a very controversial issue – even
among economists – whether a coordination of corporate tax rates would be welfare
improving in the EU, or not. However, even in case of a potential overall welfare increase
through tax harmonisation, this might be difficult to implement in the real world. It
would be difficult to create a compensation mechanism favouring those countries which
benefit from a unilateral deviation of their tax policy (see Brøchner et al. (2007)).
According to the view of many tax competition models, a politician’s attitude would
then depend on his jurisdiction’s median voter preferences (or those of the representative
household) in order to maximise votes. This implies that he will support harmonisation
in case the median voter benefits from it compared to the status quo, and reject it
otherwise.
Poole and Rosenthal (1996), who analyse the voting behaviour in the US Senate, term
this approach to decision-making the “principal-agent” approach. In this view, the politi-
cians are agents who act on behalf of their principal with the aim to maximise their utility
mainly by striving for re-election. In these models, the principal is usually modelled as
the median voter of the representative’s constituency. However, various contributions
both from economic and political science analysing legislators’ decision-making reject
the uniqueness of this “principal-agent approach” which explicitly or implicitly stands
on the basis of most theoretical approaches in tax competition models. In addition to
that, Poole and Rosenthal (1996) identify a second class of explanations, which can be
termed the “ideological” approach. With the “ideological” perspective (which is much
more common in political science than in economics), a politician’s position is described
on a certain ideological continuum. The classical example for such a continuum is the
range from left to right; another one which is of high relevance for European politics is
the range from pro to contra European integration. Thus, a politician’s location along
that specific dimension should influence his attitudes and voting behaviour, even though
this can easily interfere with his vote maximisation objective.
In addition to the interests of the constituency and the ideological position, individual
characteristics are a further determinant in attitude formation. Studies on the formation
of economic beliefs (e.g. Caplan (2002); Blendon et al. (1997)) suggest that education
or socio-economic characteristics of an individual can play a role, while Heinemann
and Janeba (2011) show that this is also relevant for belief formation of members of a
parliament. This also implies that a MEP’s field of specialisation should matter, because
members of the committee responsible for economic affairs (“Committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs” in the EU, ECON) might have a different view on issues such as
tax policy.
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These different approaches to attitude formation imply that the general opinion of a
politician on the desirability of coordination of EU corporate tax policy in general, and
EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates in particular, should depend on the
following factors:
a) member-state characteristics are a proxy for (potential) national benefits from tax
harmonisation which are relevant to the interests of national voters who are represented
by the MEP according to the “principal-agent approach”,
b) his/her ideological position according to the “ideological approach”,
c) individual characteristics which are related to the individual politician’s education, his
informative situation linked, e.g., to his field of policy specialisation or socio-economic
characteristics such as age or gender.
In the following, we will formulate several hypotheses on the determinants of the atti-
tudes of the MEPs in light of this theory.
2.3.1 Country characteristics
As discussed in section 2.2, the relevant theoretical literature regarding tax competition
is mainly of a normative character, discussing the welfare effects of tax competition
compared to different kinds of harmonisation. Nevertheless, these findings allow us to
draw some conclusions for the question at hand, i.e., which national characteristics are
important for the national voters’ attitudes towards tax competition and thus shape the
attitude of politicians who act as their principals.
A first aspect in this regard deals with the voters’ perceptions of the likely consequences
of unrestricted tax competition as predicted by standard tax competition models. As
Sinn (1994) remarks, declining public revenues as a consequence of tax competition
especially threaten the sustainability of pure systems of income redistribution. However,
the attitude towards income redistribution differs systematically between countries (see,
e.g., Corneo and Grüner (2002), or Alesina and Angeletos (2005)), which gives rise to
different perceptions of the costs of tax competition. Citizens of countries with high
preferences for income redistribution would suffer most from a downwards pressure on
national tax revenues, as they would have to fear that this might result in a level of
welfare expenditures which is suboptimal low from their perspective. This consideration
leads to the following hypothesis on the politicians’ attitudes:
Hypothesis 2.1a. Representatives from countries where the citizens have a high pref-
erence for social equality tend to be more supportive of minimum corporate tax rates.
Early extensions of the classic Zodrow-Mieszkowski framework gave up their assumption
of symmetric countries, but emphasised the importance of asymmetries in population.
Seminal models with asymmetries in the population introduced by Bucovetsky (1991)
and Wilson (1991) demonstrate the advantages of small regions in situations where tax
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competition exists. This led to a literature which disputed the view that tax coordination
eventually leads to all countries being better off as implied by the prisoner’s dilemma
model. As Bucovetsky (2009) shows in his model, small countries might gain from tax
competition. Consequently, small countries benefit from free-riding in the case of partial
tax harmonisation of the bigger countries by staying outside the union and setting low
tax rates. Consider the following hypothesis derived from tax competition models with
asymmetric country size:
Hypothesis 2.1b. Representatives from small countries should oppose minimum cor-
porate tax rates more strongly than their counterparts from larger countries.
One further more recent view towards tax competition comes from “new economic geog-
raphy” models, which introduce the “agglomeration” argument (Baldwin and Krugman
(2004)). According to this, firms tend to cluster together in higher developed regions or
countries (“core countries”) due to positive externalities of spatial concentration. This
enables these countries to sustain a higher tax burden on companies than the less-
developed countries in the periphery, as the former do not have to fear capital outflows
due to their agglomeration advantages. This implicates that the core countries would
be able to increase their agglomeration tax rents in case tax competition was reduced.
In the Baldwin/Krugman model the introduction of a tax floor would benefit the core
countries, as these can increase their agglomeration rents through an even higher level
of taxation than without any coordination. We propose:
Hypothesis 2.1c. Representatives from countries which exhibit high agglomeration
effects tend to be more supportive of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
Furthermore, the current level of corporate taxation in a country can be expected to be
of importance. Countries which exhibit a high level of corporate taxation even today
would not be affected by a minimum tax rate as soon as their current tax rate is higher.
They would even benefit from it as it reduces the gap to other countries which exhibit
low tax rates today. This would eventually reduce the stress of competition on their
economy. Peralta and van Ypersele (2006) show analytically in a tax competition model
that minimum tax rates are never unanimously accepted because they would cause an
increase in the gross price of capital in the bound countries, thus, making these countries
lose from it, although leading to an overall increase of production. The incentive of a
majority of highly taxed countries to impose their level of taxation on the minority of
low taxed countries in a federation in order to decrease their competitiveness is closely
related to the “strategy of raising rivals’ costs”, which is known from the political economy
of industrial organisation (see Vaubel (2006)). This leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.1d. Representatives from countries which currently exhibit a high tax
burden on companies tend to be supportive of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
One further aspect derived from tax competition models concerns the mobility of capital.
Apparently, the degree of competition a country is exposed to, and hence its attitude
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towards tax harmonisation, largely depends on the mobility of its local capital stock.
Carlsen et al. (2005) formalise this claim and show analytically that low mobility of the
local industry alleviates the pressure a jurisdiction faces from tax competition and leads
to a higher tax level.6 As real capital is not as mobile as other investments, countries with
a high share of real capital are expected not to be exposed to corporate tax competition
to the same degree as other countries, so that they have less to gain from a retrenchment
of tax competition through minimum tax rates. The following hypothesis results:
Hypothesis 2.1e. Representatives from countries with a high share of real capital tend
to be less supportive of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
Apart from these predictions derived from various tax competition models, one fur-
ther hypothesis regarding national interests, which should have an impact within the
principal-agent approach, can be made. This is directly linked to the voters’ attitudes
towards European integration in general and European tax competencies in particular.
Apart from the economic advantages and disadvantages discussed so far, the citizens in
the EU member states can also be expected to differ in their attitudes towards tax co-
ordination due to different attitudes towards European integration or diverging national
attitudes regarding taxation. According to the principal-agent approach, a politician
who is concerned about his re-election will not only incorporate the “economic” national
advantages and disadvantages of tax coordination in his decision, but the subjective
attitudes of his constituency as well. Therefore, we propose:
Hypothesis 2.1f. Representatives from countries whose citizens express antipathy to-
wards an increase of competencies of the European level in the area of taxation tend to
be less supportive of obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
2.3.2 Ideological position
As discussed above, political science literature puts a lot of effort into the measurement
of ideological positions and their implications for decision making and group cohesion.
The approaches to measurement of ideological positions are manifold: they are inter
alia calculated from roll-call votes, expert surveys and wording of party manifestos.
Generally, the left-right scale is found to be of decisive character in the mapping of
ideological positions. This dimension is also of high relevance for the matter of tax
competition, as the border between left and right positions runs along their attitudes
toward the economic role of public policy (see Benoit and Laver (2006)): left-wing
representatives show more support for redistribution and a larger welfare state, while
right-wing representatives are more inclined to lower taxation and a liberal, “laissez
faire” economic policy. From this differentiation in the views towards the role of the
state, it can easily be derived that left-wing politicians have to be more worried that tax
6Empirically, the authors confirm that Norwegian municipalities which experience high firm mobility
tend to have a lower level of taxation.
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competition might result in a deterioration of public revenues, as standard tax models
suggest, which leads us to the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2.2a. Left-wing representatives tend to be more supportive of minimum
corporate tax rates than right-wing representatives.
With regard to the European Parliament, a further dimension has been found to be of
major importance in political science, which is the attitude towards European integration
measured on an anti-/ pro-Europe policies scale (see Hix and Noury (2009)). Politicians
defined as anti-Europe refuse the transfer of additional competencies to the European
level. Therefore, they have to be worried that minimum corporate tax rates are a first
step to a centralisation of tax policies, and thus a reduction of national sovereignty. This
gives us the following additional hypothesis for the ideology of MEPs:
Hypothesis 2.2b. Representatives who show an anti-Europe attitude tend to have a
more opposing view towards obligatory minimum corporate tax rates.
2.3.3 Individual characteristics
Some further predictions connected to individual characteristics of parliamentarians can
predominantly be derived from the political science literature. In many works of political
science literature, policy preferences of MEPs are not regarded to be exogenously deter-
mined and stable, but that the affiliation in the EP changes their attitudes in favour of
more pro-integrationist positions (see Scully (2005)). We derive a first prediction on the
MEPs’ attitudes towards EU-wide minimum statutory tax rates:
Hypothesis 2.3a. The support for tax coordination increases with the number of years
spent in the EP.
Additionally, the effect of expertise in business and economics is interesting. As dis-
cussed above, no clear-cut conclusion can be drawn in theory whether harmonisation
of corporate taxation in the EU would be welfare-improving or welfare-decreasing. Ir-
respective of the missing consensus of experts on this normative question, we expect
a negative attitude of economists towards tax coordination due to a more liberal per-
spective on the subject. This can be justified by several empirical findings that confirm
that this population group is generally more supportive of competition and deregulation
than other groups, as already indicated by Caplan (2002) based on survey data for the
U.S. Most recent evidence comes from Dreher et al. (2009), who show that, among
500 political leaders from 73 countries, the group of trained economists has significantly
introduced more market liberal reforms than the rest, as well as O’Roark and Wood
(2011) who demonstrate that economists in the U.S. senate were less likely to vote in
favour of increasing regulation in the labour market in form of minimum wages. These
recent findings give support to the following expectation:
Hypothesis 2.3b. Representatives who have a final degree in economics or business
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administration are expected to have a negative attitude towards tax harmonisation.
It is the objective of the following empirical part to test for the actual relevance of this
variety of hypotheses based on our survey results.
2.4 Survey descriptions
The first survey which we will refer to was conducted by the authors among the members
of the European Parliament between March and July 2007. The parliamentarians were
addressed with written letters, which were sent out in five different languages: German,
French, Polish, Spanish, and English. Where available, MEPs were addressed with
letters and questionnaires in their mother tongue or in English otherwise. We received
responses from 158 members who filled out their questionnaires. The overall response
rate was 20.1 per cent and differed significantly between political groups and countries
(see Appendix, Tables 2.6 and 2.7). We received responses from all but two small member
countries (Estonia and Malta). The question which we exploit in the next sections is
the following:
What is your attitude towards the following statement: “The EU should agree on EU-wide
obligatory minimum corporate tax rates”?
The answer scale ranged from -4 (“very negative”) to +4 (“very positive”).
In addition to this survey, a second survey will be consulted, which was conducted be-
tween November 2006 and February 2007 among representatives in the German parlia-
ment (Bundestag), and allows us to study whether there are differences in the attitudes
of politicians at the European and the national level.7 In this survey, a question regard-
ing the desirability of EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates was included as
well. As this question was formulated almost with the identical wording and had the
same scale, it is highly comparable to the question at hand. This enables us to analyse
two different data sets: first, only the responses from the members of the European
Parliament in order to uncover the impact of national interests, and second, a pooled
sample of responses only from German politicians, both from the EP and the Bundestag,
to disentangle differences between both parliaments.
It is important to note that the issue at hand, i.e., the introduction of minimum corporate
tax rates at the EU level, was not very high on the political agenda in both parliaments
at the time of the surveys, and that our question is therefore rather of a general nature.
This entails that to our knowledge there did not exist any recent formal decisions at
the level of the political groups at the time of the survey, such as party manifestos,
which might be reflected in the survey responses due to parliamentary party discipline.
7That survey mainly focussed on the politicians’ perceptions of restrictions to tax policy due to
globalisation (for details, see Heinemann and Janeba, 2011).
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Figure 2.1: Survey: distribution of responses
Moreover, the divergency of responses within factions which will be presented in the
following also indicates that the responses reflect individual attitudes and not formally
specified party positions.
A visual inspection of the survey results from both samples shows a highly polarised at-
titude towards minimum tax rates (see Figure 2.1). The two prevalent answer categories
are the two extremes, either complete rejection or complete approval. This pattern is
even more pronounced for the EP sample concerning the negative answer categories.
Table 2.1 presents the corresponding descriptive statistics of our analysis. As can been
taken from the total mean value of +0.22, the politicians are altogether in favour of a
minimum EU-wide obligatory corporation tax rate but only rather modestly. The large
standard deviation points to a substantial heterogeneity of views among the politicians,
which puts our analysis on a sound basis (total std. dev.: 3.14).
Comparing means among different indicators uncovers interesting first insights: the
attitudes towards minimum tax rates differ with high significance across countries as well
as political groups. Strong opponents of the country classification come from Poland,
the Czech Republic, and the UK. Strong proponents come from Portugal, Austria, and
Belgium. Politically speaking, the minimum taxation is mostly refused by politicians
belonging to parties that either want to retain the national sovereignty (UEN) or are
simply opposed to the EU and to any further integration (IND/DEM).8 As expected,
the minimum taxation receives the most support from politicians of left-wing parties,
namely Greens-EFA, the socialist PES, and the GUE-NGL (the most far-left political
group in the EP). Surprisingly, the mean closest to zero is generated by the liberal
8Indicative ideological positions of the political groups are stated in Table 2.6 in the appendix. A
comprehensive overview of the political groups in the EP can be found in Corbett et al. (2007)
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Table 2.1: Comparisons of means, EP participants
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Classified by country
AT 7 2.57 2.94 -4 4
BE 6 2.17 3.13 -4 4
CZ 5 -2.20 2.68 -4 2
DE 39 0.51 2.89 -4 4
FR 16 1.25 2.74 -4 4
GB 12 -2.00 3.44 -4 4
HU 5 2.00 0.71 1 3
IT 8 1.75 1.39 0 3
PL 10 -2.60 2.37 -4 2
PT 7 2.86 1.46 0 4
Other1 41 -0.46 3.19 -4 4
Total 156 0.22 3.14 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000
Classified by political group
ALDE 18 -0.11 3.43 -4 4
EPP-ED 53 -0.72 3.10 -4 4
GUE-NGL 5 1.40 2.41 -1 4
IND/DEM 7 -3.71 0.76 -4 -2
IST 4 1.00 3.83 -4 4
NI 3 -4.00 0.00 -4 -4
PES 50 2.02 2.02 -4 4
Greens-EFA 6 3.17 1.17 1 4
UEN 10 -1.80 2.94 -4 3
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000
Classified by accession date (2004)
EU-15 120 0.7 3.07 -4 4
new members 36 -1.36 2.86 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0005
Classified by final degree in business admin. or economics
Yes 40 -0.65 3.25 -4 4
No 115 0.50 3.06 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0449
1 only countries with number of observations ≥ 5 are listed individually
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Table 2.2: Comparisons of means, EP and Bundestag participants
Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Classified by political group
FDP (ALDE) 36 -2.31 2.56 -4 4
CDU/CSU (EPP-ED) 72 -0.54 2.73 -4 4
Die Linke (GUE/NGL) 29 3.28 1.13 0 4
SPD (PES) 42 2.67 1.82 -2 4
Bündnis 90/ Die Grünen
(The Greens/EFA) 15 2.40 1.12 0 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0000
Classified by final degree in business admin. or economics
Yes 40 -0.55 3.26 -4 4
No 154 0.93 2.91 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0058
Classified by origin from Eastern Germany
Yes 38 .61 2.80 -4 4
No 156 0.38 3.05 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.0259
Classified by member of European Parliament
Yes 39 0.51 2.89 -4 4
No 155 0.65 3.08 -4 4
ANOVA, P-Value for F-Test: 0.7994
ALDE group; the members from the Christian democrat/conservative EPP-ED group
are slightly opposed to the idea of minimum corporate tax rates.
Classified by the accession date of the politicians’ country of origin (i.e., EU15-member
states vs. new members), it is noticeable that new member states politicians clearly
oppose the minimum taxation. This might be due to the fact that the new member
states today have a low level of corporate taxation, or the lower socialisation effect
of their MEPs. Politicians with a final degree in economics or business administration
slightly oppose the minimum taxation, while those with another educational background
are slightly in favour of it.
The results for the pooled data set consisting only of the German members of the EP
and the Bundestag are shown in Table 2.2. Here, the German members of the liberal
ALDE group, the FDP, show by far the strongest opposition towards minimum tax rates.
Again, the left parties (SPD, Bündnis 90/Die Grünen, Die Linke) offer much support for
tax coordination. An interesting conclusion can be drawn from the standard deviations:
these are in all cases lower than in the EP, which indicates that the cohesion of policy
preferences within the groups of the EP is smaller than that within the German parties.
Parliamentarians with a final degree in business administration or economics again offer
less support for minimum tax rates, which confirms the results for the EP. Politicians
from Eastern Germany are more supportive; this, however, can also be due to the fact
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that the overwhelming majority of politicians of the left-wing party Die Linke come from
this part of the country. Finally, judged from the very high p-value for the F-Test for
equal attitudes, there is no significant difference between the attitudes of members of
the EP and members of the Bundestag observable from descriptive statistics.
2.5 Econometric testing
In the following, multivariate testing aims at identifying the relevant drivers of the EU
parliamentarians’ attitudes towards corporate tax coordination by means of EU-wide
obligatory minimum rates, and at disentangling the attitudes of politicians of the EU
level and politicians at a national level in this regard.
2.5.1 Method
In the following empirical analyses, an ordered probit approach will be applied. This
approach is appropriate, as the answers on the question under investigation were made
on a scale from -4 to +4 (“very negative” to “very positive”).
An apparent problem of our econometric procedure, which is generally connected to
survey data, is the selection bias. In empirical political science literature, the problem
of missing data in expert surveys has received much attention. However, as King et al.
(2001) point out, these concerns mainly relate to “item non-response”, i.e., respondents
answer some of the questions and not others. In this case, missing data can cause seri-
ous biases. However, our missing data problem is exclusively due to “unit non-response”,
which means that some of the chosen sample individuals refuse to be interviewed. How-
ever, in our survey, practically all respondents answered the tax minimum tax question.
Since the questionnaire’s main focus was not on corporate tax competition (only one
out of seven questions was dedicated to this issue), unit non-response can hardly be at-
tributed to this aspect either. King et al. (2001) specify that unlike item non-response,
unit non-responses usually do not introduce much bias into analyses.
Nevertheless, we have to take this issue seriously as our data set may not be representa-
tive of the underlying population, which may be inferred from the response rates which
differ both between member states as well as between political groups. However, since
we are interested in conditional effects (such as the impact of national characteristics
or ideology), the use of regression techniques takes account of these inconveniences. Bi-
ased results may only emerge in the special case of an unobservable variable driving the
response rate and of this variable being correlated with an included explanatory vari-
able. However, similar to most other empirical research designs, we cannot exclude this
problem, but we do not see any theoretical indication why this should be the case in our
empirical design. Moreover, our set of explanatory variables covers a wide spectrum of
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aspects, so that this risk should be limited.
Nevertheless, in the analysis for the EP we apply a weighted estimator where weights
correct for the sample’s selection bias with respect to both country and political group
representation. This means that underrepresented observations receive a larger weight
than overrepresented cases. Furthermore, we allow for clustering of error terms among
MEPs from one political group to cope with problems from the possible omission of
unobservable determinants.
2.5.2 Variable definition
According to our hypotheses formulated above, we make use of variables along three
dimensions, which comprise country characteristics (which depict specific national in-
terests according to the “principal-agent approach”), political ideology (according to the
“ideological approach”) and individual characteristics (which quantify experience, edu-
cation, or political specialisation). Moreover, in addition to those variables which are
under investigation, several control variables are introduced which mainly capture indi-
vidual characteristics for which no clear theoretical expectations exist. In our testing,
we make use of the following variables.9
Country characteristics
The hypotheses formulated with regard to the principal-agent approach are tested by
means of several national characteristics. National preference for redistribution and
social equality is proxied by representative survey results from Eurobarometer (European
Commission, 2007d). The variable Preference for social equality reflects the share of
citizens who answered in the survey that “social equality and solidarity” is a value to be
preserved and reinforced the most, above other values, such as peace, cultural diversity
or entrepreneurship, for instance. Hence, the point of reference of this indicator is not
the current level of social equality in the society (Then, the question would be “Do
you want more or less equality than today?”), but it is rather an abstract preferential
comparison with other positive societal values.
For the corporate tax burden, we employ statutory corporate income tax rates (CITR).
We also experimented with effective average tax rates (EATR) according to the model
of Devereux and Griffith (1999). These are calculated for a profitable investment project
and take account of both statutory tax rates and the detailed provisions of the tax law
such as depreciation provisions. While the latter is a more accurate measure for the
tax burden, the former is probably more familiar to politicians and can be expected to
have a higher impact on their perceptions. However, due to the high correlation between
these two measures, the results do not vary significantly. Moreover, the measure Other
9The sources can be found in Tables 2.8 and 2.9 in the appendix.
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revenues is added, which reflects the amount that indirect taxes, social contributions
and further revenues contribute to the national budget as a share of GDP. This variable
reflects the national dependency on the revenues from corporate taxation, as it can be
expected that a country which covers a bigger part of its public expenditure through
indirect taxes does not have to worry about corporate tax competition to the same
degree.
The agglomeration argument is analysed by means of a self-constructed national ac-
cessibility measure. This is defined as the population-weighted average of potential
accessibility by road of the regions within the respective country. The underlying indi-
cator from the European Spatial Planning Observation Network (ESPON (2007)) can
be regarded as a proxy for the size of the market area which the local producers within
a certain region are faced with.10 To account for differences in the stock of real capital,
the gross value added (GVA) of industry as share of the total GVA (whose lion’s share is
the contribution of the services sector) is used (GVA industry). The size of the countries
is captured by the number of inhabitants (Size).11
The variable national support for EU tax responsibility is measured by means of a sur-
vey conducted by Eurobarometer, which asked citizens in the member states whether
decisions in the area of taxation should be made by the national governments, or jointly
within the European Union (European Commission, 2007a). The variable reflects the
national share of responses in favour of decisions being made jointly within the European
Union.
As a further control variable, a dummy for EU-15 (EU-15 member) was introduced.
The twelve new member states, mainly from Central and Eastern Europe, have common
properties related to their relatively short historical experience of political autonomy,
which is probably also relevant for their view on tax competition. It might be expected
that these countries are particularly keen on retaining their tax autonomy, so that the
sign of the dummy for the old member states is expected to be positive. Finally, national
wealth is added as a control variable; it is proxied by the GDP per capita in purchasing
power (GDP per capita) in 2006.
Ideology
The variables concerning ideology dimensions are taken from the political science liter-
ature on the measurement of ideology. They provide a more straightforward analysis of
10In particular, the value of the indicator is calculated by summing up the population of all European
regions weighted by the time needed to travel there by car in the basis year 2006. This value is then
standardised by dividing it by the European average, which is set at 100; see Vickerman et al. (1999) for
an overview of accessibility indicators. The regional values vary from 1.3 for Dodecanese (a peripheric
Greek archipelago) to 235.4 for the city of Leverkusen in North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany.
11It has also been experimented with the total national GDP as an indicator for a country’s size; the
results do not differ much due to the high correlation between the two variables.
2.5. ECONOMETRIC TESTING 27
the hypotheses on ideology than a simple use of party dummies. The individual scores
for the members of the EP are taken from Hix and Noury (2009), who analyse the
roll call votes from the first half of the sixth European Parliament and apply a scaling
technique to the individual voting behaviour.12 These enable us to test the hypotheses
regarding the politicians’ ideologies directly.13 The two variables assess each MEP’s ide-
ology concerning the two dimensions left/right and anti-/pro-Europe based on his voting
behaviour (recorded roll-call votes) in the first half of the sixth European Parliament:
left/right measures the general left-right dimension, ranging from -1 (left) to +1 (right);
anti-/pro-Europe reflects the attitude towards European integration with the same scale
(-1: anti-Europe; +1: pro-Europe).
Moreover, a measure of national party positions from Benoit and Laver (2006) is used in
the empirical analysis. For the Bundestag, no individual data on the ideological positions
of the representatives is available, so for the sample of all German representatives only
this measure can be used. Compared to the Hix/Noury measure presented above, this
measure is different in its composition: it is based on expert interviews and not on the
purely technical analysis of roll-call votes. However, this data has the advantage that it
offers more dimensions than the two dimensions of the Hix/Noury data set. In addition
to the general left-right definition (left/right (party)) focussing not only on economic
but also on social grounds (such as abortion or homosexuality), a more specific series
asks for the location of each party on an economic policy dimension. This dimension
(taxes vs. spending (party)) refers to the substantive extremes of “promoting raising
taxes to increase public services” and “promoting cutting public services to cut taxes”,
which exactly conforms to our expected main ideological driver for tax harmonisation
preferences.14 In addition, the party groups’ views towards European integration (anti-
/pro-Europe (party)) are included as well in the Benoit/Laver data set, in which one
dimension (denoted as “EU authority” in their book) focuses on the attitude towards an
increase of the range of areas in which the EU can set the policy agenda. All dimensions
are measured on a scale ranging from zero (left and anti-EU, respectively) to twenty
(right and integration friendly, respectively).15
12The values for ten 10 MEPs are missing in the Hix/Noury-dataset. Instead, the values for the
average of the respective country’s political group members were inserted.
13In addition, it was experimented with political group dummies as a proxy for ideology. The results
regarding the effects of membership in different political groups confirm the descriptive findings; the
overall results for the other variables remain constant.
14Few missing values had to be replaced by the values for the respective political group in the EP
from McElroy and Benoit (2007) which applies the same methodology.
15The anti-/pro-Europe (party) variable had to be rescaled to be comparable with the EP dataset, as
in the original contribution a high value indicates an anti-EU attitude.
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Individual characteristics, education and information
Apparently, the socialisation effect can best be captured by the length of membership
in parliament (Years in EP). In addition, Member of ECON committee, the EP com-
mittee on economic and monetary affairs, has been added; this dummy points at the
specialisation of MEPs in the domain of tax policy and can also be seen as a proxy
for socialisation. Members of this committee are expected to show more involvement
in the ambition of the European level to obtain additional competencies in the area of
tax policy. For the members of the Bundestag, the dummy takes the value of one for
members of its pendant to ECON, the “Finanzausschuss”.
The dummy Business/Economic studies takes the value of one for MEPs who declare in
their CVs (available on the website of the EP) to have studied business administration
or economics. This can be regarded as an expert effect, as these MEPs should have
informative advantages with respect to the scientific debate concerning tax competition
as well as with respect to economics in general.
Age and gender of the parliamentarians are added as control variables; with respect to
these personal characteristics we do not have particular expectations about the sign of
the effects.
2.5.3 Results for the European Parliament
In Tables 2.3 to 2.4, the results for the dataset containing the members from the EP
are depicted. The dependent variable are the answers to the question concerning the
desirability of EU-wide obligatory minimum corporate tax rates as presented in section
2.4. Specifications (1) to (5) differ with respect to the included country variables: in
regression (1), no country variables are included. In regression (2), all country variables
are included, and in (3), country variables of (2) which turn out to be insignificant at
the 10% level are excluded. As some of the hypotheses presented above suggest that
the CITR is affected by several of the other exogenous country variables, the problem of
multicollinearity might appear. Therefore, this variable is excluded in specification (4)
due to the possibility of multicollinearity. In (5), the non-significant variables from (4)
are excluded. Finally, specification (6) uses different data to measure ideologies as will
be explained below.
A highly significant impact of ideology on attitudes towards EU tax coordination can
be found as a robust result of all specifications using individual ideology data. The
results confirm our assumptions: In all specifications, the left/right dimension is highly
significant, indicating that MEPs with a left-wing ideology are more supportive of tax
harmonisation than those with a right-wing ideology. However, one has to bear in mind
that this rough measure of the left/right-dimension (which is more of a technical nature
as discussed above) does not only incorporate the politician’s view towards the role
2.5. ECONOMETRIC TESTING 29
Table 2.3: Regression results for European Parliament
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect
Ideology
Left/right -1.873*** -0.450 -2.200*** -0.400 -2.121*** -0.413
(0.529) (0.680) (0.650)
Anti-/pro-Europe 0.683*** 0.164 0.424* 0.079 0.454* 0.088
(0.166) (0.219) (0.238)
Further individual characteristics
Age 0.013* 0.003 0.004 0.001 0.006 0.001
(0.007) (0.010) (0.011)
Gender (male) -0.624* -0.174 -0.463 -0.100 -0.455 -0.102
(0.358) (0.383) (0.313)
Years in EP 0.064** 0.015 0.071*** 0.013 0.058*** 0.011
(0.025) (0.021) (0.020)
Member of ECON committee 0.589*** 0.165 0.587*** 0.133 0.606*** 0.144
(0.131) (0.144) (0.170)
Business / Economic studies -0.537*** -0.117 -0.474** -0.080 -0.438** -0.078
(0.185) (0.194) (0.223)
Country characteristics
CITR 8.209*** 1.525 4.985** 0.971
(3.143) (1.950)
Preference for social equality 6.156*** 1.143 5.067** 0.987
(1.428) (2.389)
Size -0.369*** -0.068 -0.298* -0.058
(0.138) (0.156)




GVA industry -0.084*** -0.015 -0.066*** -0.013
(0.017) (0.015)
EU-15 member -0.534 -0.118
(0.410)
Other revenues -4.910 -0.912 -3.866* -0.753
(3.859) (2.166)
National support of EU tax 0.972 0.181
responsibilities (1.515)
Observations 156 156 156
Prob chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PseudoR2 0.1442 0.2202 0.2087
Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for an obligatory minimum tax rate).
of the state in the area of economics (economic policy left/right dimension), but also
his view towards social policy, so that these two dimensions partly interfere with each
other on the general left/right dimension. To disentangle these effects, in specification
(6) the survey-based values for the ideological positions of the national parties from
Benoit and Laver (2006) are used.16 The two measures for the left-right dimension
are jointly different from zero with a very high significance (p-value: 0.000). However,
only the measure concerning the economic policy position taxes vs. spending appears
individually significant in the regression.
The anti-/pro-Europe dimension is in line with expectations as well: politicians with
a more pro-Europe attitude are more in favour of minimum tax rates than opponents
16Unfortunately, data for the positions towards European integration is not consistently available
from the Benoit and Laver (2006) data set for most countries.
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Table 2.4: Regression results for European Parliament (continued)
(4) (5) (6)
Variable Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect Coefficient Marg. effect
Ideology
Left/right -2.223*** -0.423 -1.986*** -0.409
(0.651) (0.562)
Anti-/pro-Europe 0.372* 0.071 0.419** 0.086
(0.215) (0.186)
Left/right (party) -0.057 -0.011
(0.051)
Taxes vs. spending (party) -0.071* -0.014
(0.043)
Further individual characteristics
Age 0.004 0.001 0.005 0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Gender (male) -0.513 -0.115 -0.567 -0.138 -0.529 -0.126
(0.396) (0.404) (0.406)
Years in EP 0.071*** 0.014 0.065*** 0.013 0.079*** 0.016
(0.024) (0.021) (0.023)
Member of ECON committee 0.604*** 0.141 0.617*** 0.154 0.500*** 0.119
(0.153) (0.215) (0.182)





Preference for social equality 6.635*** 1.263 5.348** 1.102 8.303*** 1.687
(1.550) (2.312) (1.558)
Size -0.205 -0.039 -0.370*** -0.075
(0.129) (0.106)
GDP per capita -0.009 -0.002 -0.002 -0.000
(0.008) (0.007)
Accessibility 0.004* 0.001 -0.001 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.003) (0.002) (0.005)
GVA industry -0.076*** -0.014 -0.065*** -0.013 -0.080*** -0.016
(0.016) (0.018) (0.018)
EU-15 member 0.473 0.077 -0.736* -0.185
(0.510) (0.422)
Other revenues -4.731 -0.901 -4.295 -0.872
(4.326) (3.785)
National support of EU tax 1.851 0.352 1.570 0.319
responsibilities (1.937) (1.959)
Observations 156 156 153
Prob chi2 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
PseudoR2 0.2108 0.1948 0.2100
Marginal effects are calculated for answer class +4 (strongest support for an obligatory minimum tax rate).
of European integration. Interestingly enough, the marginal effects of the two ideology
variables show pronounced quantitative differences. In most specifications, the marginal
effect of the left/right dimension is more than 4 times higher than the marginal effect
of the pro-/anti-EU dimension, which suggests that the former is of decisive importance
for the MEP’s attitude. The marginal effects can be interpreted as follows: a shift of 1
point on the left-right axis (which is approximately the gap between the German post-
communist PDS and the British Conservatives) to the left increases the probability by
around 40% of stating a high support for minimum tax rates. Correspondingly, a shift of
1 point upwards on the anti-/pro-Europe axis (which is about the difference between the
EU-sceptic UEN group and the Social Democrats) increases the probability by around
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8%.
Regarding the hypotheses on the individual characteristics, a robust finding can again
be made: MEPs with an academic background in economics/business administration
show less sympathy towards minimum tax rates. This indicates that among parliamen-
tarians from these professions a more positive view towards tax competition prevails
than among parliamentarians with other professions. Out of the other individual char-
acteristics, there are two which deliver significant results: MEPs who have been longer
in the EP and those who are members of the Committee on Economic and Monetary
Affairs are more supportive of tax coordination. This indicates that those politicians
with a longer individual history of political socialisation and assimilation in the Euro-
pean Parliament, as well as those who – as members of the ECON – are more exposed to
a European perspective on economic policy have a supportive position.17 This supports
our assumption of a socialisation effect in the EP, which suggests that the length of
membership in the Parliament and the membership in the ECON play a role in moving
individual views away from national interests towards a European perspective. Interest-
ingly enough, this result contrasts with Scully (2005) who doesn’t find an impact of the
length of membership in the EP on the general support for integration of a MEP.
With respect to the country characteristics, a robust significant impact of several vari-
ables can be found. In all specifications, the national corporate tax rate (measured
as CITR) has a highly significant positive impact. This confirms our assumption that
mainly representatives from high tax countries strive for mandatory minimum tax rates
in order to protect themselves against competition with their European neighbours.
One of the main predictions from standard tax competition models, i.e., that national
attitudes towards redistribution have an impact on the politicians’ attitudes towards tax
competition, can be confirmed. A positive significant impact can be observed for the
national preferences for social equality, which is in line with our assumption that tax
competition is feared in these countries because it puts pressure on the national welfare
state.
However, some further assumptions derived from tax competition models cannot be cor-
roborated, namely that smaller countries are more resistant against limiting tax compe-
tition, as well as the hypothesis that countries which benefit from agglomeration effects
express more support for minimum tax rates. Size even shows a significant negative im-
pact in many specifications. This might indicate that tax competition is not consistently
regarded as beneficial in countries which are – following theoretical tax competition mod-
els – assumed to gain from it. However, since even the largest country in the EU only
contains about 16 percent of the total population, one might argue that if one takes
17Note that this effect is converse to the effect of economic expertise proxied by a final degree in
economics or business administration and that the coefficients are even similar in size. This might give
rise to concerns about multicollinearity in case that committee membership was highly correlated with
economic expertise. However, this correlation is only 13.9%, so that this concern is of minor importance.
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these tax competition models literally, all countries should be regarded as “small”, which
would imply that all EU countries would benefit from harmonisation, regardless of size.
For the agglomeration effects, measured by the accessibility variable which indicates po-
tential market access, only in one case the expected positive sign appears significantly;
this effect turns out to be insignificant in all other specifications.
Finally, the hypothesis that parliamentarians from countries which do not have to fear
corporate tax competition to a high degree because of their higher share in real capital
are less supportive of minimum tax rates can be affirmed; as expected, the impact is
negative and significant for all specifications. The share of indirect taxes and other
public revenues turns out to have a negative effect on the support for minimum tax
rates as expected, but this is often not significant. Further national characteristics do
not disclose a significant effect for almost all specifications. This holds true for the
national support of assigning tax responsibilities to the EU level as well. Attempting to
replace this variable with the results of a Eurobarometer survey asking for the general
attitude towards the EU did not have a significant impact on the results, either.
2.5.4 Results for German politicians
In the following, we turn to a sample consisting exclusively out of German politicians. In
Table 2.5, the results for the regressions of pooled answers from the German participants
of our EP survey and those who participated in the Bundestag survey are presented.
In addition to the individual characteristics introduced above, a further control variable
is added: the origin of a parliamentarian from the Eastern (formerly communist) part
of Germany is captured by a dummy. This is a standard procedure for analyses of
German politicians’ attitudes (see, e.g., Heinemann and Janeba, 2011), since differences
in attitudes regarding the economic policy are still notable between Western and Eastern
Germany as shown by Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007). However, this dummy turns
out to be insignificant for all specifications. In contrast to the findings above for the EP
data, the educational background shows the same sign, but slightly misses significance.
The further individual characteristics display insignificant results as well. Interestingly
enough, the sign for the committee membership becomes negative when the membership
in the Bundestag’s committee on financial affairs is regarded in addition to membership
in the ECON. This supports the conjecture that the positive effect found in the EP
regression is indeed due to a socialisation effect.
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The results for the ideology characteristics are in line with the previous findings. Again,
members of parties with a more positive attitude towards European integration tend to
support minimum tax rates. However, the inclusion of the economic policy dimension
renders the effect of the general left/right dimension insignificant. The taxes vs. spending
dimension itself is highly significant in all specifications. This offers further support to
the assumption that – among the many different aspects of the left/right dimension –
it is primarily the politician’s attitude towards public spending that shapes the support
for tax harmonisation. Moreover, in specification (3) party dummies are used with
the German social democratic SPD chosen as reference category. The results confirm
our expectation, with the economic liberal FDP and the Christian Democrats (CDU)
showing significantly less support. The strongest support for minimum tax rates comes
from the former East German communist party (Die Linke), which holds the furthest
left position in the German party spectrum; however, their coefficient does not differ
significantly from that of the SPD.
Regarding the question whether attitudes differ between the EP and the Bundestag
representatives, two approaches are applied in order to investigate whether German
politicians on the European level differ in their attitudes: a dummy, which has the value
of one for a German MEP and zero for a member of the Bundestag (specification (1)),
and the number of years of membership in the EP, which is zero for parliamentarians of
the Bundestag and which depicts the increasing socialisation of German politicians in
the EP over time (plus a quadratic term in order to capture a possible nonlinear rela-
tionship, specification (2)). In order to allow for differences between the political groups,
interaction terms of party dummies and an EP dummy are introduced in specifications
(3) and (4).
The results of all approaches show no significant results indicating different attitudes of
the German EP and the Bundestag representatives. Moreover, the inclusion of interac-
tion terms (party dummies * EP dummy) does not provide significant results for any
of the political groups, either. Therefore, the objection that European parliamentari-
ans might have different attitudes towards EU-wide obligatory corporate tax rates than
representatives at the national level cannot be confirmed by the data on German politi-
cians. These results are similar to those of Scully (2005) who doesn’t find pronounced
differences in the attitudes towards European integration between MEPs and national
delegates, either.
2.6 Conclusions
This chapter contributes to filling a serious gap in the tax competition literature. In-
stead of treating tax policy decision-making as a black box conducted by monolithic
“countries”, we focus on important individual policy actors in the Parliaments and their
attitudes. Through this political-economic approach we are able to answer the positive
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question which personal characteristics and interests are the relevant drivers of harmon-
isation processes.
We find that ideology is indeed important, as it was anticipated: our hypotheses of the
driving motives being connected with ideology can be confirmed by the available data.
Politicians on the left side of the political spectrum offer the strongest support for the
introduction of minimum tax rates, whereas members from the right – and especially
those with a market liberal position – as well as EU-sceptical politicians tend to oppose
a harmonisation. The analysis based on the measures of individual ideology positions
reveals that particularly the left-right dimension shapes the attitude towards tax har-
monisation. Furthermore, a major influence on attitudes can be ascribed to individual
characteristics, referring to the experience of the parliamentarians. It turns out that
parliamentarians with an academic background in economics or business administration
tend to have a more positive attitude towards tax competition. Politicians with a longer
membership in the EP or those who belong to the committee which deals with economic
affairs are more supportive of harmonisation, which confirms our expectation of a so-
cialisation effect. However, in addition to individual characteristics, national interests
proxied by country indicators play an important role, as well. This is most notably the
case for the current national level of corporate taxation, which has a widespread influ-
ence. Politicians from countries with high corporate tax burdens are highly supportive
of minimum tax rates, as this protects them against competition with other EU member
states. Moreover, one important prediction of tax competition models transpires to have
an impact on the politicians’ attitude towards tax competition, which is the citizens’
preference for social equality. This reflects the fear of politicians from countries with
a strong support for social equality of tax competition indeed leading to a “race to the
bottom” and putting pressure on the welfare state. However, some other predictions
from tax competition models seem to play a minor role in the opinion formation process
of politicians.
Regardless of this, our EP-Bundestag comparison reveals that, at least for Germany, the
attitudes towards the issue follows very similar patterns when studying parliamentarians
at the national level. It is not possible to detect divergent attitudes, neither on the
aggregate level, nor for any of the German parties.
Overall, our results add an important aspect to the tax competition literature which is
largely dominated by normative approaches based on welfare theory. We have been able
to show that stated preferences of real life policy makers concerning tax harmonisation
are shaped by a much wider spectrum of factors than theory would suggest, ranging
from ideology and individual characteristics to specific national interests. This could
help explain why the actual tax policy in Europe and elsewhere regularly follows very
different avenues than what is recommended in the public finance literature.
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2.7 Appendix
Table 2.6: Response rate by political group








GUE-NGL Socialism, communism 41 5 12.20%





NI Non-attached members 13 3 23.08%
PES Social democracy 216 50 23.15%
Greens-EFA Green, regionalism 42 6 14.29%
UEN National conservatism 44 10 22.73%
Total 785 158 20.13%
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Table 2.7: Response rate by country
Country Number of seats Responses Response rate
AT 18 7 38.89%
BE 24 6 25.00%
BG 18 1 5.56%
CY 6 1 16.67%
CZ 24 5 20.83%
DE 99 40 40.40%
DK 14 4 28.57%
EE 6 0 0.00%
ES 54 4 7.41%
FI 14 4 28.57%
FR 78 16 20.51%
UK 78 13 16.67%
GR 24 1 4.17%
HU 24 5 20.83%
IE 13 3 23.08%
IT 78 8 10.26%
LT 13 3 23.08%
LU 6 2 33.33%
LV 9 2 22.22%
MT 5 0 0.00%
NL 27 3 11.11%
PL 54 10 18.52%
PT 24 7 29.17%
RO 35 4 11.43%
SE 19 4 21.05%
SI 7 1 14.29%
SK 14 4 28.57%
Total 785 158 20.13%
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Table 2.8: Descriptive Statistics for European Parliament dataset




Left/right 0.09 -0.80 0.99 0.32 “left-right” dimension measured by Hix and
Noury (2009) for individual MEPs; ranging
from -1 (left) to +1 (right)
Anti-/pro-Europe 0.35 -0.72 0.99 0.47 “anti-/pro-Europe policy preferences” dimen-
sion measured by Hix and Noury (2009) for in-
dividual MEPs; ranging from -1 (anti-Europe)
to +1 (pro-Europe)
Personal information
Age 52.5 30 76 10.2 Calculated as 2007 minus year of birth
Gender 0.74 0 1 0.44 Male set at 1
Years in EP 6.82 0 28 5.86 Calculated as 2007 minus year of first EP en-
try, source: official statement on the EP home-
page
Member of ECON commit-
tee
0.18 0 1 0.39 Set at 1 if member of committee on Economic
and Monetary Affairs which deals with eco-
nomic and monetary policies in the Union, as
well as tax provisions; source: official state-
ments on the EP homepage
Business/ Economic stud-
ies
0.25 0 1 0.44 Tertiary education in business administration
or economics
Country characteristics
CITR 0.29 0.10 0.39 0.08 2006 statutory corporate income tax rate,
source: IBFD European Tax Handbook 2006
(IBFD, 2006)
National preference for so-
cial equality
0.37 0.23 0.54 0.07 Share of answers “Social equality and solidar-
ity” as value which should be preserved and
reinforced the most in our current society,
source: Special Eurobarometer 278, European
Commission (2007d)
Size 2.97 -0.92 4.41 1.42 Natural logarithm of number of inhabitants in
million, source: Eurostat database
GDP per capita 94.71 35.70 267.80 30.87 In PPS with EU25=100 for the year 2006,
source: Eurostat database
Accessibility 91.61 4.1 203.7 55.33 Indicator calculated as the population-
weighted average of the potential accessibility
by road of all regions within a country in
2006, EU27=100, source: ESPON (2007)
GVA industry 22.81 10.79 38.08 5.65 Gross value added of industry as share of
all branches in 2006 (2000 prices), source:
AMECO database
EU-15 member 0.73 0 1 0.45 Old members of EU (EU15) set at 1, others at
0
Other revenues 0.31 0.22 0.38 0.04 Total current revenue minus current taxes on
income and wealth, share of GDP for 2006,
source: European Commission (2007b)
National preference for
taxation
0.28 0.09 0.45 0.08 Share of answers who think that decisions in
the area of taxation should be made jointly
within the European Union, Source: Euro-
barometer 67, European Commission (2007a)
Number of observations: 156. Source: European Parliament if no other source is named.
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Left/right (party) 10.42 3.6 13.6 3.78 “left-right” dimension measured by Benoit and
Laver (2006) for national parties; ranging from
0 (left) to 20 (right)
Anti-/pro-Europe (party) 9.74 6.9 10.8 1.36 “anti-/pro-Europe policy preferences” dimen-
sion measured by Benoit and Laver (2006) for
national parties; ranging from 0 (anti-Europe)
to 20 (pro-Europe)
Taxes vs. spending (party) 12.09 3.00 18.70 4.95 “taxes vs. spending” dimension; measured by
Benoit and Laver (2006) for national parties
ranging from 0 (high spending) to 20 (low
taxes).
ALDE/FDP 0.18 0 1 0.39 Affiliation with ALDE or FDP set at 1, all
other set at 0
EPP-ED/CDU 0.37 0 1 0.49 Affiliation with EPP-ED or CDU/CSU set at
1, all other set at 0
GUE-NGL/Linke 0.15 0 1 0.36 Affiliation with GUE-NGL or Die Linke set at
1, all other set at 0
Greens-EFA/Die Grünen 0.08 0 1 0.27 Affiliation with Greens-EFA or Bündnis
90/Die Grünen set at 1, all other set at 0
Personal information
Age 49.7 23 69 9.8 Calculated as 2007 minus year of birth
Gender 0.68 0 1 0.47 Male set at 1
Business/ Economic stud-
ies
0.20 0 1 0.40 Tertiary education in business administration
or economics
Member of ECON commit-
tee / Finanzausschuss
0.19 0 1 0.40 Set at 1 if MEP and member of committee on
Economic and Monetary Affairs which deals
with economic and monetary policies in the
Union, as well as tax provisions, or if member
of the Bundestag and member of the Finan-
zausschuss; source: official statements on the
EP homepage
Eastern Germany 0.20 0 1 0.40 Set at 1 if elected in an eastern German con-
stituency
Years in EP 1.73 0 28 4.42 Calculated as 2007 minus year of first EP en-
try, source: official statement on the EP home-
page
EP Dummy 0.20 0 1 0.40 Set at 1 if MEP
Number of observations: 194; Source: European Parliament or Bundestag if no other source is named.
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Chapter 3
Political Determinants of Corporate
Taxation in Europe
3.1 Introduction
Over the last years, a number of empirical studies1 have been published that have signif-
icantly improved our understanding of corporate tax competition in the wake of globali-
sation. These works mainly focus on the effects of globalisation and strategic interaction
with neighbouring countries on the national level of corporate taxation. However, the
effects of political factors on corporate taxation and in particular the impact of partisan
politics have been widely neglected in the related literature. The purpose of this chapter
is to extend this existing literature in two directions. First, we extend the theoretical and
empirical literature on international corporate tax policy by emphasising the relevance
of politics in explaining corporate taxation at the national level. Second, we propose the
application of an innovative measure of political ideologies which allows for more elab-
orate analyses of partisan effects on public finance outcomes than the measures which
are conventionally employed in the public economics literature.
The related empirical works do not offer much evidence concerning the role of national
decision-making processes in the international tax competition game. Instead, the ex-
isting literature seems to insinuate that corporate tax policy is an almost automatic
process in which governments inevitably lower their taxes due to the external pressure
created by increasing capital mobility or tax cuts of neighbouring countries. This view
also gets its support from the theoretical literature, which is dominated by the Downsian
approach to policy convergence, reflected in the assumption that policy makers refer to
the median voter’s utility as determinant for their decisions. In this chapter, we extend
the traditional tax competition model by assuming heterogeneous decision-makers who
1See, among several others: Slemrod (2004); Devereux et al. (2008); Haufler et al. (2009); Ghinamo
et al. (2010); Overesch and Rincke (forthcoming).
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are at the one hand driven by self-interest in the political outcome and at the other
hand differ in their perceptions of capital mobility. Then, two channels can be identified
which point to different tax reaction functions of left-wing and right-wing politicians:
differences in public good preferences as well as ideological and individual biases in the
perception of capital mobility. Both channels imply that right-wing incumbents set lower
corporate tax rates.
The existing empirical studies hardly take account of such political factors, while only a
few of these papers control for political aspects such as the composition of government;
robust evidence is scarce. This is surprising given the bulk of evidence for partisan
politics, especially in expenditure policies. Moreover, most recent elite survey-based
evidence by Heinemann and Janeba (2011) and the evidence presented in Chapter 2
hints at the relevance of political ideologies concerning related aspects of corporate tax
policies, such as the perception of the restrictions imposed by tax competition on national
tax autonomy and preferences for corporate tax harmonisation in Europe. Moreover,
further factors that might influence corporate taxation at the national level have been
widely ignored in the related economic literature, e.g., the importance of fragmentation
of national governments as well as the educational background of heads of government;
the latter has only most recently attracted some attention in the literature on fiscal
policy outcomes. Thus, the aim of the empirical part of the chapter is to unite these
strands of literature in order to investigate the political determinants of corporate tax
policies in Europe in the past 30 years, which exist beyond the widely analysed factors
related to globalisation.
The methodological innovation of this chapter is to integrate an innovative measure of
political ideologies in the empirical public finance literature. As we will show below, it is
vital to pursue high standards of data sources, as both relevant variables, corporate tax
burden, and especially political ideology cannot be expressed by one catch-all variable.
In this regard, we make use of two data sets which overcome many drawbacks of earlier
studies. First, we use forward looking measures of corporate tax burdens, which have
become standard in the empirical analysis of strategic interaction in corporate tax com-
petition, but did not find much application beyond this regard and none in the related
works in political economics. Second, we apply data on ideological positions derived
from the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) data set, which is based on the content
analysis of party manifestos. This data enables much more sophisticated analyses of
partisan politics than the data usually applied in public finance, which is almost exclu-
sively built on the use of dummies reflecting party family classifications. Furthermore,
the latter data has several disadvantages in panel analyses, which are resolved by our
measure. In particular, our new data enables us to exploit international differences of
party ideologies and their changes over time. Moreover, we are able to disaggregate
positions concerning different policy areas, which allows us a more explicit analysis of
partisan effects on fiscal policy.
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The structure of the chapter is as follows: section 3.2 presents the theoretical background
for our analysis. In addition, the related empirical literature is stated. In section 3.3, we
present the used data and, in particular, we discuss the application of data on political
ideologies in explaining fiscal policy outcomes. The fourth section presents and discusses
the empirical findings. Section 3.5 concludes.
3.2 Ideology in corporate tax competition
3.2.1 Basic model
The early theoretical literature on corporate tax competition, originating from the sem-
inal works by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986) and Wilson (1986), does not deliver clear
predictions on potential influences of partisan politics. In this kind of model taxes
are usually assumed to be determined by benevolent decision-makers who maximise the
utility of a representative household or the median voter of the jurisdiction. Political ide-
ologies are only relevant in the models of Persson and Tabellini (1992, 1994), which both
claim that the median voter might have an interest to delegate tax policies to a politician
with an ideological position different from his own one. Nevertheless, these models do
not give leeway for partisan politics in corporate taxation either, as the decision-maker
still implements the policy preferred by the median-voter, and delegation is only owed to
commitment problems in their two-period game structure. Consequently, differences in
the political couleur of the decision-maker should have no effect on the policy outcome
in all of these models.
Many subsequent works consider the individuals acting as decision-maker as being non-
benevolent. However, in this literature non-benevolence is not modelled by a political
ideology of the decision-maker which differs from that of the median voter, but by
a predefined self-interest of the decision-maker, which is reflected in his striving for
political rents.2 Only most recently models have emerged which consider politics in
corporate taxation more explicitly. Janeba and Schjelderup (2009) show that political
institutions are decisive in answering the question whether tax competition is welfare
improving when politicians are rent-seeking or have exogenous benefits from holding
office. Similarly, Eggert and Sørensen (2008) analyse the question in a probabilistic
voting model under the premise that politicians seek reelection by distributing rents to
employees of the public sector.
Beyond these approaches which link theoretical models of corporate tax competition to
politics, the related theoretical literature is relatively scarce concerning the consider-
ation of political distortions. However, the inclusion of a political bias in a standard
2Non-benevolence is integrated in the early models by considering that the maximisation of public
revenue enters the decision maker’s utility function (see Edwards and Keen (1996)).
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tax competition model is straightforward, as will be demonstrated in the following. To
illustrate this, we use a model with n jurisdictions all inhabited by the identical num-
ber of citizens normalised to unity3 which compete for completely mobile capital. For
illustrative reasons, we make some assumptions about the functional form, which have
become standard in the literature (see, e.g., Bucovetsky, 2009, or Brueckner and Saave-
dra, 2001). Following these works, we assume a quadratic production function for each
jurisdiction, so that the output per capita in jurisdiction i depends on the locally em-
ployed capital per capita (ki) and is defined as fi(ki) = aki − b2k2i . The constant-return
to scale technology is assumed to be identical for all jurisdictions. Each individual is
initially endowed with a capital amount of k¯, so that in the capital market equilibrium
it has to hold that
n∑
i=1
ki ≤ nk¯. (3.1)
Capital is assumed to be completely mobile. This implies that the net return of capital
ρ (which is assumed to be positive) has to be equal in all jurisdictions, so that
ρ = a− bki − ti = a− bkj − tj (3.2)
for each j 6= i. Finally, following the papers stated above we assume that the utility
function of the representative citizen in jurisdiction i has a linear form:
ui = ci + αgi (3.3)
with α > 1 denoting the marginal utility of public consumption (gi) over the consumption
of a private numeraire good (ci). Private consumption originates from the compensation
of a fixed factor employed in local production (whose supply is fixed to unity), plus
the interest payment received for the supply of the initial capital endowment, so that
ci = fi(ki)− f ′i(ki)ki +ρk¯ = aki− b2k2i − (a− bki)ki + (a− bki− ti)k¯. Public consumption
is financed by a source tax on invested capital, so that the following public budget
constraint has to hold: gi = tiki.
Using (1) and (2), we can derive the quantity of capital allocated to jurisdiction i subject
to its own tax rate (ti) and the vector of tax rates of the other jurisdictions, j 6= i, i.e.
({tj}):








tj − (n− 1
n
)ti) (3.4)
From this, we obtain the partial derivatives of the capital allocation in i and the interest
rate with respect to the own tax rate, which are:
3The consideration of unequal sizes simply adds the standard result of higher corporate taxation in
larger jurisdictions, which is well-known from Bucovetsky (1991), but does not affect the further results.















In the benchmark case, the decision-maker of each jurisdiction i takes the tax rates of
his competitors as given and chooses his own tax rate in order to maximise the utility
of his representative citizen. Differentiation of the utility function with respect to ti and






k¯) + α(ki + ti
∂ki
∂ti
) = 0. (3.7)
Inserting the values of ki, ∂ki∂ti and
∂ρ
∂ti
as calculated above, we can now solve the expression
for ti. This delivers us the tax reaction curve as perceived by jurisdiction i, with its tax
rate depending on the vector of all other tax rates t = (t1, ..., tn−1) as well as the total
number of competing jurisdictions, n:
ti =
(1− n+ nα)∑n−1j=1 tj + bk¯n2(α− 1)
(n− 1)(1 + n(2α− 1)) (3.8)
The resulting tax reaction function of i incorporates some stylised facts which are well-
known from the related empirical literature on international corporate tax competition in
Europe (which will be presented in the next subsection): the tax rate depends positively
on the competitors’ tax rates ( ∂ti
∂tj
> 0), which accounts for the well-established finding
of strategic interaction in tax setting; the tax reaction function shifts downward with an
increase in the number of competitors n, (∂ti
∂n
< 0). Given all tj are equal, ti declines in n
which reflects the negative impact of intensifying competition (e.g., due to globalisation
or the appearance of new competitors after the fall of the iron curtain) on corporate
taxes. Based on this reaction curve, the Nash solution for all tax rates can then be
determined as the intersection of the tax reaction curves of all n jurisdictions, which
implies a symmetric solution.
3.2.2 Integrating ideological bias
Up to this point, our model is dominated by the Downsian view of political competition,
which assumes that politicians in power are only interested in maximising their chances
of reelection. Then, they unambiguously choose the same tax rate ti in order to maximise
the median voter’s utility (while taking the median’s preference parameter α as given)
without consideration of their own interests. In this framework, which is basically at the
bottom of most theoretical contributions to the tax competition literature, the identity of
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the decision-maker, such as ideological background which is reflected in party affiliation,
has no effect on the tax level. The tax rate is then only determined by the external
factors as shown above.
An explanation for the actual relevance of partisan politics can be found in the model
by Calvert (1985).4 His model assumes a self-interest of the candidates concerning the
political outcome in combination with the assumption that candidates are uncertain
about the reaction of the voters (i.e., a probabilistic voting model).5 For simplicity,
assume that outcomes can be ordered in a one dimensional issue space, and citizens’
(i.e., voters and candidates) preferences on the outcome are single-peaked. Then, two
candidates with preferred outcomes at opposite sides of the median voter’s preferred
outcome face a trade-off when moving towards the median voter’s position: at the one
hand it increases their probability of winning which allows them the implementation
of policy; at the other other hand, any move away from their optimal policy outcome
reduces the utility which they derive from the implementation of policy. In the Nash
equilibrium, partial convergence takes place, but the chosen platforms still differ from
that of the median voter. The introduction of this kind of policy divergence into our
simple tax competition model is straightforward, and leads to two different explanations
for a political bias in corporate tax policy, (i) due to diverging preferences of incumbents,
and (ii) due to diverging perceptions of capital mobility.
Concerning diverging preferences, we assume that the candidates’ platforms reflect their
preferences for public goods. In this regard, the ideological continuum which is consis-
tently regarded as the most relevant in European national politics is the dichotomy of
left and right: leftist politicians feel more committed to an electorate which is poorer
than the average, so that they have a stronger interest in redistributive spending and a
higher level of public expenditure (see, e.g., Benoit and Laver (2006)), and the right vice
versa. This divergence of preferences for public goods spending enters our model via the
variable α, which was in our basic model assumed to be the representative citizen’s (or
median voter’s) preference for public goods. Due to the assumption of convergence to
the median based on the Downsian model, this variable was assumed to be identical for
every decision-maker notwithstanding his identity, e.g. his political affiliation. However,
assuming a preference-motivated partisan effect on tax setting, we therefore have to in-
sert a diverging preference parameter αd for decision-maker d, with αd defined over the
ideological continuum. Due to the partial convergence assumption it has to hold that
1 < αˆr ≤ αr < αm < αl ≤ αˆl, for m=median, r=right and l=left; the values with “hat”
4Some further explanations for deviations from the Downsian prediction of policy convergence exist,
such as citizen-candidate models with entry costs (Osborne and Slivinski (1996)), or models of strategic
extremism which emerges due to information imperfection (Carrillo and Castanheira (2008)) or due
to abstention of voters (Glaeser et al. (2005)). See Fiorina (1999) for an extensive survey on further
approaches.
5Note that the models by Persson and Tabellini (2002, 2004) also assume that candidates are inter-
ested in the policy outcome, but the deterministic voting procedure still leads to policy convergence to
the median voter’s preferred outcome.
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denote the most preferred parameters for the two parties, respectively. Consequently,
the platform chosen by the leftist decision-maker yields a value for the parameter α
which is between his optimal point αˆl and the median voter’s preferred value αm, and
strictly higher than the value at the platform of the right-wing candidate, which is αr.
The decision-maker’s position is thus determined by two elements: the preferences of
the (median) voter and by his own ideology. This is related to the prominent question
whether voters elect or select policies. However, this question is beyond the scope of this
chapter, and it needs a completely different research design (see, e.g., Lee et al., 2004).
It cannot answered based on our data, since in reality only the party’s actual position
in a certain policy area is observable (see subsection 3.3.2), and neither the party’s nor
the median voter’s optimal position.
Comparative statics of the tax reaction function (3.8) yields ∂ti
∂αd
> 0, which leads to our
first testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.1. We expect a more leftist politician to impose a higher tax on capital,
as he has a higher preference for public goods.
However, it is important to point out that this kind of hypothesised ideological bias
on corporate tax setting is exclusively driven by diverging partisan attitudes towards
public expenditure. Any left-right discrepancies in other political areas, such as societal
policies, should not have an impact on corporate taxes via this channel.
We then determine the cross derivative of the capital tax rate with respect to the prefer-
ence parameter αd and n. The latter represents the number of competitors in our model




which indicates that the effect of the preference parameter on the tax level – which was
found before – is mitigated by an increasing number of competitors. This leads to our
second hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.2. An increasing intensity of competition reduces the partisan effect on
corporate tax setting.
Secondly, politics can also have an impact on fiscal policy outcomes through different
perceptions of the environment. In this regard, the mobility of capital (∂ki
∂ti
) plays a
crucial role in the model presented above. As is customary in standard tax competition
models, it is assumed that the decision-maker has complete knowledge of this elastic-
ity. Such a strong assumption, however, is problematic, as in reality the elasticity is
unobservable. Therefore, we assume that capital mobility enters the tax reaction func-
tion with a subjective error d of the policy-maker d6, so that the perceived elasticity






+ d. Inserting this
6With d > −(n−1n )( 1b ), so that the reaction of capital on increasing taxes is in any case negative.
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expression into the tax reaction function gives us the new expression:




2 + bk¯(−1 + n(1 + α(nα− 1))))d
(n− 1)(1 + n(2α− 1))((n− 1)(n− 1− 2nα) + bn(1 + n(α− 1))d) (3.9)




< 0, thus a perception of higher mobility induces the choice
of a lower corporate tax rate.
In the literature, two different sources of biased perceptions are discussed. First, in case
biased perceptions of capital mobility are systematically linked to political platforms,
a partisan bias in corporate tax setting would emerge. This claim can be confirmed
by most recent evidence from Heinemann and Janeba (2011). In a survey directed at
parliamentarians of the German parliament (Bundestag), they disclose that left-wing
and right-wing politicians differ significantly in their perceptions of capital mobility,
with left ones assuming real capital to be less mobile and investing decisions to be less
dependent on taxation than right-wing politicians perceive it.7 This leads to our next
testable hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3.3. Biased perceptions of capital mobility again imply that left-wing
decision-makers tend to levy higher corporate taxes than their right-wing counterparts.
Second, Heinemann and Janeba (2011) discuss that systematically biased perceptions
might also be caused by the individual background of politicians. In particular, they
argue that the educational specialisation should contribute to the degree of information
about globalisation restrictions which directly impacts the mobility of capital. Most
recent evidence from Dreher et al. (2009) shows that the educational backgrounds of
heads of government indeed have a significant impact on policy outcomes, such as the
implementation of market-liberalising reforms.
Hypothesis 3.4. Biased perceptions of capital mobility that are induced by individual
characteristics of the decision-maker, such as his educational background, also affect the
level of corporate taxation.
However, other strands of literature suggest that the partisan effect on corporate taxation
might even be quite the opposite from our execrations sketched above. This view can
be justified by the argument from Cukierman and Tommasi (1998) that unpopular but
necessary political decisions (such as which cuts in corporate taxation are to be regarded)
are more easily implemented by “unusual characters”.8 In the same vein, Garrett (1995)
claims that left-wing governments have to pay a “political premium” in form of lower
7The mechanism behind the finding, however, remains unclear, but it may be conjectured that
politicians’ perceptions on these matters are at least partly shaped by the direct contact with interest
groups (e.g., entrepreneurs in the case of right-wing politicians), so that the bias could be attributed to
different preferences of related interest groups.
8One anecdotal example for this view is the tax reform in Germany in 2000, which was implemented
by a left-wing coalition of social democrats and the green party after many years of inaction under a
right-wing led coalition.
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corporate tax rates in order to attract investors.
The objective of the following empirical section is to disclose whether the effects outlined
above did in fact play a significant role in the explanation of European corporate tax
policies in the last decades.
3.2.3 Empirical findings of partisan effects
The impact of partisanship on fiscal policy has frequently been analysed in the empirical
public finance literature. However, the lion’s share of empirical studies focuses on the
expenditure side of the public budgets. The most recent panel-analysis for OECD coun-
tries in the 1980s and 90s by Potrafke (2009) reveals that left-wing governments spent
more on social expenditures than their right-wing counterparts in times when globalisa-
tion was proceeding faster; however, generally speaking, partisan effects weakened in the
1990s. The work by Cusack (1997) using earlier data on OECD countries identifies the
presence of partisan policies in expenditure policies as well.9 Interestingly enough, with
regard to expenditure policies, both works find evidence in support of the hypothesis
that the effect of partisan politics has declined over time. From the studies on public ex-
penditures, only Bräuninger (2005) uses data based on party manifestos similar to ours
(see next section); he shows that only ideological differences defined as programmatic
preferences have an impact on the level and mix of expenditure.
In contrast to the literature concerning expenditure policies, taxation in general and
corporate taxation in particular, have scarcely been analysed directly in the economic
literature on partisan politics.10 This is remarkable, since a large number of papers with
the objective of explaining the evolution of corporate taxation in the past decades has
been published most recently. These papers, however, primarily focus on the impact
of globalisation on corporate taxation (by using different measures such as trade and
financial openness, or sophisticated composite indicators), or they concentrate on the
direct interaction of countries in the tax-setting game for mobile capital by applying
sophisticated empirical techniques borrowed from spatial econometrics.
Some of these papers make use of political control variables (see Table 3.1 for an overview
of recent works including political variables) – but by no means all of them, as even
one of the most cited studies, Slemrod (2004), dismisses a possible partisan impact in
its empirical model. The results concerning partisan effects are mixed: most do not
discover any significant effect at all, and for those studies which do uncover an effect,
the direction of the partisan effect is ambiguous. In these works, both left-wing and
right-wing governments are found to provide a higher taxation of companies.
9For earlier evidence in the same direction, see, e.g., de Haan and Sturm (1994).
10Few works focus on partisan effects on taxation at the subnational level. Reed (2006) finds evidence
for partisan effects for US state legislatures on the personal tax burden, and Allers et al. (2001) for
property taxation of Dutch municipalities.
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Remarkable differences can be detected for works published in journals either with a
focus on economics or political science. First, some articles of the latter group offer
a much wider spectrum of variables concerning political ideology (such as government
fragmentation) and a more sophisticated measurement of ideology as discussed below,
while the papers from the economic literature almost exclusively rely on simple dummy
variables which indicate the ideology of the government. Second, there is a tendency in
the economic literature to apply a much wider spectrum of measures of corporate tax
burdens than in political science, where usually the method proposed by Mendoza et al.
(1994) (MRT in the table) is applied. Their method, however, has several drawbacks
for the analysis of the question at hand, as will be discussed in the data section.
3.2.4 Effect of government fragmentation
A further political effect that has been widely neglected in the economic literature on
corporate tax policy is the relevance of government fragmentation and the influences of
veto power in decision-making. Only few related political science papers consider the
inclusion of variables related to the fragmentation of governments in their regressions
(Basinger and Hallerberg (2004) and Hallerberg and Basinger (1998)). This is remark-
able, since the economic literature has for some time now confirmed the relevance of
the so-called “weak government hypothesis” for fiscal policy (Roubini and Sachs (1989)),
which claims in its original version that larger (in terms of the number of involved parties)
and ideologically more heterogenous coalitions find it harder to balance their budgets
after an external shock. In an application to taxation, Ashworth and Heyndels (2001)
show that more fragmented governments need more time to realign their tax structures
after an external shock has shifted it away from an ideal tax structure.
The recent findings by Le Maux et al. (2011) imply that highly fragmented governments
generally find it hard to deviate from the status quo, even though for many policy areas
(such as the public expenditure level) the direction of this deviation might be different
since it depends on the political preferences of the government (e.g., cut or expansion
of expenditure). The relevance of these arguments for corporate tax policy is evident:
they point to a higher persistence of corporate taxes under weak governments irrespec-
tive of the ideological preferences. During the period of investigation, the competition
intensity increased markedly and almost all countries reacted to this by decreasing their
tax burdens and – even under left-leaning governments – virtually no tax cuts took
place. As corporate tax cuts are usually a controversial undertaking, weak governments
are expected to react less flexibly to a changing environment. The weak government
hypothesis then implies that weak governments should have carried out less (or smaller)
cuts of corporate taxation than more homogenous coalitions (inevitably leading to a –
at least temporally – higher level of tax rates), which will be tested in the empirical
section as well.
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3.3 Data
Both tax burdens as well as political ideologies are multi-dimensional concepts which
cannot be expressed by the “one and only” index number, so that several different mea-
sures of corporate tax burdens and ideologies have been applied in the related literature.
In the following, we will present and discuss the most appropriate concepts for the
empirical operationalisation of these two dimensions in our context.
3.3.1 Measuring tax burdens
The empirical literature analysing international corporate tax policy which has evolved
in recent years (such as Devereux et al., 2008, or Overesch and Rincke, forthcoming), has
come along with more elaborate methods of measuring corporate tax rates. In line with
this literature, we employ statutory tax rates and effective tax rates as most appropriate
tax measures for our analysis. It stands out from the earlier literature – especially that
from political science – which mostly uses data on implicit tax rates calculated according
to the method proposed by Mendoza et al. (1994). Their measure determines an average
tax rate by dividing tax revenues of pretax corporate profits, both based on data from
national accounts statistics. A first obvious drawback of such implicit rates is that they
already reflect reactions to tax laws. Moreover, as discussed by Haufler et al. (2009)
and Devereux et al. (2008), such implicit tax rates have the decisive disadvantage that
changes in their values do not necessarily have to reflect changes in the underlying tax
laws.11 Hence, the Mendoza et al. indicator even fluctuates regularly during years in
which the national tax system is not subject to any legal change. This, however, implies
for our analysis that these measures are misleading, as it is our primary concern to
explain the impact of political factors on corporate tax legislation.
In our analysis we will employ two different types of measures: statutory corporate
income tax rates (CITR) and effective tax rates. The obvious drawback of the use of
the former is its complete neglect of the definition of the tax base. However, statutory
tax rates are probably the most visible element of the national corporate tax system and
hence an important element of tax policy. Moreover, they constitute the relevant variable
for profit-shifting of multinational firms. However, the more accurate measures of tax
burdens as perceived by entrepreneurs are effective tax rates, which are usually calculated
based on the approach by Devereux and Griffith (2003) for a hypothetical standardised
investment project. Said measures do not only take the statutory tax rates into account,
but also other taxes imposed on corporate income and the legal definition of the tax base,
which is defined by national regulations concerning tax allowances or depreciation rights,
for instance. The effective average tax rate (EATR) thus indicates the tax burden which
11These can also be caused by business cycle fluctuations or other factors which do not belong to the
responsibility of the government, and for which it is empirically not entirely possible to control.
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an investor faces for a profitable investment project. In addition, the effective marginal
tax rate (EMTR) indicates the tax burden of a marginal investment.12 Consequently, all
of these measures are forward-looking in the sense that they reflect the tax burden which
an investor faces for an investment decision in a particular year.13 In brief, the relevance
of these measures for our question at hand can be summarised as follows: variation of
the CITR (which has fallen in almost all European countries in the observation period
as discussed in the literature cited above) explicitly reflects differences in the level of
the headline tax rate as set directly by the national tax legislature, whereas changes of
EMTR reflect changes in the tax legislature either affecting the level of the CITR and
other relevant taxes on capital, or the definition of the tax base, whereas the latter tends
to counteract the former effect to a certain degree due to a tendency of broadening the
tax bases (see Devereux and Griffith (2003)). A detailed descriptive overview of the tax
data we apply can be found in Table 3.10 in the appendix.
3.3.2 Measuring ideology
The accurate measurement of political ideological is highly relevant for our empirical
analysis – however, this aspect has until now not received much attention in the eco-
nomic literature on partisan politics. Most studies measure the impact of a government’s
or legislature’s ideological orientation on the policy output by including a dummy vari-
able which indicates whether, e.g., a left-wing or Christian democrat party leads the
(coalition) government or not. Almost all studies related to our work apply this kind
of data, which is obtained either from the Worldbank Database of Political Institutions
(DPI), or from the ordinal ranking of party governments from left-wing, centre-left,
centre, centre-right and right-wing.
Known as the “party family approach”, this is the dominant approach in political eco-
nomic works which has been demonstrated to be successful in explaining partisan effects
in many areas of public policy. However, it is regarded as highly undertheorised in po-
litical science. Moreover, the lack of evidence discussed in section 3.2.3 might suggest
that some disadvantages of this data impair the panel analysis of tax rates: (i) the use
of these categorisations does not allow for international differences within party fami-
lies (e.g., the British New Labour can be assumed to be much more centrist than their
French Socialist counterpart), (ii) these categorisations do not allow for changes of party
positions over time (which are frequent as will be discussed below), (iii) they do not allow
for differentiations between single policy areas (however, a liberal position in economic
12As Devereux and Griffith (2003) discuss, the EATR is equal to a weighted average of the EMTR
and the CITR. The empirical results for the EATR are similar to those of EMTR and CITR and will
therefore not be reported in the following.
13In particular, we resort to the data calculated by Overesch and Rincke (2009) and Overesch and
Rincke (forthcoming). A more thorough description of the data and the assumptions underlying the
calculation of EATR and EMTR can be found therein.
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policy is certainly not equivalent to a right-wing position in immigration policy, and
vice versa). Among the more elaborate methods which exist in political science in order
to estimate programmatic positions of political actors beyond simple categorisation, we
choose data based on the quantitative content analysis of party manifestos.
Further methods are as well quite common in political science, but exhibit marked
disadvantages for our analysis. First, the analysis of the legislative voting behaviour
of politicians allows one to locate political actors on at least one policy dimension.
This indicator has been applied in the related economic literature in the analysis of
the attitudes of European parliamentarians towards corporate tax harmonisation (see
Chapter 2) and several studies of the U.S. congress originating from Poole and Rosenthal
(1985). However, in parliamentary democracies with strongly disciplined parties, an
analysis of roll call votes would sooner result in the extraction of a conflict line between
the government and opposition camp than in an identification of policy dimensions
within the parliament. Second, programmatic positions of parties can be derived from
elite or mass surveys, as well as expert surveys. The latter have been conducted on an
irregular basis, e.g., by Benoit and Laver (2006) and Laver and Hunt (1992). As already
indicated, one important problem when referring to this approach is that expert surveys
are temporally stable and can neither account for variations in the respective party policy
positions nor for potential changes in the party-specific dimension saliencies. However,
if we take the results of the two cited studies seriously, the programmatic orientation
and issue saliency of parties did indeed change between the time periods in which both
expert surveys were conducted.
Therefore, in this chapter we shall refer to data based on the content analysis of party
policy documents. In comparison to the other alternatives mentioned, the main advan-
tage of an analysis of policy documents can be seen in the high degree of their availability.
Prior to an election, nearly every party or party alliance publishes a program for govern-
ment, in which its goals for the next legislative period are outlined. Moreover, because
election programs normally have to be passed by a party congress or at least by a wider
group of party elites, they should more or less reflect the mean of all intra-party groups
weighted by their importance. Another aspect is relevant: the programmatic statements
inside such pre-election programmes can be used as a starting point for future coali-
tion negotiations and as a point of reference for the policy assertiveness in a coalition
government formed later.
While different types of computerised content analyses exist14, the most prominent data
source on party preferences for various policy areas is the dataset of the Manifesto Re-
search Group (MRG), which has been known since 1989 as the Comparative Manifesto
Project (CMP). The work of the MRG and the CMP, respectively, resulted in the largest
14One can distinguish between partly and completely computerised approaches. While the approaches
mentioned first require the programming of a dictionary that contains some a priori defined signal
words, fully computerised techniques like Wordscores or Wordfish require the full text of programmatic
documents, which is not available for our country sample and time span.
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and most complex database, which includes saliencies on 56 policy issues, i.e., the em-
phasis of these issues which is measured as the share of quasi-sentences that are devoted
to the issues. The data covers 3,018 election manifestos from 54 countries since 1945.15
We therefore use the manifesto dataset to quantify the policy preferences of each party
represented in the legislature in the time span and country sample under consideration
here. By doing so, we can account for changes in the general left-right placements and
the explicit economic policy preference of political actors.
There is already empirical evidence which shows for some of the policy issues covered by
the CMP data set that there is a strong link between issue saliences in party manifestos
and actual subsequent policies. Concerning public expenditures, Bräuninger (2005) finds
that an indicator for expenditure preferences, calculated as the ratio of emphasis given
to social security issues to economic affairs categories, impacts on the expenditure mix
as well as the overall level of expenditures. Other studies focus on a single policy issue
of the CMP data and demonstrate the link to subsequent policy for several different
policy areas: Knill et al. (2010) demonstrate that party preferences for “environmental
protection” (per501)16 and “anti-growth economy” (per416) positively affect the number
of adopted environmental policies, Jensen and Spoon (2011) find that the issue “envi-
ronmental protection” also has a link to progress towards the greenhouse gas emissions
targets of the Kyoto Protocol, Duso and Seldeslachts (2010) find that the emphasis
given to the issues “Market Regulation” (per403) and “Welfare state limitation” (per505)
are determinants of liberalisation in the digital mobile telephony market, and Geys and
Nuscheler (2010) show that the emphasis given to the category “Welfare State Expan-
sion” (per504) is a significant determinant of public spending for health care. The link
between political rhetoric and policy is also elaborated in Imbeau (2009), and it is sum-
marised with respect to the CMP data that “in most countries there is a link between
the electoral platform of a party and the policies adopted by that party when in gov-
ernment” (p.6). This evidence backs our view that the saliences of policy issues in the
CMP data are a good predictor of party preferences.
From the raw data on issue saliencies, it is possible to determine indicators for ideology by
ascribing issues to certain broader categories such as left-right dimensions. For instance,
an emphasis on “social justice” in the manifestos characterises a more left-wing party,
while an emphasis on “law and order” is characteristic for a more right-wing party. But
while both enter the general left-right dimension, obviously only the former enters an
economic specific left-right dimension.
The general left-right dimension is already provided by the CMP dataset (see Budge et
al. (2001)). It is generated by adding up the share of sentences in the manifestos dedi-
15While a number of alternative methods for estimating the positions of political actors exist (e.g.,
Laver et al. (2003); Slapin and Proksch (2008)), the manifesto data of the CMP is the only one to cover
the programmatic statements of all relevant parties in the OECD countries over a long time period.
16This is one of the 56 policy issues recorded in the CMP data set. The code refers to the category
number as listed in Budge et al. (2001).
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Figure 3.1: Ideological Positions in the UK
cated to categories which are consistently ascribed to right-wing parties, and subtracting
those shares devoted to categories which are typical for left-wing parties. Exemplarily,
this indicator is depicted in Figure 3.1 for the major parties in the UK, Labour Party
and Conservative Party. A higher value indicates more right-wing positions taken by
the party. As can be seen, the positions of both parties fluctuate over time, but the
Conservatives are always “more rightist” than Labour. Interesting enough, the indicator
reflects the shift of the position of Labour Party to the centre under Tony Blair at the
election of 1997 very well.
Moreover, the manifesto data set allows for the determination of several more refined ide-
ological indicators. We therefore refer to an operationalisation of the economic left-right
policy dimension provided by Cusack and Engelhardt (2002) (called ‘myrl3’ therein).
This variable explicitly includes CMP categories that only deal with economic and wel-
fare policy.17 Additionally, we test our empirical methods with various other measure-
ments of the (economic) left-right position of political parties. For instance, the Cusack
and Engelhardt (2002) dataset also provides a measure of the degree of economic liber-
alism (‘markecon’), as well as welfare policies.18 To test for the robustness of the effect
of our variable on the ideological orientation, we further created an additional index
that covers non-economic social policy only (covering issues such as family values or
17The relevant right-wing categories are (CMP codes in parentheses): Free Enterprise (per401), Eco-
nomic Orthodoxy (per414), Governmental and Administrative Efficiency (per313). Left-wing categories:
Market Regulation (per403), Economic Planning (per404), Keynesian Demand Management (per409),
Controlled Economy (per412), Nationalisation (per413), Social Justice (per503), Welfare State Expan-
sion (per504).
18Calculated as (per401 + per414)/2, and (per503 + per504)/2, respectively.
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immigration).19 From these measures for the party ideologies in advance of elections, we
calculate the parliament’s ‘centre of gravity’, i.e. the position of each party represented
in the legislature is weighted by its relative seat share. This allows for estimating the
overall position of a legislature for both the left-right and the other policy dimensions.20
Moreover, we will add the DPI data discussed above to the empirical analyses, for which
the centre of gravity of the government is determined equivalently based on the seat
shares of the governing parties. Thus, we are able to compare the results obtained by
our measures with those which are obtained by that of one of the most frequently used
data sources for ideology applied in the related literature.
3.3.3 Further variables
In our empirical analysis we investigate an unbalanced panel consisting of up to 32
European countries in the period from 1980 to 2006.21 The coverage and the choice of
control variables are comparable to the most recent empirical analyses of tax competition
in Europe, such as Devereux et al. (2008) or Overesch and Rincke (forthcoming). These
control variable comprise the top personal income tax rates (PITR) as well as several
national socio-economic characteristics, which are depicted in Table 3.9 in the appendix.
Since we expect an effect of individual politicians’ characteristics due to different per-
ceptions of capital mobility as stated in our hypothesis 4, we include individual data on
educational backgrounds of heads of government in our analysis. Here, we rely on the
extensive data set collected by Dreher et al. (2009), who identify an impact of education
on market liberalising reforms.22 In our analysis, we restrict ourselves to the inclusion
of dummies for a final degree in economics as well as in law. While the first group has
been identified in Dreher et al. (2009) as being significantly different in their political
outcomes, lawyers are of interest as they constitute the by far largest group of heads of
government (with a share of about one third of all observations).23
19Right-wing categories: National Way of Life: Positive (per601), Traditional Morality: Positive
(per603), Law and Order (per605), Social Harmony (per606), Multiculturalism: Negative (per608).
Left-wing categories: Social Justice (per503), Way of Life: Negative (per602), Traditional Morality:
Negative (per604), Multiculturalism: Positive (per607).
20Note that this approach is tailored for parliamentary systems with proportional representation,
which constitute by far the majority in our sample. In subsection 3.4.3 we test the robustness of our
results by considering that under plurality representation opposition parties might be marginalised.
21The scope of our panel is restricted by the availability of tax data, which starts at the earliest in
1980 for some western European countries and for most eastern European countries in the beginning
of the 1990s, as well as the availability of CMP data which is missing for some countries in the most
recent years. See Table 3.10 for a detailed overview on the covered period.
22We extend their data set by several countries missing in their analysis and also include Switzerland,
which does not have a single head of government in the traditional sense but a Federal Council consisting
of seven members with equal rights. We calculate the values as the share of members with the respective
educational background in the given year.
23More disaggregate analyses of other educational backgrounds were tested, but did not deliver strong
results, also partly due to low numbers of cases.
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Finally, we include the absolute number of parties in a coalition government as the
variable which captures the fragmentation of governments. This approach is in line with
the seminal literature on veto players originating from Tsebelis (1995), which regards
the number of parties in a coalition as a major time-varying factor for the capacity to
produce policy changes.
3.4 Empirical model and results
In our empirical analysis, we test the hypotheses formulated above using two differ-
ent empirical approaches. First, we follow the existing literature and apply panel data
approaches using fixed effects in order to cope with unobservable time-invariant char-
acteristics. In several robustness checks, we control for the strategic interactions of
countries in the choice of the tax level, the omission of fixed effects and an alternative
ideology indicator which takes account of the governments’ centre of gravity in plural-
ity systems. Second, we introduce a specification in first differences which allows the
analysis of changes in taxation instead of the levels of it.
One further important aspect is the choice of the appropriate lag structure in the model.
In tax policy, new tax legislature concerning corporate taxation almost always comes
into effect at the 1st of January of a given year. Therefore, tax rates at point t can only
be ascribed to political decisions made in year t-1 which rest on the political environment
at that point of time. Hence, for our benchmark model we consider the first lags of all
exogenous variables with the exception of the PITR, whose next-year value is assumed
to be set simultaneously with corporate taxation in the preceding year. In addition, we
will examine the time structure of the effect of changes in legislature on changes in taxes
more rigourously in the first difference specification.
Finally, a standard problem inherent in the related empirical literature is the serial
correlation of tax rates, as these are usually infrequently adjusted. In the following,
in those cases where the assumption is supported by the Wooldridge test, we follow
Devereux et al. (2008) and present standard errors which are clustered by country.
3.4.1 Fixed effects estimation
In our benchmark specification we apply a fixed effects model; this approach is reasonable
since several time invariant factors can hardly be controlled for and thus we run the risk
that an omitted variable bias interferes with our results.24 We introduce the following
specification as our benchmark model, with αt representing the time fixed effects, ηi
representing the country fixed effects and Zi,t−1 the vector of socio-economic control
24The Hausman test supports the use of a fixed effects model and rejects a random effects model in
all cases.
3.4. EMPIRICAL MODEL AND RESULTS 59
variables:
Taxi,t = β1 + β2Ideologyi,t−1 + β3Ideologyi,t−1 × Trend+ β4NumberPartiesi,t−1
+β5EducEconomicsi,t−1 + β6EducLawi,t−1 + β7PITRi,t + Zi,t−1θ
+αt + ηi + i,t (3.10)
We estimate the presented model with our three different measures for ideology (see
Table 3.2), i.e. the general left-right dimension derived from the CMP manifesto data
(CMP), the economic left-right dimension from the same source (CMP econ), and the
general left-right dimension obtained from the DPI data (DPI ) which represents the
traditional party family approach. In all cases the ideology variable shows a negative
sign, thus indicating a higher tax burden generated by left legislatures.25 This finding
is in line with our expectations of a partisan effect formulated in hypotheses 1 and 3.
However, it can be seen that the impact of political ideology differs markedly depending
on the choice of the variable. It is only statistically significant for the variables generated
from the CMP data, i.e., the general left-right dimension as well as the economic left-
right dimension, while the results for the DPI data are always insignificant. The finding
reflects our expectation that only the CMP data allows a reasonable comparison across
borders and over time, as it allows for differences in ideological positions of national
parties despite that they belong to the same party family. Interestingly enough, the
effect is for all indicators more pronounced when the statutory tax rate is applied and
not the EMTR (this pattern is similar for the following approaches). This result is
not surprising given that the statutory tax rate is the most visible component of the tax
system, so that we would expect that partisan politics play the strongest role concerning
this part of the tax system. Moreover, the statutory tax rate is the relevant factor shaping
incentives for profit shifting activities of multi-nationals.
Moreover, a positive effect can be found for the interaction of ideology and the time
trend which captures the intensification of tax competition over time, e.g. due to the
integration of Eastern European countries (see Overesch and Rincke (2009)). This find-
ing points to a diminishing impact of ideology with intensifying competition as stated
in hypothesis 2, which is at least for the CITR highly significant. In Figure 3.2, this
effect is illustrated exemplary for the first specification of Table 3.2. The marginal ef-
fects and the bounds for the 95% interval are depicted for all years which are included in
our analysis. As can be seen, the initial highly negative effect of ideology on the CITR
becomes smaller over time, and finally becomes insignificant at the end of the nineties.
The development of the partisan effect over time is qualitatively the same for almost all
of our regressions, indicating that the effect of ideology breaks down at some point in
time.
25Note that the coefficient β2 is evaluated at the point where the value of the trend is zero, which is
set at the year 1990. The marginal effects for other years result from β2 + β3 × trend. For a discussion
of the interpretation of lower-order coefficients in interaction models, see, e.g., Brambor et al. (2006).
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Table 3.2: Estimation results – fixed effects
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure CMP CMP Econ DPI CMP CMP Econ DPI
Ideologyt−1 -0.177*** -0.070*** -1.094 -0.068* -0.042** -0.831
(0.048) (0.023) (0.761) (0.038) (0.020) (0.547)
Ideologyt−1 × trend 0.016*** 0.006*** 0.201** 0.001 0.002 0.187***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.084) (0.006) (0.002) (0.063)
Number partiest−1 0.384 0.254 0.312 0.791* 0.731* 0.745
(0.544) (0.528) (0.579) (0.436) (0.443) (0.440)
Educ Economicst−1 -0.029 -0.358 -0.270 0.969 0.740 0.561
(1.571) (1.584) (1.770) (1.712) (1.633) (1.642)
Educ Lawt−1 1.754 1.309 1.376 3.097* 2.740 2.392
(1.615) (1.679) (1.857) (1.815) (1.699) (1.856)
GDP per capitat−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.200 -0.183 -0.194 -0.091 -0.092 -0.085
(0.129) (0.130) (0.122) (0.104) (0.104) (0.098)
Public consumptiont−1 -0.234 -0.234 -0.352 -0.350 -0.300 -0.340
(0.441) (0.430) (0.450) (0.357) (0.353) (0.368)
Population oldt−1 3.975*** 3.544*** 3.763*** 0.983 1.104 0.944
(0.839) (0.881) (0.909) (0.746) (0.813) (0.681)
Population youngt−1 0.643 0.625 0.700 -0.781 -0.841 -0.718
(0.774) (0.788) (0.808) (0.687) (0.664) (0.687)
Populationt−1 -0.310 -0.412 -0.300 -0.081 -0.126 -0.103
(0.719) (0.661) (0.548) (0.787) (0.749) (0.725)
Integration t−1 -0.421** -0.304* -0.337* -0.230 -0.201 -0.161
(0.170) (0.174) (0.169) (0.162) (0.175) (0.156)
PITRt 0.441** 0.562*** 0.481** 0.407** 0.458** 0.435**
(0.190) (0.189) (0.188) (0.190) (0.190) (0.172)
Constant -22.192 -24.850 -22.096 25.860 21.532 19.175
(28.419) (30.563) (28.652) (31.876) (31.306) (27.994)
Country FE yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
R-squared 0.70 0.71 0.69 0.59 0.60 0.60
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
The variable indicating the number of parties in the government has the expected posi-
tive effect on the tax measure: coalitions containing a larger number of political parties
generate higher levels of corporate taxes. However, the observed effect is only statisti-
cally significant in two of the regressions on the EMTR. Moreover, we do not find an
unambiguous result for the effect of the educational background in economics, while the
coefficient for the lawyer dummy is positive throughout and significant in at least one
case. However, the effects of these variables on the levels of taxation are not very robust,
and a more short-term effect which has interfered with long-term influences cannot be
dismissed. The short-term dynamics of tax setting will be examined more closely later
on.
In the regressions presented in Table 3.3, we consider similarly to Devereux et al. (2008)
in addition to our other control variables the direct interaction of European countries in
their tax setting. Thus, for every year we include the average tax rate of the respective
country’s direct neighbours which is denoted as NeighbourTaxi,t =
∑j ωijTaxj,t, with
j 6= i denoting the countries defined as neighbours of country i and ωij as the correspond-
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Figure 3.2: Marginal effects of ideology (CMP) on CITR
ing weighting matrix.26 Due to the presence of spatial autocorrelation, we instrument
this endogenous right-hand variable with the weighted average of the other control vari-
ables. It can be seen that this extension of the empirical model slightly drives down
the significance of the “general left-right” ideology variable, but it stays significant at
conventional levels for both specifications applying the “economic left-right” dimension.
In the following we analyse the effects of ideological positions with regard to few delimited
policy areas. This procedure enables us to reveal which specific elements of the general
(or economic) left-right dimension are the driving forces of the partisan effects detected
above. In particular, it helps us to discriminate between hypothesis 1 and 3, i.e., whether
the partisan bias observed above originates from differences in preferences or biased
perceptions of the politicians. Based on the specifications which include the neighbouring
countries’ tax rates, we apply three disaggregated ideology variables: two of the main
components of the economic left-right dimension, i.e. welfare state policies (Welfare)
and the attitude towards free markets (MarketEcon), as well as non-economic social
politics (Society), which capture elements of the general left-right dimension that do
not encompass economic policies. The results, which are shown in Table 3.4, indicate
that we only obtain consistent significant results for the attitude towards welfare policies
(the Welfare dimension enters the left-right dimensions negatively, so that a high value
indicates a more pro-welfare, i.e., left-wing position). This result reveals that parties
which put more emphasis on the welfare state did indeed generate higher taxation, but,
interestingly enough, the other economic dimension does not show coefficients deviating
significantly from zero. This result gives strong support for hypothesis 1 formulated
26We assume a uniform weighting of all direct neighbours. For the definition of direct neighbourhood,
we follow Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002).
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Table 3.3: Estimation results – fixed effects and interaction
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure CMP CMP Econ DPI CMP CMP Econ DPI
Ideologyt−1 -0.128** -0.061*** -1.044 -0.014 -0.034** -0.631
(0.058) (0.022) (0.812) (0.046) (0.016) (0.422)
Ideologyt−1 × trend 0.012** 0.004* 0.171* -0.005 -0.001 0.159***
(0.005) (0.002) (0.093) (0.007) (0.002) (0.055)
Number partiest−1 0.106 0.005 0.058 0.564 0.525 0.564
(0.580) (0.558) (0.624) (0.433) (0.385) (0.447)
Educ Economicst−1 -0.827 -0.878 -1.017 0.722 0.763 0.358
(1.811) (1.805) (1.974) (1.710) (1.569) (1.582)
Educ Lawt−1 1.980 1.787 1.666 3.540* 3.444** 2.798
(1.734) (1.792) (2.019) (1.839) (1.653) (1.897)
NeighbourTaxt 0.475*** 0.472*** 0.517*** 0.439*** 0.449*** 0.390***
(0.140) (0.151) (0.127) (0.096) (0.095) (0.075)
GDP per capitat−1 0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.180 -0.179 -0.177 -0.027 -0.047 -0.027
(0.126) (0.127) (0.124) (0.095) (0.091) (0.092)
Public consumptiont−1 -0.070 -0.070 -0.117 -0.292 -0.228 -0.242
(0.438) (0.441) (0.435) (0.317) (0.320) (0.321)
Population oldt−1 3.862*** 3.648*** 3.692*** 0.793 1.140 0.828
(0.843) (0.796) (0.834) (0.691) (0.683) (0.630)
Population youngt−1 1.089 1.007 1.162 -0.485 -0.616 -0.464
(0.782) (0.812) (0.811) (0.649) (0.625) (0.672)
Populationt−1 -0.704 -0.791 -0.752 -0.432 -0.469 -0.427
(0.631) (0.607) (0.541) (0.623) (0.577) (0.606)
Integrationt−1 -0.366** -0.306* -0.295* -0.196 -0.238 -0.145
(0.172) (0.173) (0.168) (0.153) (0.169) (0.154)
PITRt 0.467** 0.543*** 0.496*** 0.456** 0.455** 0.468***
(0.181) (0.191) (0.178) (0.180) (0.187) (0.163)
Constant -56.423** 25.729 -44.181 18.396 60.620 16.690
(21.244) (54.337) (27.721) (28.043) (53.372) (24.055)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 498 498 498 498 498 498
R-squared 0.84 0.84 0.84 0.82 0.82 0.83
NeighbourTaxt was instrumented with the weighted average of the other control variables.
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
above. The indicator for social policies is at least significant in the specification applying
the statutory tax rates, which indicates that the non-economic dimension has at least
some explanatory content, although it is far lower than that of the economic indicator
applied above.
3.4.2 Providing for level effects
The common reliance of the existing literature on the use of fixed effects estimation
is well-founded for the questions analysed in these papers, as the application of fixed
effects prevents unobserved time-invariant country-specific factors from interfering with
the variable of interest.27 However, the estimation with fixed effects may not be ap-
27Among the works reviewed above, Schwarz (2007) is the only paper that estimates a specification
without fixed effects.
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Table 3.4: Estimation results – disaggregated ideology measures
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure Welfare MarketEcon Society Welfare MarketEcon Society
Ideologyt−1 0.910** -0.002 -0.306** 0.587* 0.346 -0.193
(0.340) (0.470) (0.123) (0.306) (0.461) (0.132)
Ideologyt−1 × trend -0.091** -0.060 0.053*** -0.046 -0.091 0.035**
(0.037) (0.055) (0.012) (0.039) (0.058) (0.016)
NeighbourTaxt 0.337** 0.508*** 0.554*** 0.306*** 0.409*** 0.423***
(0.150) (0.156) (0.127) (0.104) (0.085) (0.094)
GDP per capitat−1 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.202 -0.170 -0.159 -0.063 -0.022 -0.041
(0.138) (0.137) (0.131) (0.111) (0.110) (0.101)
Public consumptiont−1 -0.161 -0.275 -0.066 -0.283 -0.433 -0.233
(0.390) (0.398) (0.444) (0.332) (0.326) (0.338)
Population oldt−1 3.518*** 2.425*** 3.644*** 1.039* 0.614 1.043*
(0.767) (0.922) (0.804) (0.608) (0.503) (0.589)
Population youngt−1 1.097 1.340* 1.199 -0.279 -0.089 -0.249
(0.687) (0.671) (0.709) (0.600) (0.556) (0.601)
Populationt−1 -0.600 -0.762 -0.410 -0.237 -0.420 -0.146
(0.462) (0.617) (0.641) (0.490) (0.532) (0.655)
Integrationt−1 -0.260 -0.265 -0.272* -0.134 -0.126 -0.123
(0.181) (0.160) (0.149) (0.179) (0.156) (0.153)
PITRt 0.513*** 0.460** 0.498*** 0.457** 0.363** 0.469**
(0.172) (0.190) (0.178) (0.187) (0.176) (0.183)
Constant -37.430 -30.569 -50.061 24.156 59.380 6.951
(22.429) (60.187) (21.678) (19.412) (50.033) (18.270)
Country Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 500 500 500 500 500 500
R-squared 0.85 0.83 0.84 0.82 0.81 0.81
NeighbourTaxt was instrumented with the weighted average of the other control variables.
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
propriate in cases where theory predicts level effects of the independent variables on
the dependent variable, as these effects would then be erased by the application of
country-fixed effects (see the discussion in Plümper et al., 2005). In our data set, one
prime example is the size of the countries which is largely time-invariant so that robust
findings cannot be expected from fixed effects estimations. However, the theoretical lit-
erature (see Bucovetsky (1991)) predicts a level effect on corporate taxation which can
be expected to be found in a cross-country comparison, but by no means in the marginal
variation of the variable over the time period within countries. This assumption can be
confirmed by the results shown in Table 3.5 where we omit the use of country fixed
effects. There, we find the expected positive effect highly significant, in contrast to the
regressions using fixed effects in the preceding subsection. Similarly, level effects are
also of importance for our analyses of partisan effects. In this regard, our CMP data on
party ideology has the advantage of capturing these level effects since its scales are com-
parable across countries, so that differences in levels reflect actual persistent differences
in ideological positions between parties in different countries.
The coefficients of the ideology variable again point to a negative effect of right-wing
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Table 3.5: Estimation results – no fixed effects
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure CMP CMP Econ DPI CMP CMP Econ DPI
Ideologyt−1 -0.125** -0.041* -0.530 -0.212*** -0.076*** -1.506
(0.048) (0.022) (1.176) (0.070) (0.022) (1.040)
Ideologyt−1 × trend 0.015** 0.007** 0.117 0.002 0.003 0.141
(0.006) (0.003) (0.116) (0.010) (0.002) (0.096)
GDP per capitat−1 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.128 -0.086 -0.106 -0.112 0.010 0.039
(0.148) (0.143) (0.144) (0.169) (0.166) (0.152)
Public consumptiont−1 0.296 0.330 0.264 0.077 0.052 0.060
(0.226) (0.224) (0.234) (0.217) (0.245) (0.232)
Population oldt−1 1.206** 1.124* 1.052* 0.043 -0.034 -0.121
(0.575) (0.554) (0.609) (0.559) (0.634) (0.604)
Population youngt−1 0.388 0.400 0.326 0.075 0.014 0.042
(0.399) (0.366) (0.423) (0.323) (0.369) (0.323)
Populationt−1 0.192*** 0.188*** 0.185*** 0.155*** 0.157*** 0.149**
(0.064) (0.059) (0.066) (0.055) (0.048) (0.061)
Integrationt−1 -0.263** -0.256** -0.247** -0.051 -0.092 -0.063
(0.096) (0.094) (0.100) (0.117) (0.115) (0.120)
PITRt 0.231* 0.261** 0.243* 0.180 0.247* 0.202
(0.124) (0.117) (0.120) (0.137) (0.139) (0.131)
Presidential -0.629 -1.645 -0.145 -3.945 -5.615 -5.574
(3.635) (3.550) (3.901) (5.510) (6.034) (6.823)
Plurality -5.668 -5.723* -5.501 -0.122 -0.663 -0.607
(3.761) (3.348) (3.906) (2.683) (2.215) (2.687)
Former Communist -3.065 -1.655 -2.833 -0.429 -1.359 -0.519
(3.570) (3.486) (3.556) (3.159) (3.500) (3.767)
EU member -1.497 -1.026 -1.123 -2.036 -1.760 -1.754
(2.169) (2.192) (1.912) (2.149) (2.365) (2.368)
Catholic 0.034 0.036 0.031 -0.003 0.014 -0.000
(0.022) (0.023) (0.019) (0.021) (0.021) (0.024)
Constant 8.165 5.708 10.531 8.938 10.512 10.693
(13.844) (12.535) (14.387) (15.027) (15.997) (16.975)
Country FE no no no no no no
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes yes yes
Observations 502 502 502 502 502 502
R-squared 0.69 0.70 0.68 0.58 0.58 0.55
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
legislatures on corporate tax burdens in all specifications. Again, we cannot detect
significant partisan effects by means of the DPI data, while the indicators derived from
the CMP are significant in all specifications. Moreover, the estimation without fixed
effects allows us to add some time-invariant variables to our analysis. These comprise
dummies for the membership in the EU and a communist past of a country which might
have an impact on corporate taxation. Moreover, constitutional factors which are known
from the cross-country analyses of Persson and Tabellini (2003), such as dummies for
the presidential and the plurality system, are added. However, the results which are
reported in Table 3.5 show that none of these time-invariant variables has a significant
impact on the level of taxation.
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3.4.3 Correcting for plurality systems
Until now, we applied consistently our political measures capturing the relative party
strengths in the legislature. These measures, however, might be inadequate for West-
minster-style parliaments, in which strong one-party governments dominate the political
agenda. For that reason, in the regressions depicted in Table 3.6 we consider the gov-
ernment centre of gravity instead of the parliament centre of gravity for those countries
which are classified as plurality systems.28 The results are qualitatively in line with
those obtained with the original political measures in section 3.4.1. The main quantita-
tive difference is that this data indicates a slower decline of the impact of the ideology
variables over time.
Table 3.6: Estimation results – government positions for plurality systems
Dependent variable CITR EMTR
Ideology measure CMP CMP Econ CMP CMP Econ
Ideologyt−1 -0.123** -0.048** -0.069* -0.034**
(0.046) (0.019) (0.035) (0.016)
Ideologyt−1 × trend 0.008 0.003 0.003 0.002
(0.005) (0.002) (0.006) (0.002)
Number partiest−1 0.440 0.374 0.848* 0.824*
(0.537) (0.501) (0.422) (0.422)
Educ Economicst−1 -0.188 -0.464 0.770 0.551
(1.739) (1.670) (1.697) (1.604)
Educ Lawt−1 1.509 1.180 2.786 2.477
(1.747) (1.698) (1.821) (1.714)
GDP per capitat−1 0.000 0.000 -0.000 -0.000
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
GDP growtht−1 -0.196 -0.187 -0.088 -0.086
(0.131) (0.133) (0.105) (0.105)
Public consumptiont−1 -0.281 -0.264 -0.323 -0.290
(0.451) (0.452) (0.373) (0.367)
Population oldt−1 4.039*** 3.822*** 1.105 1.088
(0.860) (0.923) (0.729) (0.781)
Population youngt−1 0.612 0.577 -0.786 -0.838
(0.786) (0.808) (0.682) (0.667) )
Populationt−1 -0.344 -0.377 -0.106 -0.130
(0.672) (0.647) (0.777) (0.750)
Integrationt−1 -0.451** -0.380** -0.247 -0.221
(0.170) (0.170) (0.154) (0.161)
PITRt 0.458** 0.543** 0.414** 0.465**
(0.199) (0.201) (0.191) (0.190)
Constant -17.161 -21.174 24.631 21.413
(28.947) (30.210) (31.321) (30.575)
Country FE yes yes yes yes
Period Dummies yes yes yes yes
Observations 500 500 500 500
R-squared 0.70 0.70 0.59 0.60
Standard errors robust to serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
28We applied the classification introduced by the DPI.
66 CHAPTER 3. POLITICAL DETERMINANTS OF CORPORATE TAXATION
3.4.4 First difference specification
One attractive solution to the problem of serial correlation stated above is the estimation
of a model in differences (see Kittel and Winner (2005)). However, such a specification
requires a completely different interpretation of the measured partisan effect: we no
longer explain the effect of the decision-maker’s ideological position on the level of tax-
ation, but rather the changes in the level of taxation with changes in the ideological
position of the legislature.29
This consideration clarifies why it is hard to achieve definite results using simple left-
right dummies in such a specification. With these measures, the value for government
ideology does not change frequently, since changes occur only in cases where power is
passed over from the left to the right or vice versa, so that these may fail to explain
variations in the level of taxation. Our data, however, overcomes the problem. As party
ideologies measured by the CMP data change with every election, the centre of gravity
shifts regularly. These changes can then also be caused by changes in the ideological
positions of parties which stay in power or by changes in the strength of the coalition
partners, even when the power stays in the hand of the left-wing or the right-wing of
the political spectrum, respectively.
In this approach, we differentiate our left-hand side variable and our ideology variables,
as well as all of our control variables which have been applied in the precedent anal-
ysis. Only two variables enter the regression in levels: first, we expect that a higher
level of veto power within the governing coalition impacts the decision-making, so that
NumberParties enters the equation in levels. Second, we rely on TaxGap as a measure
which reflects the direct competitive pressure from neighbouring countries on the local
tax setting in a given year. It is attained as the difference between a country’s own level
of taxation and the average of its direct neighbours for each of the two measures applied
(i.e., CITR and EMTR), respectively: TaxGapi,t = Taxi,t −
∑j ωijTaxj,t, for all j 6= i
which are defined as neighbours of i. Our estimations are then based on the following
specification:
∆Taxi,t = β1 + β2∆Ideologyi,t + β3∆Ideologyi,t−1 + β4∆Ideologyi,t−2
+β5NumberPartiesi,t−1 + β6TaxGapi,t−1 + β7∆PITRi,t
+∆Zi,t−1θ + i,t (3.11)
The results which are shown in Table 3.7 indicate that our measure of competitive
pressure has the expected effect (tax cuts become larger in case the own tax level exceeds
29Despite the theoretical attractiveness of the approach, it has only been applied in Basinger and
Hallerberg (2004) in the related empirical literature.
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Table 3.7: Estimation results – specification in differences
Dependent variable ∆CITR ∆EMTR
Ideology measure CMP DPI CMP DPI
∆ Ideologyt -0.010 0.046 -0.026 0.155
(0.023) (0.441) (0.026) (0.398)
∆ Ideologyt−1 -0.034** 0.118 -0.055*** 0.106
(0.016) (0.324) (0.021) (0.301)
∆ Ideologyt−2 -0.035 0.498 -0.011 0.512
(0.023) (0.347) (0.022) (0.396)
Number partiest−1 0.205** 0.180** 0.112 0.084
(0.091) (0.092) (0.139) (0.142)
Tax Gapt−1 -0.041*** -0.044*** -0.066*** -0.070***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.024) (0.024)
Educ Economicst−1 0.267 0.274 0.060 0.085
(0.375) (0.380) (0.434) (0.429)
Educ Lawt−1 0.655** 0.653** 0.817*** 0.814***
(0.302) (0.306) (0.285) (0.293)
GDP growtht−1 0.004 0.014 0.044 0.063
(0.048) (0.050) (0.039) (0.041)
∆ Public consumptiont−1 -0.249 -0.276 -0.201 -0.225
(0.199) (0.167) (0.149) (0.142)
∆ Population oldt−1 -0.665 -0.277 -0.446 0.002
(0.855) (0.848) (0.944) (0.933)
∆ Population youngt−1 -0.214 -0.202 -0.508 -0.475
(0.558) (0.558) (0.615) (0.619)
∆ Populationt−1 0.135 0.250 0.529 0.616
(0.652) (0.657) (0.582) (0.610)
∆ Integrationt−1 0.095 0.102 0.011 0.014
(0.091) (0.090) (0.090) (0.089)
∆ PITRt 0.338*** 0.339*** 0.241*** 0.238***
(0.108) (0.109) (0.087) (0.088)
Constant -1.648*** -1.661*** -1.418*** -1.467***
(0.385) (0.401) (0.420) (0.437)
Country FE no no no no
Period Dummies no no no no
Observations 467 461 467 461
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.13 0.12
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant
at the 1% level.
the neighbours’ level).30 We include changes in ideology within the current year as well
as in the two preceding years. The effect of concurrent changes is not significantly
different from zero; this finding supports our assumption that taxes react with a delay
to changes in the political environment. By contrast, the first lag is negative once again
for the CMP data and highly significant for both tax measures, while the second lag
of ideological changes also has a negative impact, but the coefficient is not significantly
different from zero. This result again indicates the existence of a partisan effect on
corporate taxation, reflected in the fact that a shift in ideology to the right – ceteris
paribus – leads to a cut of the corporate tax rate in the following year. The DPI data
does not deliver any robust results in these estimations.
30The differentiation eliminates the country fixed effects in the data. Hence, the null hypothesis of
no fixed effects (i.e., the pooled model) cannot be rejected at standard significance levels anymore, so
that the application of fixed effects will be dismissed in the following regressions.
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In these regressions, we find the same qualitative effects of educational background as
before, which now turn out to be highly significant for heads of state with a background
in law. The finding corroborates our hypothesis 4 insofar as it indicates that individual
characteristics of the decision-maker affect the amount and speed of changes in corporate
taxes. Moreover, the coefficient for NumberParties has a positive sign and is significant
at least in the specifications applying the CITR, which shows an adverse effect of larger
coalitions on cuts of corporate taxes. These findings give at least some indication that
large coalitions as well as the leadership of a lawyer averted tax cuts to a certain degree
and, thus, counteracted the tendency of lowering corporate taxes which prevailed in the
period under investigation.
3.4.5 Possible endogeneity of ideology
Empirical research on partisan effects on fiscal policy regularly treats political ideology
as strictly exogenous. At first glance, however, this assumption is questionable, as the
legislature’s and government’s ideology is the stringent result of elections. Consequently,
it might be argued that changes in the external environment – in our case we might think
of increasing pressure from tax competition as being relevant – impact policy outcomes
through elections, which generate a new ideological position of the legislature. Thus,
one could argue that in the case of corporate tax policy, the declining competitiveness
of a country due to the tax cuts of its neighbours might cause a gain in votes of right-
wing parties (or a shift of left-wing parties to the right), and that the domestic tax
cut in the subsequent period (inevitable due to the decline in competitiveness) happens
under a more rightist legislature than before. In this case, an interpretation of the
actual partisan impact on the tax cut becomes difficult. However, these critiques can be
mitigated by the fact that policy preferences which are revealed by voters at the ballot
box encompass a wide field of programmatic aspects which go far beyond the scope of
different positions in economic policy. From that perspective, it is highly unlikely that
the national position in international tax competition has a strong impact on the voters’
decisions, which would theoretically be expected as a right-shift of the median voter in
case of intensifying pressure from other countries.
Nevertheless, we address these concerns by explicitly studying the impact of our vari-
ables of interest on changes of our ideology measures. In Table 3.8, we explain annual
changes in the ideological position of the legislature by the Tax gap in the previous year
complemented by changes in the other exogenous variables, proceeding as before. In
these regressions, we cannot detect a major effect of Tax gap on changes in the ide-
ological position. The only variable which has a strong effect on changes in ideology
is the lagged GDP growth. Interestingly, this finding is in line with Markussen (2008)
who demonstrates that higher economic growth causes a shift of policy sentiments to
the left. However, growth has not been found to have a notable impact on corporate
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taxation in any of the regressions presented above. Consequently, we conclude that the
possible endogeneity of ideology cannot be regarded as a major problem in the empirical
approaches presented above.
Table 3.8: Estimation results – explaining ideological changes
Dependent variable ∆ CMP ∆ CMP Econ ∆ DPI
Tax measure CITR EMTR CITR EMTR CITR EMTR
Tax Gapt−1 0.037 0.040 0.098 0.100 -0.000 0.002
(0.027) (0.029) (0.069) (0.067) (0.003) (0.003)
GDP growtht−1 -0.247*** -0.248*** -0.725*** -0.730*** 0.007 0.007
(0.090) (0.090) (0.246) (0.246) (0.008) (0.008)
∆ Public consumptiont−1 -0.443 -0.434 -1.257 -1.235 0.024 0.025
(0.363) (0.361) (0.785) (0.778) (0.032) (0.032)
∆ Population oldt−1 -2.940* -2.615* -1.881 -1.043 -0.120 -0.114
(1.581) (1.550) (4.952) (4.862) (0.162) (0.161)
∆ Population youngt−1 -0.368 -0.299 -7.306** -7.135** -0.009 -0.006
(1.140) (1.133) (3.062) (3.062) (0.105) (0.105)
∆ Populationt−1 -1.256 -1.256 -2.617 -2.580 0.085 0.071
(1.230) (1.244) (2.304) (2.258) (0.082) (0.075)
∆ Integrationt−1 -0.034 -0.017 -0.580* -0.536 -0.004 -0.004
(0.124) (0.125) (0.338) (0.338) (0.018) (0.018)
Constant 1.139** 1.108** 1.959 1.871 -0.011 -0.009
(0.514) (0.512) (1.309) (1.287) (0.044) (0.043)
Country FE no no no no no no
Period Dummies no no no no no no
Observations 475 475 475 475 469 469
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.01
Standard errors robust to heteroscedasticity in parentheses. * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant
at the 1% level.
3.5 Conclusions
The relevance of partisan politics has been widely neglected both in the theoretical as
well as in the empirical corporate taxation literature for quite a while – but politics
matter for corporate taxes, as our analysis has shown. Theoretically, we have shown
that there are two channels which hint at an effect of partisanship on corporate tax
policy: the former being differences in preferences towards the size of the public sector,
and the latter being different perceptions of the economic environment. Empirically, we
have shown that there is strong evidence that ideologies have indeed impacted corporate
taxes in Europe. The partisan effect is generally more pronounced for the statutory tax
rates than for the effective marginal tax rates, but for which we also find a partisan effect.
This finding might be due to two different reasons: first, the statutory tax rate is the
most visible component of national tax systems, so that partisan politics which aim at
satisfying the own clientele should be the strongest there. Second, the statutory tax rates
are relevant for profit-shift activities of multi-national corporations. Hence, if ideology
is correlated with the perception of this phenomenon (i.e., leftist politicians assume a
lower mobility of profits), then it can also explain why the partisan effect is stronger
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for the statutory tax rates. Moreover, our results indicate that the general impact of
national partisanship is diminishing with increasing intensity of competition in Europe.
Beyond the impact of partisan politics, we have identified two further factors which have
interfered with the general pressure on cutting tax rates: educational background of the
respective head of government, as well as the fragmentation of government.
In a wider sense, the chapter has underlined the importance of the appropriate data
choice for the overarching issue of analysing partisan politics in public finance. Our
measure of political ideologies based on manifesto data delivers robust results, whereas
the simple use of dummy variables for party families points to the same direction, but
does not produce significant effects. In particular, it has been shown that for the ques-
tion at hand, mainly one specific dimension of the complex left-right dimension is of
importance: the attitude towards the welfare state. This effect is in line with our pre-
dictions from the theoretical part, which ascribe the partisan effect on corporate taxation
to differences in preferences for public goods provision.
In this regard, our study is the first to analyse the ideological impact on fiscal policy in a
more specific way than the general left-right dimension. The feasibility of an analysis in
which the left-right divergence is disaggregated into political positions concerning single
policy areas as provided by the CMP data might also be of interest for further applica-
tions in the literature of partisan effects on economic policy. Similar to our results, it
might be suspected that it is also the welfare dimension which affects spending policies.31
However, according to theory, it should change for other explanandums. Concerning the
partisan effect on market liberalisation, for instance, theory predicts that other compo-
nents of the left-right dimension, such as the attitude towards the free market, should be
the better explanatory variables. Concerning other policy outcomes, such as the factors
underlying the partisan effect on economic growth (studied in Bjørnskov (2005)), theory
is ambiguous thus calling for more elaborate analyses.
31It has only recently be demonstrated for public health expenditures by Geys and Nuscheler (2010).
3.6. APPENDIX 71
3.6 Appendix
Table 3.9: Descriptive Statistics
Variable Description Mean Std.
Dev.
Min Max Source
CMP Ideology measured for
general left-right di-
mension
-0.09 11.04 -30.60 36.47 own calculations, based on CMP
data and parliament composi-
tions from Cusack and Engel-
hardt (2002) and Klingemann et
al. (2008)
CMP econ Ideology measured for
economic left-right di-
mension
-4.61 30.86 -92.65 56.45 ibid.
Society Ideology measured for
societal left-right di-
mension
3.19 5.18 -12.65 20.99 ibid.
MarketEcon Ideology measured for
market liberalism
2.52 1.70 0 9.51 ibid.
Welfare Ideology measured for
welfare policies
5.93 2.35 1.27 13.49 ibid.
DPI Ideology measured for
general left-right di-
mension
0.06 0.78 -1 1 own calculations, based on
database of Political Institutions,
Beck et al. (2001)
Number Par-
ties
Number of parties in
coalition government
2.48 1.28 0 6 Database of Political Institu-
tions, Beck et al. (2001)
PITR Highest personal in-
come tax rate
50.03 12.52 18.0 87.0 Overesch and Rincke (forthcom-
ing)
Integration Political and social in-
tegration; KOF global-
isation index corrected
by economics flow vari-
ables
75.26 12.51 29.95 93.11 Dreher (2006)
Educ Eco-
nomics
Dummy = 1 if educa-
tion in economics
0.23 0.41 0 1 Dreher et al. (2009) updated by
various internet sources
Educ Law Dummy = 1 if educa-
tion in law
0.33 0.46 0 1 Dreher et al. (2009) updated by
various internet sources
GDP cap GDP per capita in US
Dollar
22732.75 9844.59 2927.9 65807 World Bank, World Development
Indicators
GDP growth annual growth rate of
real GDP
2.79 2.98 -11.89 12.7 World Bank, World Development
Indicators

















19.24 3.41 14.03 33.01 World Bank, World Development
Indicators
Presidential Dummy = 1 if presi-
dential system
0.04 0.20 0 1 Database of Political Institu-
tions, Beck et al. (2001)
Plurality Dummy = 1 if election
under plurality rule
0.15 0.36 0 1 Database of Political Institu-
tions, Beck et al. (2001)
Catholic Share of catholics 0.46 0.38 0 0.98 various sources




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fiscal Interactions at the Local Level
4.1 Introduction
Whether at the national or local level, a government deciding public policies in one
jurisdiction is likely to affect – and be affected by – decisions of governments in other
jurisdictions (e.g., due to spillover effects or strategic decision-making). The resulting
spatial policy interdependence has received significant attention from regional science
scholars, urban and public economists and political scientists in recent years, both in
terms of its measurement and its implications (for partial reviews, see Brueckner, 2003;
Revelli, 2005). With respect to local corporate tax competition, the intensity of strategic
interactions in business tax policy should be determined by the intensity of competition
for mobile capital between jurisdictions. The intensity of competition between certain
jurisdictions is then approximated by weighting matrices which either account for the
direct neighbourhood or the distance of jurisdictions within a particular region or coun-
try. However, such weighting matrices are only a rough indicator for the competitive
pressures which are actually perceived by decision-makers at the local level, and in par-
ticular they abstract from the “true” structure of competition which is not necessarily
only determined by the location of jurisdictions. In this chapter, results from a survey
conducted among mayors in the German state of Baden-Württemberg are used to show
that the perceived intensity of competition varies considerably between jurisdictions,
and can mainly be explained by the size and location of the jurisdiction. The findings
have important implications for the literature on local competition, as will be discussed
below in detail.
First, studies of spatial policy interdependence in (local) public policies usually concen-
trate on the relations between jurisdictions within a single analysed region, and disregard
possible extra-regional effects. The first part of this chapter evaluates the validity of such
restriction based on the survey results. It is found that location near a border signifi-
cantly undermines politicians’ perception that the fiercest competitive pressure derives
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from jurisdictions within their own state. This effect sets in about 20km (12.5km) from a
national (international) border. It can also be confirmed that intra-national borders are
perceived as much less constraining for firms than international ones, even in a highly
integrated area such as the European Union. Overall, these results indicate that near-
est municipalities perceive each other as competitors regardless of the state or country
where they are located. The practical implications of these findings for future studies
on spatial policy interdependence are discussed.
Second, little is known about the actual spatial structure of inter-municipal competi-
tion. Assuming that competition takes place only among neighbours (as in the empirical
literature) is at odds with the theoretical approaches where all jurisdictions compete si-
multaneously. In the second part of this chapter, a sequential tax competition model
in which city centres compete with other city centres and their own surrounding ju-
risdictions is developed based on the survey findings. This model predicts that larger
jurisdictions do not necessarily rely more on capital taxes when they face strong competi-
tion with more distant competitors. In addition, it is discussed how the model compares
to a standard simultaneous approach and shown that the results from our sequential
model are in line with trends in local taxation in Baden-Württemberg.
The remainder of the chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 critically reviews
the types of spatial weights matrices commonly employed in the literature and derives
testable hypotheses concerning the effect of (inter)national borders. Section 4.3 discusses
our survey design and the empirical methodology employed to verify the existence and
persistence of border-effects. It also describes the results and discusses the implications
for future studies. In section 4.4 we present how the findings from our survey motivate
our theoretical model. In section 4.5, we introduce a sequential model, present the
results, and compare to a simultaneous model (shown in the appendix). Finally, we
discuss the implications of the model for local tax setting and compare these with local
business tax rates in Baden-Württemberg.
4.2 Defining the neighbourhood
A central concern for empirical analyses of spatial policy interactions relates to the
specification of the neighbourhood matrix. As the components of this matrix – i.e.,
‘spatial weights’ that define who is expected to compete with whom – generally cannot
be directly estimated from the data (due to a lack of degrees of freedom; e.g., Anselin,
1988; Case et al., 1993), their specification is at the discretion of the researcher and
critically depends on the underlying theoretical model (Brueckner, 2003; Revelli, 2005).
In this chapter, we focus on the competition of public authorities to attract mobile
capital, so that the spatial weights should ideally reflect the mobility of capital between
these jurisdictions (Brueckner, 2003). However, most previous work either relies on
a simple contiguity- or distance-based neighbourhood-specification, or augments the
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latter with socio-demographic criteria such as relative population size. Additionally,
and crucially, the spatial weights are generally defined with reference to only a limited
group of countries in the literature on international competition (e.g., Devereux et al.,
2008) or with reference to other jurisdictions within one particular region when studying
local competition (the focus of this chapter).1
The latter operational choice is often due to the lack of comparable data from outside the
analysed region; however, it is not innocuous. Since “spatial dependence may transcend
the boundaries of the data set” (Anselin, 1988: 172), jurisdictions within the dataset
may well be spatially autocorrelated with jurisdictions outside the observed data. Hence,
“spatial interaction (...) may well extend beyond identified regional borders” (Griffith,
1983). This possibility – known as the ‘boundary value problem’ or ‘edge effect’ – has
been discussed extensively in the early theoretical spatial econometrics literature, and
was shown to “result in a biased estimate of spatial dependence when ignored” (Anselin,
1988: 173; see also Griffith and Amrhein, 1983; Griffith, 1983). Although various partial
solutions to this problem have been proposed (e.g., Griffith, 1983, 1985), the boundary
value problem has, quite surprisingly by and large been ignored in the applied literature.
Admittedly, one could conceive of arguments to justify the disregard of extra-regional
effects and implicitly assume that competitive forces are independent of the distance to
surrounding regions (one of the ‘solutions’ proposed, see Griffith, 1983: 380).2 However,
in our view, the validity of such assumptions should be subject to direct empirical
scrutiny, which allows establishing whether or not we should worry about the edge effect
and the “considerable bias into parameter estimates for the region in question” it induces
(Griffith, 1983: 377).
Although some indirect evidence does exist, it remains inconclusive. On the one hand,
Gérard et al. (2010) fail to find significant interactions in the tax-setting of municipalities
located in different Belgian regions. Sub-national borders in Belgium, however, are
likely to constitute a significant barrier to mobility due to the predominant role of the
regions in Belgian federalism as well as their concurrence with linguistic borders. On the
other hand, Brügger and Parchet (2010) demonstrate that although linguistic borders
in Switzerland weaken policy interdependence, fiscal interactions persist also between
municipalities belonging to different regions. This suggests that jurisdictions’ peer group
need not consist exclusively of jurisdictions within their own region.
1Prominent examples in the local tax competition literature include, among several others, Brueckner
and Saavedra (2001) on cities in the Boston metropolitan area, Brett and Pinkse (2000) on municipalities
in the Canadian province of British Columbia, and Buettner (2003) on jurisdictions in the German state
of Baden-Württemberg.
2Depending on the underlying theoretical model, several partial defences can be provided. First, from
a tax competition perspective, mobile factors, such as capital or workers, may face a significant hurdle
to move across a border. Second, from a yardstick competition perspective, firms and/or citizens may
not believe that jurisdictions at the opposite side of an (inter)national border are a relevant ‘yardstick’
for their own incumbents’ policies or they may be less likely to obtain and/or process information from
‘the other side’. In both cases, the result is that politicians’ need to mimic cross-border jurisdictions’
policies is weakened, though it obviously need not disappear completely.
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This chapter takes a first step to assess this issue – i.e., spatial dependence transcending
identified borders – more directly by addressing two related questions. First, do jurisdic-
tions near a border compete only with jurisdictions on their own side of the border (as
implicitly assumed in most previous work), or do they have a broader reference group?
This question regards what could be designated as a pure border effect ; it evaluates
the constraining strength of borders. Such border effects are well-known in the trade
literature, and we will study whether they also matter in fiscal competition. Second,
how far ‘inland’ do competitive pressures from beyond the borders reach? This ques-
tion pertains to the radius within which the neighbourhood to another region is taken
into account by local decision-makers (a proximity effect). The answers to both ques-
tions have important implications for the specification of contiguity- and distance-based
neighbourhood matrices in future work, even for studies concerned with a single well-
defined region. Specifically, when border-jurisdictions perceive themselves as having an
inter-regional reference group (i.e., question 1), they should be treated differently from
inland-jurisdictions when evaluating spatial dependence within any given jurisdiction
(Griffith, 1983, 1985; Anselin, 1988). The revelation that such effects either materialise
only in close proximity to the border or persist also at significant distances (i.e., question
2) indicates how broadly such re-operationalisation should be applied.
We tackle both questions by surveying politicians about their perceptions of their ju-
risdictions’ most important competitors. While politicians’ opinions have until now not
been explicitly exploited to define jurisdictions’ peer groups, the processes analysed in
the literature (i.e., intergovernmental interactions) are real-world phenomena whereby
politicians take behaviour elsewhere into account. Hence, and especially since the under-
lying competitive forces are hard to measure objectively, politicians’ beliefs are particu-
larly likely to become of crucial importance. In line with this idea, Revelli and Tovmo
(2007) illustrate that spatial policy dependence is particularly strong between jurisdic-
tions where politicians believe that voters engage in benchmarking of their performance
against other jurisdictions (for a related finding, see Brülhart and Parchet, 2010). This
suggests that since politicians’ opinions about the importance of competitive pressures
and the extent of tax base mobility have important implications for their policy deci-
sions, empirical analyses of tax competition for mobile capital would do well to use such
information to create sensible definitions of competing/reference groups (rather than
impose ad hoc criteria that might have little relevance in practice). As demonstrated
by Heinemann and Janeba (2011), the opinions of politicians can exhibit considerable
variation also within the same institutional environment.3
3Alternatively, we could obtain estimates for the empirical relevance of the ‘border’ and ‘proximity’
effects by setting up a spatial econometric model that directly addresses the boundary value problem,
and run it for various operationalisations of what defines being ‘near’ a border. As detailed in the
main text, we think our use of politicians’ opinions has distinct benefits for addressing our research
questions and is certainly less cumbersome in its approach to the proximity effect. Moreover, the
practical relevance of this alternative approach may be limited since no generally accepted solution to
the boundary value problem exists (Griffith, 1985; Anselin, 1988) – and making inferences based on
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Our empirical results are based on both OLS and natural spline regressions using survey
data from over 700 German municipal leaders in the state of Baden-Württemberg. The
state is located in the south-west of Germany; it is surrounded by three German states
to the north and east, as well as France to the west and Switzerland to the south. The
results show that most politicians perceive other municipalities within their own state
as the strongest competitors. Yet, in municipalities ‘near’ a border, politicians also per-
ceive a strong competitive threat from across the border. This finding corroborates the
idea that municipalities near a border have a broader reference group than is commonly
assumed. Moreover, the importance of borders as a dividing line varies depending on
the type of border. First, ceteris paribus, their effect is weaker (i.e., less constraining)
for national than international borders. Decision-makers in municipalities up to roughly
20km from a national, inter-regional border (or about 10% of the maximum possible
distance to such a border in our sample) take competition with jurisdictions beyond the
border into consideration, while the equivalent effect of an international border ceases
after approximately 12.5km (or about 6% of the maximum possible distance). Although
these distances appear relatively small, it comprises 21% and 9.5% of all municipalities
in the state, respectively. Second, the French-German border is in our sample shown to
have a stronger dividing effect than the Swiss-German border. One tentative explana-
tion is that politicians perceive the cultural dimension of these respective borders (i.e.,
language) to be more important than the institutional dimension (EU versus non-EU).
Alternatively, it could reflect Switzerland’s more aggressive corporate tax policy, which
might make German local politicians feel as if they are facing a vigorous fiscal competi-
tor. Overall, our findings suggest that geographically close municipalities perceive each
other as competitors for mobile capital regardless of the state or country where they
are located. This, in turn, implies a need for more careful treatment of potential ‘edge
effects’ in empirical analyses of spatial fiscal interactions to avoid biased inferences on
parameters of spatial dependence (Griffith, 1983, 1985; Anselin, 1988).
4.2.1 A critical view of existing approaches
Independent of the underlying theoretical framework, operationalisations of a jurisdic-
tion’s ‘neighbourhood’ in studies of spatial policy interdependence most often rely on a
simple contiguity- or distance-based criterion. Neighbours are thereby defined as two ju-
risdictions which share a border (e.g., Heyndels and Vuchelen, 1998; Geys, 2006; Rincke,
2007) or are within a certain Euclidian or travel distance from each other (e.g., Buettner,
2001, 2003; Bosch and Solé-Ollé, 2007; Brett and Tardiff, 2008). In a similar vein, the
inverse of the distance between jurisdictions is often invoked to approximate the strength
of the assumed competitive relation between them (e.g., Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001;
Charlot and Paty, 2007; Koh and Riedel, 2010). Such distance-based criteria can be
imperfect solutions would certainly be less than ideal.
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justified by the fact that proximity is important for the dissemination of information –
certainly at the local government level (Allers and Elhorst, 2005) – and is significantly
linked to relocation decisions, both for individuals (e.g., Day, 1992) and firms (e.g., van
Dijk and Pellenbarg, 2000).4
Interestingly, and somewhat surprisingly, the delineation of jurisdictions’ peer groups in
most studies relies exclusively on ‘objective’ data and never accounts for politicians’ per-
ceptions about who they believe to be competing with. Such beliefs, however, are likely
to play a critical role. Revelli and Tovmo (2007), for example, indicate that the spatial
parameter estimated for local government efficiency patterns in Norway is significantly
larger for jurisdictions whose politicians believe that voters employ other jurisdictions’
performance as a yardstick, suggesting the importance of politicians’ perceptions for
observed policy interactions.
More generally, politicians’ beliefs are likely to matter for their decisions independent of
whether they are correct (i.e., accurately reflecting reality) or biased. On the one hand,
if one assumes that rational politicians have unbiased beliefs, their observable decisions
will reflect the underlying reality. Even then, however, politicians’ subjective opinions
will continue to play a crucial role in settings where the underlying reality is hard to
measure objectively (such as, for example, concerning inter-jurisdictional competitive
forces). In such a setting, objective data are arguably ‘unavailable’, and subjective
perceptions – which in this case are assumed unbiased – become central to the decision-
making process. On the other hand, if one allows for biased beliefs, the actual truth
(e.g., mobility of firms) might become less relevant than politicians’ perceptions thereof,
since it is these perceptions that shape their decisions. This idea rests on a substantial
academic literature indicating that individuals’ actions in a wide variety of situations
are more often driven by subjective perceptions rather than objective facts.5 Politicians
are unlikely to be immune to such effects. Evidence in this direction is provided by
Brülhart and Parchet (2010) who find that Swiss municipalities strategically interact in
their inheritance tax decisions in the belief that tax competition takes place. However, the
authors do not find any tax base effects induced by tax differentials. Hence, politicians
apparently base their decisions on wrong assumptions about the mobility of the taxable
4In order to define peers more specifically, some scholars move beyond a merely geographical neigh-
bourhood criterion by including information on, for example, relative population sizes, migration pat-
terns between jurisdictions (e.g., Case et al., 1993; Baicker, 2005; Rincke, 2010) or, in studies of inter-
national tax competition, the level of trade integration between countries (e.g., Prakash and Potoski,
2006; Exbrayat, 2009).
5Voter turnout in elections and participation in rebellious collective action, for example, have been
linked to the individuals’ overestimation of their personal influence on such actions’ outcomes (e.g.,
Muller and Opp, 1986; Opp, 2001). Similarly, “subjective interpretations of recurrence risks are better
predictors of reproductive intentions [of people with genetic disorders] than the ‘objective’ risks” (e.g.,
Shiloh and Saxe, 1989, 45). With respect to US tax policy, Birney et al. (2006), Krupnikov et al.
(2006), Slemrod (2006) and Sides (2010) analyse the critical role of voter misconceptions and ignorance
in explaining voters’ views on, for example, the repeal of estate taxation and the replacement of income
taxes by flat or retail sales taxes.
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object (referred to as “alleged tax competition” by Brülhart and Parchet, 2010: 1). It
is then only a small step to exploit politicians’ subjective perceptions about the identity
of their most important competitors in order to construct the neighbourhood matrix,
rather than their view on the mere existence of such competitors (as studied in, e.g.,
Ashworth and Heyndels, 1997, 2000; Hendrick et al., 2007; Heinemann and Janeba,
2011).
Moreover, applying contiguity- or distance-based specifications of the neighbourhood
matrix only within one analysed region, as most studies do, implicitly assumes that the
world ends at the region’s border. This clearly does not need to be the case, as Brügger
and Parchet (2010) demonstrate for culturally defined regions in Switzerland. They find
that local income tax burdens in Swiss municipalities do not change discretely at the
language border dividing the regions, but exhibit smooth spatial gradients. Although
‘cross-border’ interactions are found to be weaker than ‘within-region’ interactions, the
mere presence of such interregional interdependence indicates that municipalities along
a (language) border are not only competing with neighbours in their own region. In-
deed, it demonstrates that decision-making processes in at least some jurisdictions are
influenced by what happens beyond a border.6 Importantly, ignoring such cross-border
effects when they are present is likely to generate biased inferences on the central spa-
tial parameters – known as the ‘boundary value problem’ or ‘edge effect’ in the spatial
statistics literature (e.g., Griffith, 1983, 1985; Anselin, 1988). While different procedures
have been developed to deal with such edge effects (for a thorough discussion, see Grif-
fith, 1983, 1985), most scholars take the standard solution of “ignoring them” (Griffith,
1983: 380). Clearly, however, the validity of such assumption should be subject to direct
empirical scrutiny.
4.2.2 Hypotheses on the effect of (proximity to) borders
In what follows, we take up both criticisms by empirically evaluating whether the inclu-
sion of politicians’ opinions (criticism 1) can help to disclose the validity of ignoring the
edge effect (criticism 2). The central idea is that decision-makers in jurisdictions near
a border may well perceive themselves to have a peer group that extends beyond the
own region. This allows for potential cross-border interactions because in such setting
borders are not always perceived by politicians to be insurmountable obstacles for, for
example, mobile capital. In some sense, the state or country border represents an “ar-
tificial border” (Griffith, 1983: 378) that has little relevance in practice. Moreover, one
could argue that such effects need not be constrained to jurisdictions located physically
at the border (e.g., effects of cross-border trade and smuggling often persist at consider-
able distances from the border; see Asplund et al., 2007; Lovenheim, 2008; Beatty et al.,
6The same inference can obviously be drawn from the vast literature on cross-border shopping (for
reviews, see Chiou and Muehlegger, 2008; Lovenheim, 2008).
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2009). Such a proposition indeed follows naturally from the commonly acknowledged
central importance of distance (see above); however, while the existing literature has
consistently assumed that distance is crucial within a given region, the same logic can
easily be transferred to jurisdictions outside that region. Doing so implies that prox-
imity to jurisdictions outside the analysed region (i.e., on the other side of the border)
defines the extent to which local decision-makers perceive the intensity of competition
with these jurisdictions (relative to those within the own state). This leads to a first
testable hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.1. Proximity to competing jurisdictions beyond subnational or inter-
national borders shifts politicians’ perceptions on the relative importance of ‘internal’
and ‘external’ competitors: they perceive a stronger competitive pressure from ‘external’
competitors; a proximity effect.
Clearly, however, the mere existence of borders is likely to retain at least some ‘closing-
off’ effect. Indeed, although Basile et al. (2009) demonstrate that location choices for
multinationals in Europe are becoming increasingly uncoupled from national borders
due to increased integration, significant evidence indicates that borders continue to im-
pede trade (e.g., McCallum, 1995; Anderson and van Wincoop, 2003), even in highly
integrated areas such as NAFTA and the European Union. Some authors explain this
persistence by the existence of technical barriers (e.g., Chen, 2004), while others suggest
that cultural factors may drive these results (e.g., Guiso et al., 2009).
While this suggests a perceptible effect of international borders, a similar effect could
also be expected from subnational borders in a federal state, such as Germany. In our
German setting, the effect might be driven by cultural factors since state borders in Ger-
many largely coincide with historical and/or cultural borders, and the latter have been
shown to still matter for economic decisions such as migration (e.g., Falck et al., 2010). It
may also be caused by institutional factors as firms need to register at chambers of com-
merce (IHK), whose authority coincides with state borders. Furthermore, employment
conditions (including wages) are often defined in so-called “master contracts” arranged
at the state level. Such administrative requirements increase the cost of firm mobility
across state borders. Finally, German municipalities are geographically arranged in dis-
tricts (Landkreis) and represented in state-level organisations (Gemeindetag), both of
which have an advisory and coordination function and lead to information exchange.
Moreover, their statistical and accounting systems are coordinated at the state level. As
a result, local decision-makers are likely to be much better informed about the policies
of municipalities in the same state, thus becoming more likely to focus on municipalities
in the same state as their reference group. Moreover, Turrini and van Ypersele (2010)
identify asymmetries in judicial systems as driving forces of the border effect in trade,
both at the national level (due to international differences in the judicial system) and
the subnational level (due to the competency of different courts of appeal, which is also
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a relevant dividing line between German states).
Taken together, state borders are likely to have a relatively weaker ‘closing-off’ effect
than national borders since mobility as well as information costs are arguably lower
across the former. This discussion leads to our second hypothesis:
Hypothesis 4.2. Both national and international borders are perceived as real bar-
riers; a border effect. International borders are likely to exert a stronger influence than
national ones.
Given the institutional setting analysed below (i.e., municipalities in the German state
of Baden-Württemberg), the latter hypothesis can be specified a bit further. As Baden-
Württemberg shares a direct border with both France and Switzerland, it provides the
possibility to test for diverging effects of different types of international borders. On the
one hand, the border with France has a much stronger cultural dimension than the one
with Switzerland as Swiss municipalities near the Swiss-German border are German-
speaking. On the other hand, France is a member of the EU, while Switzerland is not
(although many of the economic freedoms provided by the EU apply to transactions
with Switzerland) and has its own currency. Hence, there might be a larger institutional
hurdle for firms to move from Germany to Switzerland than from Germany to France as
they effectively leave the EU-area in the former case. Analysing how politicians’ percep-
tions of their jurisdictions’ main competitors varies along the French and Swiss borders
provides an opportunity to gain some (preliminary) insight into the relative importance
of these two effects. This is reflected in our third and final proposition:
Hypothesis 4.3. The effect of international borders varies with the cultural and insti-
tutional dimensions of such borders. The exact nature (and strength) of such mediating
effects is theoretically open and thus constitutes an empirical question.
4.3 Empirical analysis of reference points near a bor-
der
4.3.1 Survey description
We employ data from a survey that asked local decision-makers in the German state
of Baden-Württemberg about their perceptions of the competitive pressures between
various jurisdictions to empirically test the hypotheses derived in the previous section.
We selected this setting for two main reasons. First, local business tax revenues (i.e.,
the ‘Gewerbesteuer’) make up roughly 48% of municipal tax revenue (or 21% of total
revenues; figures for 2004), and constitute the main source of tax revenues for local gov-
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ernments in Baden-Württemberg (e.g., Geys et al., 2010; Kalb et al., 2010). Moreover,
previous research found evidence of strong competition between municipalities in this
state (Buettner, 2001, 2003; Hauptmeier et al., 2009). It not only indicates the relevance
of business tax revenues and competition for such revenues within our setting, but also
allows us to relate our findings to existing work. Second, there exists a quasi-presidential
system in the municipalities of Baden-Württemberg, with a strong mayor and a rather
weak council. This is important since it implies that the decision-makers we surveyed
(i.e., the mayors, see below) have real decision-making power regarding fiscal policies.7
Specifically, the survey was conducted in May 2008 among the mayors of all 1108 munic-
ipalities in Baden-Württemberg. It obtained a response rate of 64.3%, thus providing a
sizeable sample (N=712). Both the sample size and response rate are exceptionally high
compared to the few previous economic studies of politicians’ opinions (e.g., Ashworth
and Heyndels, 1997, 2000; Hendrick et al., 2007; Heinemann and Janeba, 2011). Also,
and importantly, this sample is representative of the entire population in terms of the
geographical distribution of the municipalities (see Table 4.5 in the appendix). There
are some quantitatively minor, but statistically significant, differences with respect to
population size, unemployment rate, fiscal capacity and political make-up. Hence, we
directly control for the influence of these variables in the analysis below.
The central question of interest for our purposes is the following: “With which cities and
municipalities do you perceive yourself to be particularly in competition for businesses?”
Respondents were thereby asked to assess the strength of competitive pressures on a
discrete scale from -4 (not at all regarded as competitors) to +4 (very strongly regarded
as competitors) regarding three types of jurisdictions: (Q1) cities and municipalities in
Baden-Württemberg, (Q2) cities and municipalities in other German states, and (Q3)
cities and municipalities in other countries.8
The distribution of responses is illustrated in Figure 4.1. Clearly, and unsurprisingly,
most respondents regard internal competitors (i.e., those from the state of Baden-Würt-
temberg) as their most important competitors. Still, significant variation exists across
respondents, especially when they are asked about external competitors (i.e., those from
other states or countries). Moreover, and crucially, respondents often strongly vary their
responses across the three types of competitors mentioned. This not only indicates that
answers to the survey were taken seriously, but also that mayors indeed perceive and
report differences in the extent of competitive pressures across the three groups men-
tioned. It is this variation we exploit in our analysis.
7Mayors are elected directly by the citizens for eight year periods and lead the administration of
the municipality. Moreover, they preside over the local council and have full voting rights there. This
generates a unique combination of executive authority and agenda-setting power.
8The original wording in German is: “Mit welchen anderen Städten und Gemeinden sehen Sie sich
besonders im Wettbewerb um Unternehmensansiedlungen?” Note that we did not ask respondents
about specific municipalities, but requested an opinion concerning the three general municipality types
outlined.
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Figure 4.1: Survey results, perceived competitive pressures (N=712). For each of the
three questions, the percentages add up to 100%.
4.3.2 Specification and methodology
Our baseline specification takes the following form:
RPCi = a+ b1Borderi +Xib2 + ei
The left-hand-side variable Relative Perceived Competition (RPC ) is constructed as the
difference of the perceived intensity of competition between two types of competitors:
those inside and those outside the state. This effectively leads to two dependent variables:
a) RPCstate, which is calculated as the perceived intensity of competition with
municipalities in other German states (Q2) minus the perceived intensity of com-
petition with municipalities in Baden-Württemberg (Q1),
b) RPCcountry, which measures the perceived intensity of competition with munic-
ipalities in other countries (Q3) minus the perceived intensity of competition with
municipalities in Baden-Württemberg (Q1).
A value of zero in either case denotes that a given respondent regards municipalities in
other German states (or other countries) as equally important competitors compared to
municipalities in their own state. A negative (positive) value denotes that municipalities
in the same (other) state or country are more important competitors.
The central explanatory variables relate to the geographical placement of municipalities.
We introduce a number of different operationalisations to address our various hypotheses
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(see section 4.2.3). First, to study the impact of direct neighbourhood to a state border
(see H2), we introduce a dummy variable equal to 1 for municipalities directly located
on one of Baden-Württemberg’s borders to its three surrounding German states (i.e.,
Bavaria, Hessen and Rhineland-Palatinate), and 0 otherwise. Such an indicator variable
is appropriate since there are no major institutional differences between these three
neighbouring states. Altogether, 54 municipalities in our sample (7.6%) are located
adjacent to a state border. Second, to study the impact of direct neighbourhood to a
country border (see H2), we introduce an indicator variable equal to 1 for municipalities
bordering France (18 municipalities) or Switzerland (likewise 18 municipalities), and 0
otherwise. Given the institutional and cultural differences between these neighbours, we
also differentiate between the effect of the Swiss and the French border (see H3). Third,
to estimate the spatial reach of borders’ effects (i.e., see H1), we replace the dummies
for adjacent municipalities with distances to the closest municipality beyond a state or
country border (and its squared value to capture non-linearities).9
Finally, in the vector Xi, we introduce a number of socio-economic control variables,
which are summarised in Table 4.6 in the appendix. They first of all comprise the
municipal unemployment rate and the population of working age. Then, we include
two political variables reflecting the share of seats in the local council held by left-wing
parties and independents (so-called “Freie Wählervereinigungen”, see Geys et al., 2010),
respectively. They capture the influence of the ideological position of a given jurisdiction,
which is included because political ideology has been shown to significantly affect politi-
cians’ perception of business tax competition (Heinemann and Janeba, 2011). Thirdly,
we introduce dummies identifying those municipalities which are the main beneficiaries
of transfers in the local system of fiscal equalisation. Since these municipalities are ar-
guably partially protected from competition (i.e., the system compensates for losses in
municipalities’ tax bases; e.g., Buettner, 2006), their decision-makers might have differ-
ent perceptions of competitive pressures.10 Fourth, we insert a dummy indicating that
survey responses were given directly by the mayor (rather than delegated by him to a
member of his bureaucracy). Finally, municipal size and dummies for highly agglomer-
ated cities intend to capture that urban centres are generally more exposed to external
competition, as will be examined in greater detail in section 4.4.
Before we turn to our estimation results, it is important to mention three aspects re-
garding our estimation methodology. First, we centre all control variables by subtracting
their means. Hence, all right-hand side variables – except the neighbourhood dummies
and the distance measures – are rescaled to have an average of 0. This transformation
facilitates the interpretation of our results, especially for the coefficient on the constant,
9Distances are thereby defined as the minimum land distance between the centres of the relevant
jurisdictions.
10We exploit a discontinuity in the local system of fiscal equalisation, which categorises municipalities
according to their “fiscal capacity” and gives those with a low fiscal capacity the highest contribution
rate, i.e., compensates them most extensively for reductions in their tax base (see Buettner, 2006).
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which cannot be clearly interpreted without this transformation. Second, given the non-
continuous nature of the dependent variables, we initially estimated all models using an
ordered probit approach; however, as there is a relatively large number of values those
variables can take (i.e., 17 options ranging from -8 to 8), we also ran all estimations
using OLS. Both sets of results provide qualitatively very similar results. As the OLS
results are easier to interpret, we present those in the following. Finally, as the effect
of proximity to borders is likely to be highly non-linear, we complement the OLS re-
gressions, which include distance and distance squared as discussed above, with natural
spline regressions. This particularly accounts for nonlinear effects and allows a much
more detailed analysis of the proximity effect (see Beatty et al., 2009, and Brülhart et
al., 2010, for recent applications of this estimator to the analysis of border effects).
4.3.3 Empirical results: effect of state borders
Table 4.1 reports our results regarding the impact of subnational borders on mayors’
perceptions of inter-jurisdictional competitive pressures. In column (1), we focus on the
impact of direct neighbourhood to a state border. The coefficient estimate for the con-
stant equals -3.155 and is statistically significant beyond the 1% level. This indicates that
mayors on average regard municipalities in their own state as much closer competitors
than those beyond the state borders (remember that a value of 0 would set both com-
petitors at the same level), which suggests a relatively important ‘closing-off’ potential
of state borders. Yet, in line with our hypothesis H2, this effect is strongly and statis-
tically significantly counteracted by direct neighbourhood to state borders (see the top
row of Table 4.1). This result indicates that a decision-maker from a border-municipality
perceives, ceteris paribus, much higher competitive pressure from other German states
than decision-makers from municipalities in the interior of the state. Nevertheless, even
a border-municipality perceives significantly higher competition intensity from munici-
palities within their own state (-3.155+1.953=-1.202; p=0.002). However, this disaggre-
gation of the constant demonstrates that the apparent strength of the ‘closing-off’ effect
of state borders is predominantly driven by the distance of most municipalities to state
borders (i.e., the adverse proximity effect, see below), and not by the border effect itself.
Replacing the dummies for adjacent municipalities with the distance to the closest mu-
nicipality beyond a state border (and its squared value) in column (2), two things are
worth emphasising. First, the value of the constant term, which now represents the
perceptions of mayors on the state border (or, technically, for municipalities where the
distance to this border is 0km), is still significantly negative. This finding re-confirms
that, although mayors of municipalities on the border still regard municipalities in their
own state as closer competitors than those beyond the state borders, the strength of
their perception is much weaker than the estimated average value (which is -3.155, see
column (1)). Second, we find a significant non-linear effect of proximity to borders.
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Table 4.1: Effect of subnational borders, OLS regressions
Relative Perceived Competition with municipalities
in other states (RPCstate)
(1) (2)
Neighbour state border 1.953***
(0.335)
State Border Distance -0.0490***
(0.00899)
State Border Distance2 0.000302***
(6.88e-05)
Unemployment ratet−1 -2.706 0.822
(17.98) (17.97)




Free Voterst -0.147 -0.0518
(0.470) (0.474)
Fiscal capacityt: low -0.766** -0.877***
(0.329) (0.330)






Regional centre 1.567** 1.392*
(0.748) (0.758)






Standard errors in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
In order to evaluate the implied persistence of the border’s effects in more detail, it is
instructive to switch to the results from the natural spline regressions, which are visu-
alised in Figure 4.2. These results first of all confirm that the null hypothesis of “no
border effect”, i.e., municipalities regard internal and external competitors as equally
important, can be rejected even for municipalities with a very low distance to other
states (i.e., the 95%-confidence interval around the point estimate never encompass 0).
Second, the lower bound of the confidence interval around the estimated effect intersects
with the mean value of the dependent variable, which is represented by the horizontal
line in Figure 4.2, at a distance of 20.3 kilometres. This result indicates a significant and
strong (but declining) proximity effect in the perceptions of the mayors of municipalities
up to 20.3 kilometres from the state border (in line with H1). Beyond this point, the
estimated value is no longer statistically significantly different from the average of all
jurisdictions. Consequently, our results indicate that politicians’ perceptions become
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Figure 4.2: Subnational borders, natural spline regressions. Smooth line is obtained by
cubic spline with five knots. 95% confidence interval indicated by shaded area. Straight
line represents mean value of RPCstate = -3.17.
‘immune’ to extra-regional competitive forces at distances beyond 20km from the bor-
der. Altogether, 233 out of the 1108 municipalities of the state are located within this
critical distance (21.0%).
4.3.4 Empirical results: effect of international borders
Turning to the analysis of international borders, our results are summarised in Table 4.2.
In column (1), we do not differentiate between the French and Swiss border and focus on
direct adjacency to one of these countries. The estimated coefficient of the constant is
again negative and even larger than in the previous section. Although we once again find
that this effect is counteracted by direct neighbourhood to the border (see the top row of
Table 4.2), this reductive effect is both substantively and statistically (p<0.10) weaker
than in the sub-national case. Both these results imply that international borders are
indeed perceived by local mayors as ‘stronger’ borders than regional ones (supportive
of H2). Interestingly, this finding helps illuminate recent failures to find cross-border
interactions by means of traditional spatial econometrics techniques in the tax setting of
French and German municipalities (Cassette et al., 2010). Indeed, our findings suggest
that politicians generally perceive country borders to be relatively strong, and therefore
focus predominantly on the decisions of neighbours on their own side of the border. The
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only exceptions are those in charge of a municipality in very close proximity to this
border, as we will see below.
In order to evaluate H3, we differentiate in column (2) between the effect of the Swiss
and the French border. The results indicate that the effect of the Swiss border is about
twice the size of that of the French one. It also is significantly different from zero at
the 10% significance level, whereas the effect of adjacency to France remains statistically
insignificant. Given the different nature of both borders, one tentative explanation is that
politicians perceive the cultural dimension of these respective borders (i.e., language) to
be more important than the institutional dimension (EU versus non-EU).11 Hence, our
results appear supportive of the idea that the effect of international borders varies with
the cultural and institutional dimensions of such borders (as proposed in H3). Still, an
alternative explanation may lie in Switzerland’s aggressive corporate tax policy. The
average effective tax rates of the adjacent cantons’ capitals ranged from 13.9 to 20.9% in
2009, compared to 34.2% in the French city of Strasbourg and between 21.9 and 26.8%
in the state of Baden-Württemberg (see BAK Basel 2009).
We obtain the results in columns (3) and (4) by replacing the border dummies with
the minimum distance to the closest foreign municipality. As before, the value of the
constant term rises above the average value, indicating that mayors’ perception of munic-
ipalities in their own state as closer competitors than those beyond the country’s borders
is weaker in municipalities on the border than in municipalities away from the border.12
The difference, however, is much weaker than in the regional-border case, reinforcing
our earlier finding that local mayors perceive international borders as ‘stronger’ borders
than regional ones. As before, we also find a significant non-linear effect of proximity to
the border. This finding is replicated when separating France, Switzerland and Austria,
although the results for Austria remain statistically insignificant.13 The associated nat-
ural spline regressions, depicted in Figure 4.3, differ from those for the state borders in
two central respects. First, we observe that the border effect is much stronger in the case
of country borders (as could also be gathered from a comparison of Tables 4.1 and 4.2).
Second, the proximity effect is much weaker than in the regional-border case and ceases
after a much shorter distance. Already at a distance of 12.5 km, the lower bound of the
confidence interval intersects the abscissa indicating the mean value. In other words,
for municipalities more than 12.5 kilometres away from the neighbouring country, ‘prox-
11A potential problem here is that many direct neighbours to France have a sizeable distance to
the next French city because the river Rhine runs between them. Restricting the sample to those
municipalities with a direct connection to France via a bridge or ferry (13 observations), however, does
not affect our results in terms of both coefficient estimate and statistical significance (available upon
request).
12Note that the intercept in column (4) obviously becomes meaningless since no municipality can at
once be at 0km distance from France, Switzerland and Austria. Hence, this interpretation is only valid
for column (3).
13Although Baden-Württemberg does not share a border with Austria, we pick it up here as it is the
nearest country for a small number of municipalities.
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Table 4.2: International borders, OLS regressions
Relative Perceived Competition with municipalities
in other countries (RPCcountry)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Neighbour International Border 0.942*
(0.484)
Neighbour Int. Border: FRA 0.652
(0.677)
Neighbour Int. Border: SUI 1.226*
(0.672)
Int. Border Distance -0.0215**
(0.0106)
Int. Border Distance2 0.000132*
(7.48e-05)
Int. Border Distance: FRA -0.0391*
(0.0227)
Int. Border Distance2: FRA 0.000159**
(7.24e-05)
Int. Border Distance: SUI -0.0175*
(0.0106)
Int. Border Distance2: SUI 0.000149
(0.000115)
Int. Border Distance: AUT -7.55e-05
(0.0140)
Int. Border Distance2: AUT -7.23e-05
(7.71e-05)
Unemployment ratet−1 0.882 1.097 7.020 13.52
(21.40) (21.41) (21.76) (22.67)
Population Working-aget−1 -4.494 -4.188 -3.894 -3.972
(5.209) (5.235) (5.211) (5.322)
Left-wingt -0.108 -0.129 0.0623 0.272
(1.138) (1.139) (1.143) (1.164)
Free Voterst -0.971* -0.981* -0.775 -0.714
(0.559) (0.559) (0.575) (0.587)
Fiscal capacityt: low -1.049*** -1.048*** -1.069*** -1.084***
(0.390) (0.391) (0.391) (0.396)
Fiscal capacityt: medium -0.609 -0.612 -0.606 -0.605
(0.376) (0.377) (0.376) (0.376)
Mayor 0.193 0.187 0.193 0.189
(0.222) (0.222) (0.222) (0.222)
Log(Population)t−1 -0.207 -0.211 -0.164 -0.156
(0.190) (0.190) (0.192) (0.198)
Regional centre 1.770** 1.753** 1.553* 1.354
(0.887) (0.887) (0.894) (0.911)
Secondary centre 0.814* 0.820* 0.757* 0.681
(0.431) (0.431) (0.433) (0.443)
Constant -3.757*** -3.748*** -3.041*** -0.464
(0.251) (0.252) (0.403) (2.606)
Observations 712 712 712 712
R-squared 0.034 0.035 0.035 0.040
Standard errors in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
imity’ to the border no longer affects decision-makers’ perceptions of the intensity of
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international competition.14 Even so, 105 municipalities (9.5% of all municipalities in
the state) are located within this critical distance. The geographical location of munici-
palities within the critical distance to a state or country border is visualised in Figure 4.4.
Figure 4.3: International borders, natural spline regression. Smooth line is obtained by
cubic spline with five knots. 95% confidence interval indicated by shaded area. Straight
line represents mean value of RPCcountry = -3.88.
Before we conclude, we should say a few words about the results of our control variables,
which perform fairly consistently across Tables 4.1 and 4.2. Most significantly, we find
that the local system of fiscal equalisation indeed appears to affect the competition per-
ceptions of decision-makers in municipalities with low (and, to a lesser extent, medium)
fiscal capacity. In line with the idea that this system compensates such municipalities
for losses in their tax bases relative to other municipalities in the state, their mayors
perceive that competition is rather a local issue. We also confirm that decision-makers of
highly agglomerated cities, as they are generally more exposed to external competition,
perceive competitive pressures to come relatively more from extra-regional municipalities
(see section 4.3 for more the detailed analysis of this issue). Neither the local unem-
ployment rate nor the population of working age plays a significant role in politicians’
perceptions. Furthermore, political variables play no consistent role in our estimations
either.
14This might in part explain the non-significant effects for Austria discussed above. Indeed, since
there are only few municipalities with a rather low distance to Austria in the sample, the fact that the
effect of proximity to other countries ceases quickly implies we cannot expect a strong effect for Austria.
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Figure 4.4: Location of municipalities within critical distances. Light-coloured : distance
to closest municipality in other German state < 20.3km; Intermediate-coloured : distance
to closest municipality in other country < 12.5km; Dark-coloured : distance to closest
municipality in other German state < 20.3km and distance to closest municipality in
other country < 12.5km
4.3.5 Implications
A common characteristic of existing work on local-level spatial policy interactions is
that the specification of the neighbourhood matrix, which defines who is expected to
compete with whom, occurs solely with respect to other jurisdictions within the re-
gion under study. Consequently, it ignores the potential influence of jurisdictions in
neighbouring regions. Similarly, studies of international tax competition generally de-
fine the neighbourhood matrix with respect to a limited number of countries (often due
to data limitation). To the extent that spatial dependence transcends the boundaries
thus imposed by the researcher and/or the dataset, such restriction may induce biased
inferences on the spatial parameter (Griffith, 1983, 1985; Griffith and Amrhein, 1985;
Anselin, 1988).
Analysing German local politicians’ perceptions about their municipality’s main com-
petitors in the struggle for business investments (i.e., other jurisdictions a) in their own
region, b) in other regions in the same country, or c) in other countries), this article
evaluated how worried we should be about the potential threat to empirical findings by
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this boundary value problem or edge effect. Our results show that local decision-makers
on average regard municipalities in their own state as much closer competitors than
those beyond the state borders. Crucially, however, we also find that location close to
a border significantly undermines the perception that the fiercest competitive pressure
derives from jurisdictions within their own state. Moreover, this effect is stronger for,
and is felt at further distances from, subnational than inter-national borders. Over-
all, nearest municipalities appear keenly aware of each other as competitors for mobile
capital. This effect is independent of the state or country where they are located.
These results have two important practical implications. First, they provide a parsi-
monious explanation for the presence of cross-regional local-level strategic interactions
(e.g., Brügger and Parchet, 2010) and the difficulties to identify equivalent cross-country
interactions (Cassette et al., 2010). Indeed, our findings suggest that it is politicians’
perceptions about the relative constraints imposed by these different types of borders
that defines the (absence of) reaction to extra-regional jurisdictions’ actions. Moreover,
our empirical approach allows us to quantify the spatial extent of such border-related
effects. In particular, whereas the proximity to international borders ceases to affect
local decision-makers’ opinions at a distance of about 12.5km, the proximity to sub-
national borders plays a role up to about 20km. Interestingly, the latter finding is in
close accordance with recent findings by Brügger and Parchet (2010) using a sample of
Swiss municipalities separated by a cultural border. They show that jurisdictions’ tax
choices are constrained by tax competition at a distance of up to 20 kilometres. Our
results suggest that it may well result from the fact that decision-makers do not consider
municipalities beyond this critical distance as their rivals in the competition for mobile
capital. This finding also corroborates van Dijk and Pellenbarg’s (2000) finding that
firm migration is mostly short distance; short distance moves allow firms to keep most
of their workforce since it is within a reasonable commuting distance. Moreover, within
the identified critical distance firms can still maintain relations with local suppliers or
selling markets as well as local networks.
Second, our results imply that the likelihood of obtaining biased estimates – if one
refrains from taking these inter-border links into account and specifies an inappropriately
constrained reference group of competing jurisdictions (Griffith, 1983, 1985; Griffith
and Amrhein, 1985; Anselin, 1988) – is substantial; indeed, no less than 21% of all
municipalities in our sample are located within the critical distance to a state border,
and 9.5% within the critical distance to another country. Moreover, based on our finding
that different types of borders can have different effects (e.g., regional versus national
borders, France versus Switzerland), the specific context of the jurisdiction should ideally
be taken into account as it reflects the extent to which two jurisdictions separated by a
border are close or distant substitutes.
Our results in general thus emphasise the need to take the ‘edge effect’ seriously in
analyses of spatial fiscal interactions. At the very least, robustness analyses should be
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presented indicating whether or not it is likely to affect the inferences from the analysis.
In this respect, it is interesting to observe that the various potential solutions to the
boundary problem discussed in the theoretical literature include constructing a buffer
zone along the regional boundary (i.e. dropping the border jurisdictions), using dummy
variables for differentiating jurisdictions at the boundary, or employing statistical tech-
niques that cast the boundary problem as one of missing data along the periphery of
the study area (see Griffith, 1983, who discusses nine different solution concepts). While
the relative (de)merits of these various correction concepts lie credibly beyond the scope
of this chapter (for such discussion, see Griffith, 1985; Anselin, 1988) and the choice
between them is finally up to the researcher, almost all of the discussed methods require
the designation of ‘border jurisdictions’ or ‘buffer zones’. As such designation should,
ideally, not proceed on an ad hoc basis, but rather be guided by the data at hand,
our analysis hints to the fact that corrections may be required on a different ‘scale’
depending on the type of border one faces in the sample analysed: i.e., whereas for
international borders it appears appropriate to restrict the correction to jurisdictions
immediately adjacent to the border, national borders appear to require a (considerably)
wider correction.
4.4 The spatial structure of local tax competition
4.4.1 Overview
The past two decades have seen a great interest in the study of (local) capital tax com-
petition. The empirical literature has focused on the analysis of spatial interactions.
When these interactions originate from inter-municipal tax competition for mobile capi-
tal the literature typically assumes that the competitors of a local community are mainly
those jurisdictions in its close neighbourhood. Thus intensity of competition is approxi-
mated by neighbourhood matrices (see Brueckner, 2003 and Revelli, 2005, for surveys).
If true, this assumption implies for theoretical modelling that the tax reaction function
of a community depends directly only on the tax rates of its neighbouring jurisdictions.
This is, however, incompatible with standard models of capital tax competition where
complete capital mobility is assumed and all jurisdictions compete with each other in a
simultaneous game (see, Wilson, 1999, for a survey; exceptions discussed below). Note
that the two sets of assumptions generate different implications when more and more
jurisdictions become part of an integrated capital market. According to the theoretical
literature this should lead to very small or even zero capital tax rates (assuming other
tax instruments with finite supply elasticities are available), while in the context of the
empirical model at most a rather small indirect effect should be found.
In this second part of the chapter we make two novel contributions, one empirical and
one theoretical, that relate to the above discrepancy between theoretical and empirical
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models. First, based on survey evidence from more than 700 mayors in the German
state of Baden-Württemberg, we study the “true” spatial structure of local tax competi-
tion by asking local politicians who they actually consider to be their main competitors
for mobile capital. This allows us to identify empirically the reference group for local
business tax policy decisions. The size of the jurisdiction and in particular its economic
function (based on categories from spatial planning) turn out to be the important deter-
minants of the decision-maker’s perception of the intensity of competition. Compared to
non-urban municipalities, respondents from urban centres (up to population of 600,000)
perceive a much higher intensity of competition for firms in general, and especially with
respect to competing jurisdictions which are distant or even located in other countries.
By contrast, mayors from smaller municipalities (usually with populations of between
1,000 and 10,000 inhabitants) regularly state that they don’t compete with distant ju-
risdictions for mobile firms. Moreover, we find evidence that jurisdictions in the direct
neighbourhood are generally regarded as especially important competitors. On the one
hand these findings confirm the assumption of the empirical literature about the im-
portance of neighbourhood competition, but on the other hand it also shows that an
important effect is left out.
Second, based on these empirical findings we build a multi-stage tax competition model
with a rich competition structure. Our model assumes n metropolitan regions, each
of which consists of one city centre and m surrounding jurisdictions called hinterlands.
There are two levels of competition for mobile capital. First, cities simultaneously com-
pete for mobile capital by setting their tax policies, followed by capital movements to
a particular city. This represents the level of competition between non-neighbouring
communities identified in our survey. Second and after the cities’ tax choices, hinter-
lands compete simultaneously for capital within its metropolitan area taking the city
centre’s tax rate and the total metropolitan capital supply as given (which is their own
supply plus the capital attracted by the city beforehand). This approximates the neigh-
bourhood competition effect described above.15 One way to think about our sequential
structure is to view large cities as the primary competitors for large-scale investments,
such as headquarters, which are often accompanied by smaller investments (for example
from suppliers or subcontractors). After the large-scale investment has been located in
a city, the associated suppliers and subcontractors have strong incentives to settle in a
reasonable distance to their client, i.e., in the same metropolitan region.16
15Therefore two commitment assumptions are built into our model: i) A city’s capital tax is fixed
once its hinterlands compete (but the city rationally anticipates competition from hinterlands), and ii)
after the cities’ tax competition game capital is mobile only within the city’s metropolitan region but
not beyond.
16This finding gets further empirical support from van Dijk and Pellenbarg (2000) who show that the
vast majority of firm relocations in the Netherlands occurs in form of short distance moves. Brueckner
and Saavedra (2001) argue why capital – although theoretically completely mobile at least within a
country – is supplied inelastically within a region and thus remains in the respective metropolitan
region. For instance, investments in specialised industries are strongly tied to a region. Moreover,
closeness to suppliers or selling markets as well as existing local networks are further reasons why firms
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We then compare the outcome of the fiscal competition game from this model, called the
sequential model, to a traditional tax competition model in which all governments decide
simultaneously in an otherwise identical setup, called the simultaneous model. We are
particulary interested in the effects of a rise in the number of metropolitan regions n,
which approximates the increase in competition through globalisation (or in Germany’s
context the effects from Eastern enlargement of the EU and German unification; more
on this below). Our first result is a limit result and demonstrates that in both types
of models for a very large number of metropolitan regions (n → ∞) capital tax rates
in cities converge to zero, while for hinterlands the capital tax rate goes to zero in the
simultaneous model, but stays bounded above zero in the sequential model. Secondly,
in the sequential model an increase in n affects cities more than hinterlands in two ways:
i) cities reduce capital tax rates more than hinterlands lower theirs, and ii) cities shift
more from mobile capital taxation to immobile labour taxation than hinterlands. Result
i) does not hold in the simultaneous model, where in cities the effect can be larger or
smaller than in hinterlands and is typically close to zero when evaluated numerically.
Our sequential model thus predicts that hinterlands are less affected than cities by
increasing competition from entry of metropolitan regions. As empirically hinterlands
are typically much smaller than urban centres, our model is in contrast to research that
has shown that smaller countries and countries on the periphery have lower corporate tax
rates than large countries or regions in the core (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Haufler
et al., 2009; Haufler and Wooton, 2010). We then show, however, that several of our
predictions coming from the sequential model are in line with stylised facts about local
business tax rates in the German state of Baden-Württemberg, the same state on which
our survey draws. Local business tax rates in small jurisdictions are clearly not small and
sometimes even higher than in city centres. In addition, in recent years tax rates in small
jurisdictions in Baden-Württemberg have increased, while being stagnant in city centres.
Cities in turn have shifted tax burden much more to a less distortionary property tax
than small communities did. Our preferred explanation for the difference in predictions
and stylised facts is that competition between geographically close jurisdictions at the
local level is qualitatively different from competition among countries or states. At the
local level, but not at the country or state level, it is relatively easy for a firm to benefit
from the agglomeration benefits and infrastructure of a city centre, while enjoying the
same legal and cultural context, and yet for tax reasons to be located just outside that
jurisdiction.
Our theoretical approach is related to several strands of literature. Few of the empirical
contributions on local tax competition (e.g., Buettner, 2001; Brueckner and Saavedra,
2001; Hauptmeier et al., 2009) enrich the empirical analyses with explicit theoretical
considerations. These are based on standard tax competition models in the tradition of
the workhorse model by Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), and are modified by restricting
may not respond elastically after they are locked in in a location.
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the number of competing jurisdictions. Capital is then completely mobile within one
region, so that jurisdictions only compete with jurisdictions from the same region for
capital, but capital is not at all mobile with respect to jurisdictions in other regions.
This assumption, however, is refuted by our survey results at least for larger cities.
A comparable finding to ours – not all jurisdictions compete for capital to the same degree
– is found in few theoretical papers which endogenise the number of jurisdictions that
compete for mobile capital. The approaches by Jayet and Paty (2006) and Matsumoto
(2010) assume that local jurisdictions have to pay a development cost before entering
the competition for a mobile firm, and therefore in equilibrium not all jurisdictions enter
competition for outside investment. The main focus of these papers is thus on the overall
number and not the type of jurisdictions that compete for an investment.
The theoretical tax competition literature has identified size differences (expressed as dif-
ferences in labour endowments) as a factor for explaining why different jurisdictions are
affected asymmetrically by tax competition (see Bucovetsky, 1991, and Wilson, 1991).
In these two-jurisdiction models, the small jurisdiction suffers a bigger outflow of capital
after an increase of its capital tax rate than the bigger competitor, so that the smaller
jurisdiction sets the lower tax rates than the bigger one.17 However, these works focus
only on the pure size effects and do not consider that larger urban centres might com-
pete with a different set of competitors for mobile capital, so that they are faced with a
different competitive pressure than smaller rural areas.
Concerning the model structure, Gordon (1992) and Wang (1999) assume similar to us
a sequential timing in which the bigger region moves first. They justify the structure
with the reasoning that in the real world the large region is likely to move first and
the small region moves second. This assumption gets support from empirical evidence
on international corporate tax reforms (see e.g., Altshuler and Goodspeed (2002) and
Redoano (2007)). Sequential game structures are also common in new economic geog-
raphy models to tax competition, such as Baldwin and Krugman (2004) and Borck and
Pflüger (2006). A new approach has been presented by Kempf and Rota-Graziosi (2010)
who endogenise the moves in a simple two-region tax competition model and find that
in their model the smaller region might have incentives to move first.
4.4.2 Perceptions of local decision-makers
The existing empirical literature on spatial interactions suggests that capital mobility
is highest between neighbouring jurisdictions. Spatial tax interaction is, for instance,
demonstrated for the local business tax for cities and municipalities in the German
state of Baden-Württemberg by Buettner (2001). Similar evidence for inter-municipal
interactions has been found for local business property taxes in the metropolitan area of
17Most recently, Bucovetsky (2009) shows that this result can be generalised for federations consisting
of more than two jurisdictions.
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Boston (Brueckner and Saavedra, 2001) and the Canadian province of British Columbia
(Brett and Pinkse, 2000). However, evidence for spatial fiscal interaction is by itself not a
sufficient proof for the existence of capital tax competition that is induced by high capital
mobility between neighbouring jurisdictions. The observed patterns may also have other
causes such as yardstick competition (see Revelli (2005) for different explanations of
spatial interactions). In fact, the direct evidence for tax base mobility is mixed. Brett
and Pinkse (2000) as well as Brett and Tardif (2008) do not find any effect of neighbours’
levels of business property tax rates on the tax base for a sample of municipalities in the
Canadian province of British Columbia. Some positive evidence comes from Buettner
(2003) who studies the tax base effect for the local business tax in the state of Baden-
Württemberg. He finds only evidence for relatively small municipalities whose tax base
is positively affected by the tax rates of its neighbours.
A survey therefore helps in finding out whether capital mobility between jurisdictions is
high. Decision-makers can only be expected to be responsive to taxes in other jurisdic-
tions if they believe that capital is mobile to these jurisdictions. We assume that these
beliefs can be regarded as proxies for the true mobility of firms as decision-makers are
likely to be well-informed about one of their most important revenue sources.18 Our sur-
vey approach is similar to that of Heinemann and Janeba (2011) by focusing on political
decision makers. They study individual perceptions of members of German parliament
(Bundestag) with respect to the intensity of international tax competition, and find,
inter alia, a strong ideological bias.19 In this work, we will shift the focus to the study of
the municipality characteristics to explain differences in the competitive pressures which
are perceived by politicians. We control for a possible ideological bias in the regressions.
We examine the determinants of the competitive pressures which are actually perceived
by real world decision-makers at the local level. We again focus on German cities and
municipalities in the state of Baden-Württemberg and use the data of the survey which
was described in section 4.3.1 in greater detail. Our survey question of interest is again
the following: “With which cities and municipalities do you perceive yourself to be
in competition for businesses?”20 However, in contrast to section 4.3, we now do not
refer to the Relative Perceived Competition, but to the straight answers given to the
question, which asked the respondents to assess the strength of competitive pressures on
a discrete scale from -4 (not at all regarded as competitors) to +4 (very strongly regarded
18We realise that beliefs about mobility do not necessarily have to be identical with real mobility,
and therefore decision-makers might build their decisions on wrong perceptions of the reality. Evidence
for this view comes from Brülhart and Parchet (2010) who demonstrate what they call “alleged” tax
competition for inheritance taxes in Swiss municipalities.
19A survey-based approach with respect to lower-tier decision-makers has until now only be applied
by Ashworth and Heyndels for Belgium municipalities. In contrast to our work, however, they focus
on the stated preferences for tax reforms (see Ashworth and Heyndels 1997, 2000), and not on the
perceptions and spatial structure of competitive pressures.
20The exact wording of this question in German is: “Mit welchen anderen Städten und Gemeinden
sehen Sie sich besonders im Wettbewerb um Unternehmensansiedlungen?”.
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Figure 4.5: Survey: distribution of responses
as competitors) regarding three types of jurisdictions: (Q1) cities and municipalities in
Baden-Württemberg, (Q2) cities and municipalities in other German states, and (Q3)
cities and municipalities in other countries. Unfortunately, the survey questions do not
allow us to disentangle the perceived intensity of competition with urban centres and
with rural areas within the state of Baden-Württemberg. The responses given to the first
question confound the two channels discussed above, i.e., competition with neighbouring
municipalities as well as with more distant jurisdictions within the same state.21
First, we are interested in the effect of the jurisdiction size on the perceived competitive
pressure. The illustrations in Figure 4.5 show the distributions of the responses to the
three survey questions conditional on the size of the jurisdictions. Jurisdiction sizes
are partitioned into deciles plus the twenty biggest jurisdictions of the state. All three
diagrams indicate that larger cities perceive the highest degree of competitive pressures.
However, this effect varies strongly depending on the reference group. Whereas the
perception of the intensity of competition with local competitors (within the state of
Baden-Württemberg) does not differ strongly for all size deciles, it depends strongly on
size when competition with more distant competitors is considered, that is, jurisdictions
located in other German states or different countries (Q2 and Q3).
21We would have liked to ask for the exact identity of a jurisdiction’s competitors rather than using
this indirect question. In order to obtain a high response rate, however, we enlisted the support of the
cities’ joint representation organisation who did not allow us to ask such a direct question.
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We proceed by studying the statistical significance of our descriptive findings in a SUR
(seemingly unrelated regressions) ordered probit model. The responses to the three
survey questions presented above serve as dependent variables. We choose a system
estimator because the individual error terms for all three questions are expected to be
correlated with each other. Control variables are included for the same municipal char-
acteristics as in section 4.3 which can be found in Table 4.6 in the appendix. We apply
two different measures to highlight the differences between urban and rural areas. First,
we insert the logarithm of a jurisdiction’s number of inhabitants as explanatory variable.
Second, we insert dummies for district types, which are provided by the spatial planning
programme of the state of Baden-Württemberg (see LEP 2002, Wirtschaftsministerium
Baden-Württemberg (2002)). This categorisation classifies jurisdictions into three cate-
gories according to a number of specific characteristics and the functions they provide,
such as infrastructure or education institutions. We insert dummies for the two highest
groups of urban jurisdictions, i.e. regional centres (“Oberzentrum”: the highest level,
16 cities) and secondary centres (“Mittelzentrum”: intermediate level, 95 cities); the
baseline category is rural area.
For the identification of neighbourhood effects we use the proximity to subnational (and
international) borders as reference points (for the detailed analysis of the scope and
extension of such neighbourhood effects, see the analysis in section 4.3). We insert dum-
mies for those municipalities which share a border with another German state (Bavaria,
Hesse or Rhineland-Palatinate) or another country (France or Switzerland). We are
especially interested in the former group since there are no formal barriers to capital
mobility between German states. We are now in position to investigate whether border
municipalities take neighbourhood (to competitors in other states) into account in their
perceptions of competitive pressures.
The results are presented in Table 4.3. First, the size effect which is apparent from
Figure 4.5 turns out to be statistically significant. Decision-makers in larger jurisdic-
tions assess the competition with more distant jurisdictions as much more intense than
decision-makers from smaller ones. This becomes even more evident in the second system
of regressions in which the district type dummies are used. Decision-makers in regional
and secondary centres perceive a much higher intensity of competition with respect to
more distant competitors (in other states or countries) than decision-makers in rural
areas. Second, we note that the perceived intensity of competition with municipalities
from other German states is significantly higher for those municipalities located adjacent
to a state border – and consequently for those jurisdictions that are direct neighbours of
jurisdictions in other states – than for non-border municipalities. With respect to inter-
national competition a neighbourhood effect can also be observed for those jurisdictions
adjacent to a country border, but this effect is much lower. This confirms that nearest
municipalities perceive each other as very important competitors and is in line with the
results from section 4.3, using a different research design.
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Table 4.3: Results: perception of competition intensity – Seemingly unrelated ordered
probit regressions
Perception of competition intensity with jurisdictions:
(a) in Baden-Württemberg, (b) in other states, (c) in other countries
System (1) System (2)
(a) (b) (c) (a) (b) (c)
Log(Population)t−1 0.280*** 0.264*** 0.237***
(4.52) (4.51) (3.77)
Regional centre 0.050 0.547*** 0.569***
(“Oberzentrum”) (0.26) (2.71) (2.98)
Secondary centre 0.253* 0.468*** 0.414***
(“Mittelzentrum”) (1.90) (3.64) (2.98)
State border -0.021 1.016*** 0.205 0.003 1.013*** 0.208
(-0.14) (5.61) (1.43) (0.02) (5.58) (1.43)
Country border -0.187 -0.050 0.400** -0.189 -0.061 0.389**
(-1.29) (-0.31) (2.17) (-1.28) (-0.37) (2.09)
Mayor 0.097 0.133 0.124 0.026 0.093 0.093
(1.14) (1.61) (1.37) (0.32) (1.16) (1.06)
Left-wingt -0.594 0.002 -0.331 -0.152 0.355 -0.023
(-1.34) (0.00) (-0.77) (-0.35) (0.88) (-0.06)
Free voterst 0.125 0.133 -0.266 -0.038 -0.011 -0.395*
(0.56) (0.61) (-1.16) (-0.17) (-0.05) (-1.75)
Fiscal capacityt: low 0.058 -0.367*** -0.479*** -0.040 -0.447*** -0.549***
(0.39) (-2.63) (-3.00) (-0.28) (-3.27) (-3.48)
Fiscal capacityt: medium 0.100 -0.176 -0.155 0.067 -0.207 -0.185
(0.72) (-1.33) (-1.05) (0.48) (-1.60) (-1.26)
Population working aget−1 -1.826* -0.486 -0.873* -1.348 -0.123 -0.592
(-1.79) (-0.56) (-1.84) (-1.23) (-0.13) (-1.20)
Unemployment ratet−1 2.589 5.129 5.224 13.946* 9.930 9.153
(0.34) (0.67) (0.62) (1.83) (1.36) (1.12)
Observations 716 715 716 716 715 716
Pseudo R-squared 0.013 0.034 0.028 0.006 0.032 0.027
z-values in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
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Out of the control variables, the only variables which show a strong impact are the
dummies which reflect the impact of the fiscal equalisation system. This reflects that
municipalities which benefit from fiscal equalisation transfers are less concerned about
competition. The political variables, however, fail to show significant effects.
4.5 A model of local tax competition
In this section we develop a multi-stage model of fiscal competition between many metro-
politan regions, each consisting of a city and several surrounding jurisdictions called hin-
terlands. Several important features of the model are consistent with the survey results
reported above: First, the findings for border regions give support to the assumption
that capital has to be regarded as particularly mobile between directly neighbouring ju-
risdictions. Second, larger cities, and in particular regional and secondary centres, also
perceive a high intensity of competition with more distant jurisdictions. This corrobo-
rates with recent empirical evidence from the literature on competition for headquarters
(see Strauss-Kahn and Vives (2009) on the US and Becker et al. (2009) on Germany).
While it is shown for Germany that the vast majority of municipalities does not attract
any headquarters, the literature also finds that headquarters are very mobile and that
reallocating headquarters are, inter alia, attracted by low corporate taxes at the local
level.22
We therefore assume two levels of competition: (1) Competition among urban city cen-
tres for investments, and (2) competition within a metropolitan region. We choose a
sequential structure of the tax-setting game. Initially all urban areas or ‘cities’ – su-
perscripted by c – decide simultaneously on their tax rates, and the capital is allocated
among cities. Capital is thereafter bound to a city’s metropolitan region. Then, the hin-
terlands – superscripted by h – follow in their tax setting, and the fixed supply of capital
stock in a metropolitan region i is allocated between the city in i and the hinterlands in
i.
One way to think about our sequential structure is as follows: large cities are the primary
competitors for large-scale investments, such as headquarters, which are often accompa-
nied by smaller investments, such as those from suppliers or subcontractors. After the
large-scale investment has been located in a city and has thus committed to a certain
metropolitan region, the associated suppliers and subcontractors have strong incentives
to settle in a reasonable distance to their client, i.e., in the same metropolitan region.23
22Similar evidence exists for different kinds of foreign investments. Evidence that mainly highly
agglomerated centres compete for foreign investments comes, e.g., from Guimarães et al. (2000) and is
summarised by Dembour (2008).
23And even the headquarter itself is sometimes mobile within a metropolitan region, perhaps due to
tax advantages. One example for such a behaviour is the German stock exchange (Deutsche Börse AG)
which outsourced in 2008 half of its staff to the small town of Eschborn (20,000 inhabitants), which is
only 7 kilometers away from its traditional headquarter in the financial centre of Frankfurt, due to low
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4.5.1 Model structure
The model builds on Borck (2003), but we extend his work in a substantial way by
considering the interaction between different types of jurisdictions in a multi-stage game.
The economy consists of n symmetric metropolitan regions indexed by i, each comprising
one city and m symmetric hinterland municipalities indexed by j. Hence there are
n(1+m) jurisdictions in the economy. Our main interest is in determining how increases
in n, interpreted as globalisation (for example via German unification or integration of
Eastern Europe into the European union), affect equilibrium tax policy.
Output of a numeraire consumption good is produced using interjurisdictionally mobile
capital and immobile labour. In section 4.5.5 we apply our model in the context of
Germany’s localities and with some adjustments reinterpret the factor labour as land.
For now, it is easier to follow the standard tax competition approach and label the
factors as capital and labour. In each region i the population share of all hinterlands
together is denoted as s, so that the population share of a city is 1− s. Each hinterland
thus has a population share of s/m. Capital (expressed in per capita terms) is equally
distributed between all jurisdictions in the sense that cities and hinterlands in all regions
have the same capital-labour endowment k¯c,i = k¯h,ij = k¯. Capital use k in any particular
jurisdiction may differ from this value due to fiscal policy differences. We assume that
the production function is quadratic in order to keep the analysis tractable, which in
intensive form reads (we leave out city and hinterland subscripts when no confusion is
possible):




Each jurisdiction is populated by many consumers who differ in their capital and labour
endowment (which is explained in more detail below). Each individual consumes the nu-
meraire consumption good and a public good which is provided by its local government.
Preferences are assumed to be quasi-linear:
U(c, g) = c+ u(g) (4.2)
where c is the private consumption good, g the publicly provided private good – called
the public good in the following – and the partial derivatives obey u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0.
We assume that one unit of the private good can be transformed into one unit of the
public good. The public good is provided by the government and financed through
two taxes: (i) a distortionary tax per unit of capital levied at source t, and (ii) a non-
distortionary labour tax τ . Given that labour is immobile and fixed in supply the labour
tax is effectively an efficient lump sum tax.
Finally, we introduce an unequal endowment of labour and capital among individuals.
local business tax.
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In every region the factor e determines the individual per capita endowment of labour,
(1 + e), and capital, (1− e)k¯. The factor e has a mean of zero, while a non-zero median.
The heterogenous distribution of endowments ensures – equivalently to Borck (2003) –
that both tax instruments are used in equilibrium.24
We are now in a position to pin down an individual’s private consumption c, which
is financed from the return to the fixed factor labour plus the profits from the capital
endowment. The return to labour equals the residual output after payment for capital
use minus the labour tax:
c = (1 + e)[f(k)− (ρ+ t)k − τ ] + (1− e)ρk¯, (4.3)
where ρ = f ′(k)− t is the net return to capital.
The public good is financed from taxing capital and labour:
g = tk + τ, (4.4)
which represents the government budget constraint.
The game structure can be summarised as follows:
In the first stage, all n cities determine simultaneously their capital and labour tax rates
{tc,i, τ c,i}i=1,...,n. Each city takes the tax rates in all other cities as given. In addition,
in each city the tax policy tuple must be the outcome of a majority rule voting process
where voters take into account how the city’s tax policy affects subsequent play.
In the second stage, capital is completely mobile between cities. A city i obtains a per
capita capital stock of k˜i, which depends on the tax policy vector from stage 1. Together
with the capital endowments of the hinterlands this determines the overall capital stock
available in a metropolitan region in stages 3 and 4.
In the third stage, all hinterlands of metropolitan region i choose simultaneously their
tax policies, {th,ij, τh,ij}j=1,...,m. Each hinterland takes the city’s tax rates {tc,i, τ c,i} and
the tax policy of all other hinterlands in the same metropolitan region as given. In
each hinterland tax policy forms a majority rule voting equilibrium, taking subsequent
choices into account.
In the fourth and final stage, capital within a metropolitan region i is allocated between
the city and its hinterlands, so that kc,i and kh,ij result, based on tc,i and th,ij. At this
stage, capital can only flow within a metropolitan area by assumption. Since labour
taxes do not distort the capital allocation, their levels are determined by the difference
between the public good demand and the funds provided from the taxation of capital via
(4.4). Production and consumption take place, and the government provides the public
24This intentionally contrasts with much of the earlier literature (such as Bucovetsky and Wilson
(1991)) which predicts the complete disuse of the distortionary tax in small jurisdictions as soon as a
non-distortionary tax becomes available.
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good in all jurisdictions.
In the following, the model is solved via backward induction, starting with the final
stage of the game.
4.5.2 Solving the model
Stage 4
We now solve the final stage for a typical metropolitan region i and drop the index
whenever possible to simplify notation. In the final stage, capital used in a city and its
hinterland areas depend on the respective capital tax rates of those jurisdictions (tc, th,j).
The overall supply of capital which is available in any given metropolitan region consists
of the initial endowment of the hinterlands, which is k¯ per jurisdiction, and the capital
stock that is available in the city, k˜i (which comes out of stage 2). The capital market
equilibrium condition can be written




kh,j = (1− s)k˜ + sk¯. (4.5)
Recall that s is the population share of all hinterlands in a metro region.
In equilibrium the net return to capital, ρ = f ′(k) − t, has to be identical in city and
every municipality in the hinterland:
ρ = a− bkc − tc = a− bkh,j − th,j (4.6)
Combining (4.5) and (4.6) gives the capital stock in a city

















h,l − (m− s)th,j
mb
, (4.8)
as functions of capital tax rates, the capital supply in the metro area, and exogenous
parameters. Note that in both expressions the first two terms denote the overall capi-
tal stock available within the metropolitan region, and the last two terms capture the
adjustment due to tax differentials between the city and the municipalities in the hin-
terland. For both (4.7) and (4.8), an increase in the own tax rate lowers the amount of
capital employed, while an increase in another jurisdiction’s tax rate increases capital
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It is easy to see that after inserting (4.7) and (4.8) into (4.6) the net return to capital is
declining in any jurisdiction’s tax rate. For example, we get
∂ρ
∂th,j
= −s/m < 0.
Stage 3
We now solve for the tax policy equilibrium within a metropolitan region, given the tax
policy of the city and capital stocks determined in stage 2 for that city (tc and k˜, omitting
city index i). Since fiscal policy in each hinterland must be a political equilibrium, we
follow Persson and Tabellini (2000) and (omitting hinterland indices) rewrite the utility
function of a voter with endowment e after substituting (4.3) and (4.4) into (4.2) as
U((t, τ); e) = J(t, τ) + eH(t, τ),
where
J(t, τ) = f(k)− (ρ+ t)k − τ + ρk¯ + u(tk + τ)
H(t, τ) = f(k)− (ρ+ t)k − τ − ρk¯,
and k is the capital stock of hinterland community, as given by (4.8), and which in
turn depends on t and τ . Since e is monotonic and J(t, τ) and H(t, τ) are common
to all voters, the intermediate preferences condition (see Grandmont (1978)) is fulfilled.
Consequently, the equilibrium tax rates depend on the capital endowment of the median
voter, eˆ. In the standard case of equal endowments of all citizens within each jurisdiction,
i.e. eˆ = 0, the median voter would only use the non-distortionary labour tax, and set
the rate of the distortionary capital tax to zero. In order to obtain an equilibrium with
positive tax rates for both tax instruments, we have to assume that the distribution of
the capital endowment is skewed to the right, so that eˆ > 0. This seems empirically
reasonable. Furthermore it is assumed that eˆ is identical in all cities and hinterlands.
The preferred policy of the median person in hinterland j of metropolitan region i is
derived by maximising utility function (4.2) with respect to th,ij and τh,ij subject to
individual budget constraint (4.3), government budget constraint (4.4), and the capital
stock functions (4.7) and (4.8), where (4.8) is substituted into (4.3) and (4.4). The two
first order conditions are (index i is omitted):
−(1 + eˆ)f ′′(kh,j)∂k
h,j
∂th,j
kh,j + (1− eˆ) ∂ρ
∂th,j
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and
u′(gh,j)− (1 + eˆ) = 0. (4.10)
Note that (4.10), the first order condition from optimising over the labour tax, fixes
the supply of the public good as function of the median’s endowment parameter eˆ. The
number of hinterlands or their joint population share s does not matter. The provision is
efficient when the distribution of capital-labour endowments is not skewed (i.e., eˆ = 0).
After inserting the comparative-static results reported at the end of stage 4, as well as
(4.8) into (4.9), and assuming a symmetric equilibrium for all hinterlands, we obtain a
















Note that a hinterland’s capital tax is increasing in the city’s tax rate and capital stock:
∂th
∂tc
> 0 and ∂th
∂k˜
> 0. In addition, for given k˜ and tc the hinterland’s capital tax rate
goes to zero as the number of hinterland communities m converges to infinity. In that
situation hinterlands use only the nondistortionary labour tax.
Next, we insert the reaction function (4.11) into kc({th,j}, tc, k˜) and kh,j({th,j}, tc, k˜) from










k¯s [m(1 + eˆ)− 2s+ 1− eˆ]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) , (4.12)
with ∂kh
∂tc









k¯s[m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) , (4.13)
with ∂kc
∂tc
< 0 and ∂kc
∂k˜
> 0.
The labour tax follows from the government budget constraint τh = gh − thkh, where
gh is determined by (4.10), as argued above. The net return to capital in metropolitan
region i can be determined by substituting (4.11) and (4.12) into (4.6):
ρ(tc,i, k˜) = a− m(1− s)[bk˜
i + tc,i]
(m− s2) −
k¯sb[m(eˆ+ 1) + s(eˆ− 1)]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) (4.14)
Stage 2
We now consider the interaction of tax setting and investment decisions across metropoli-
tan regions. In stage 2 equilibrium in the capital market across cities is considered for
a given vector of cities’ tax policies. Since capital is perfectly mobile between all cities,
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the capital allocation has to entail the equalisation of the net returns to capital
ρ(tc,i, k˜i) = a− bkc,i − tc,i = a− bkc,v − tc,v = ρ(tc,v, k˜v) (4.15)
for any pair of cities v 6= i, which implies
k˜v =
bk˜i + tc,i − tc,v
b
. (4.16)




k˜v = nk¯ (4.17)
Inserting (4.16) into (4.17) and solving for k˜i gives:











We may now determine the capital stocks in cities and hinterlands as function of cities’
capital tax rates only, by inserting (4.18) into (4.11)-(4.13):





k¯[m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s2]




k¯[m(1 + eˆ) + s2(eˆ− 1)− 2eˆs]













sum of all cities’ tax rates without city i. In addition, the net return to capital is found
by substituting (4.18) into (4.14) and rearranging terms:
ρ(tc,1, ..., tc,n) = a− m(1− s)T
n(m− s2) −
bk¯[m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s2]
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) (4.22)
Note that hinterland variables and the net return to capital depend only on the sum
of the cities’ tax rates (and exogenous parameters). A city’s capital stock is negatively
affected by a raise in its capital tax but increases with tax increases in other cities.
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Stage 1
In the first stage, all n cities determine simultaneously their tax policies {tc,i, τ c,i}i.
Each city takes in its decision the tax policy of all other cities as given, but rationally
anticipates the effects of its tax policy on its capital stock and hinterland policies in
subsequent stages. A city’s tax policy must also be a majority voting equilibrium. We
use the same approach as under stage 3 to argue that the preferred policy of the median
endowment person prevails. To find this, we maximise the utility of the median voter






f(kc,i)− f ′(kc,i)kc,i)− τ c,i]+ (1− eˆ)ρk¯ + u((tc,ikc,i) + τ c,i), (4.23)
where kc,i = k(tc,i, {tc,v}) and ρ = ρ(tc,i, {tc,v}) come from (4.19) and (4.22), respectively.
Similar to (4.10), the derivative with respect to τ c,i, after setting equal to zero, delivers
u′(gc,i) − (1 + eˆ) = 0 and thus determines the public good level g. The public good
level in cities and hinterlands is the same when the endowment distribution is the same,
which we assume.
We then differentiate the utility function with respect to tc,i, replace u′ by (1 + eˆ), and
make use of the symmetric equilibrium property tc,i = tc for all i. This gives us the
equilibrium capital tax rate in a symmetric city equilibrium
tc =
2m2eˆbk¯(1− s)
(1 + eˆ) [n(m− s2)2 −m2(1− s)2] ≥ 0, (4.24)
and after inserting into (4.21) the equilibrium capital tax rate for each hinterland
th =
2eˆbk¯sn(m− s2)
(1 + eˆ) [n(m− s2)2 −m2(1− s)2] ≥ 0. (4.25)
To see that capital tax rates are nonnegative, it is sufficient to show that the denomi-
nators are positive, that is, n(m − s2)2 > m2(1 − s)2. This condition holds for m = 1
regardless of the value of n (assuming n > 1). Moreover the left hand side of the in-
equality is rising in m faster than the right hand side because 2n(m− s2) > 2m(1− s)2,
thus showing the claim.
Conditions (4.24) and (4.25) are the key expressions for our further analysis, as they
capture the equilibrium capital tax rates as function of exogenous parameters, in par-
ticular the number of hinterlands m and metropolitan regions n. All other equilibrium
variables now follow from simple substitution. In particular, the equilibrium capital
stocks are found by inserting the equilibrium capital tax rates into (4.19) and (4.20)
(omitted here). In a symmetric city equilibrium the overall capital stock is identical in
all metropolitan regions, so that k˜i = k¯. This completes the solution of the multi-stage
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game. We now turn to further characterising the equilibrium.
4.5.3 Equilibrium properties
We are particularly interested in how capital tax rates in cities and hinterlands, and the
difference of the two, change with n. We also examine the extent of shifting taxation
from mobile to immobile factors in both types of jurisdictions. A change in n can be
interpreted as globalisation or market integration such as the fall of communism that
brought Eastern European countries into the European Union or German unification
which extended the number of metro regions that compete for similar investments under
the same political and legal system. In addition we compare those findings to a model
where all tax policy decisions both by cities and hinterlands are made simultaneously
while maintaining all other assumptions. This is called the simultaneous model and is
summarised in the appendix.
We start with a limit result to demonstrate the difference between our sequential model
and a standard tax competition model in which all governments make simultaneous
choices.
Proposition 4.1. The equilibrium capital tax rate of a city tc converges to zero for
n→∞, while the tax rate of a hinterland jurisdiction converges to 2eˆbk¯s
(1+eˆ)(m−s2) > 0.
Proof: The convergence to zero of the city tax rate follows immediately from (4.24).
Using l’Hôpital’s rule the hinterland’s tax rate converges to the value provided in the
Proposition.
In the appendix, by contrast, we show that in the simultaneous model all capital tax
rates converge to zero when the number of metropolitan regions becomes very large,
which is very intuitive, as the number of competitors for both types of jurisdiction
grows without limits. The limit result should not be interpreted literally, because in
practice the number of metropolitan areas is not even close to infinity. Still, local
business tax rates even in small localities in Germany are clearly positive, even if the
number of potential competitors is fairly large (evidence on local tax rates is provided in
section 4.5.5). This points to the usefulness of the sequential model in which hinterland
communities compete only in the geographic neighbourhood.
In addition to the limit result we study whether capital tax rates are monotonic in the
number of metropolitan regions. Our result show that an increase in n affects cities and
hinterlands differentially.
Proposition 4.2. All capital tax rates fall when the number of metropolitan regions n
rises, but the hinterland’s capital tax falls less in n than the city’s capital tax, that is,
0 > dth/dn > dtc/dn.
The proof for falling capital tax rates follows from differentiation of (4.24) and (4.25).
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To see that the city’s tax rate falls more, combine (4.24) and (4.25) to obtain
tc − th = 2eˆbk¯[m
2(1− s)− sn(m− s2)]
(1 + eˆ) [n(m− s2)2 −m2(1− s)2] , (4.26)
which is decreasing in n as the numerator falls and the denominator rises in n. The
tax differential (4.26) also shows that it is not a priori determined whether a city or
hinterland has the higher tax. For small m and high n a hinterland has the higher
capital tax, while the reverse is true when n is small relative to m and s takes on a low
value.
In the appendix we show that in the simultaneous model the derivative d(tc − th)/dn
can be positive or negative, and with the help of numerical simulations often close to
zero in absolute value and small in comparison to the derivative in the sequential model
with the same parameter values. In other words, an increase in n has a similar effect on
capital tax rates in cities and hinterlands in the simultaneous model, while hinterlands
are somewhat more sheltered than cities in the sequential model. In section 4.5.5 we
will argue on the basis of actual tax data that the sequential model seems a better fit
for the trend in local business tax rates in Germany.
We now consider the shift in taxation from mobile to immobile factors, that is, the
difference between the capital and labour tax rate ∆ = t− τ, both for a typical city and
a hinterland.
Proposition 4.3. For both cities and hinterlands the tax rate gap between the tax on
mobile capital and immobile labour, ∆r = tr − τ r, r = c, h, is falling in the number of
metropolitan areas n.
Proof: Consider first the tax gap in a hinterland jurisdiction
∆h = th − τh = th − (gh − thkh) = th(1 + kh)− gh, (4.27)
where we made use of the government budget constraint to substitute for the labor
tax. Recall that the public good level is independent of the number of jurisdictions and
depends only on the median’s endowment position. Because th falls, ∆h is decreasing
in n if kh is declining in n. Condition (4.20) shows that kh equals a constant plus a
term that is proportional in the sum of cities’ capital tax rates. The direct effect of n
in the first term of (4.20) vanishes after realising that in a symmetric city equilibrium
T = ntc. As the city tax rate falls in n, and kh depends positively on tc, the capital use
in hinterlands must fall with competition. Hence d∆h/dn < 0.
Next consider a city’s tax gap ∆c = tc − τ c = tc(1 + kc)− gc. Because g is not changing
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Note first that tc is falling in n, hence the tax difference in cities is declining if the term
in square brackets is positive and the last term in (4.28) is non-positive. Consider first
the direct effect of n on a city’s capital stock. Imposing symmetry among cities the




k¯(m(1 + eˆ) + (eˆ− 1)s2)
(1 + eˆ)(m− s2) ,
which does not depend on n directly, i.e., ∂kc/∂n = 0. We are thus left with the first
term in (4.28). The square bracket is positive for n toward infinity as tc converges to zero
(Prop. 4.1), as long as the derivative dkc/dtc is finite. The latter derivative represents
the total change of a city’s capital stock to all cities changing their capital tax rates.
To examine the square bracket more generally, consider the sum of the second and third
term in square brackets, kc+tcdkc/dtc, which looks like the slope of a government revenue
curve. The difference to the typical Laffer curve of a city is that here the total effect of a
change in capital tax rates of all cities is considered, when n increases. If we assume for
now that each city is on the left side of its Laffer curve, so that kc,i+ tc,i(∂kc,i/∂tc,i) > 0,
then the sum of the second and third term of the square bracket in (4.28) must be




the loss in tax base for an individual city is smaller if all cities increase their taxes. This
becomes evident from (4.19), where the derivative of the city’s capital stock with respect




and hence kc,i + tc,i dkc
dtc
= kc,i + tc,i( dk
c,i
dT−i + ∂k
c,i/∂tc,i) > kc,i + tc,i(∂kc,i/∂tc,i) > 0.
We assumed above that a city is on the left-hand side of its Laffer curve, which must hold
because otherwise the city could choose a lower tax rate that would generate the same
public good level, lead to a higher net return to capital and higher private consumption.
This completes the proof.
Proposition 4.3 demonstrates that both cities and hinterlands shift from capital tax rates
to land tax rates when external competition increases. In the next section 4.5.4 we go
beyond this and analyse numerically for whom the shift is larger. We now ask whether
governments also rely more on labour taxes in terms of revenues. We therefore define
the following revenue gap
Γr = trkr − τ r, r = c, h (4.29)
and notice that τ is both the labour tax rate as well as labour tax revenue in per capita
terms. Using again the government budget constraint, we can write Γr = 2trkr − g. For
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based on the arguments provided in the proof of Proposition 4.3. For hinterlands the
result is less straightforward. Notice that we can write the hinterland’s capital stock




k¯[m(1 + eˆ) + s2(eˆ− 1)− 2eˆs]
(m− s2)(1 + eˆ) ,
where tc is given by (4.24). Hence kh increases with the cities’ capital tax rates (dkh/dtc >















because all capital tax rates decline in n. We summarise in
Proposition 4.4. An increase in n leads to more tax revenue collected from the im-
mobile factor (labour) and less from the mobile factor (capital) in both cities and hin-
terlands.
Propositions 4.3 and 4.4 are consistent with results from standard tax competition mod-
els. Yet, the mechanism differs due to the sequential structure, which gives rise to
indirect effects as in the proof of Proposition 4.4.
4.5.4 Numerical example
In the following we present a numerical example to illustrate and complement some
of our analytical results. We assign a specific subutility function for the public good,
u(g) = ln(g), in order to calculate the public good provision level and the tax rates
on labour, τ c and τh. From a hinterland’s first order condition (4.10), and similar for a
city from stage 2, we obtain the per capita provision level of the public good in c and
h: g = 1
1+eˆ
. Substituting this value back into the government budget constraint, the
labour tax rates are found to be: τ c = 1
1+eˆ
− tckc and τh = 1
1+eˆ
− thkh, where the capital
tax rates are taken from (4.24) and (4.25), respectively, and the capital stocks follow
from (4.19) and (4.20) after appropriate substitutions. Together these values allow us
to calculate the tax rate gap between the capital and labour tax rate, ∆ = t− τ .
We now go beyond Proposition 4.3 by analysing how the tax rate gap changes in cities
relative to hinterlands, that is, d∆c/dn and d∆h/dn. In addition we also compare the
absolute level of capital tax rates in the two types of jurisdictions, that is, we evaluate
the sign of (4.26) as function of n. We vary the values for the overall population size
of the hinterlands relative to the city, s, the number of hinterlands in a metropolitan
area, m, and the number of metropolitan regions, n. All other parameter values are held
constant and chosen as reported in the table below. Table 4.4 shows that the tax rate
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gap in a city ∆c can be higher or lower than the gap in a hinterland ∆h. The gap in
the city is smaller (higher in absolute terms) when s and n are sufficiently high (lines 3
and 5), and/or m is sufficiently low (line 4). Furthermore, a decrease in the size of each
hinterland relative to the city – either through a smaller overall population size of the
hinterlands s for a given number of hinterlands, or an increasing number of hinterlands
m for given population size – leads in the hinterland to a shift from distortionary capital
taxation to non-distortionary labour taxation. The corresponding effect for cities differs
however (the city’s capital tax decreases for increasing m, compare lines 4 and 3, while
for decreasing s the city’s tax may increase, see lines 3 and 2).
Obviously, doing the reverse exercise, namely making a city smaller in population size
(i.e., s increases) leads to the same qualitative outcome, that is, a shift from capital
taxation to non-distortionary labour taxation in a city. However, this does not imply
that the smaller jurisdiction always makes less use of capital taxation than the bigger
ones, as lines 3 to 5 in Table 4.4 demonstrate. This result contrasts with the finding of
the model by Bucovetsky (2009) in which smaller jurisdictions always make less use of
the distortionary taxation than larger ones.
Table 4.4: Numerical example
tc th τc τh ∆c ∆h
1. s=0.05, m=10, n=2 0.5776 0.0061 0.1056 0.6573 0.4720 -0.6512
2. s=0.05, m=10, n=50 0.0129 0.0034 0.6538 0.6632 -0.6409 -0.6598
3. s=0.3, m=10, n=50 0.0096 0.0204 0.6570 0.6464 -0.6474 -0.6261
4. s=0.05, m=2, n=50 0.0129 0.01700 0.6537 0.6497 -0.6408 -0.6327
5. s=0.3, m=2, n=50 0.0103 0.1058 0.6560 0.5679 -0.6457 -0.4620
Other parameters: k¯=1, b=1, eˆ=0.5
The dependency of capital tax rates and tax rate gaps in cities and hinterlands on the
number of metropolitan regions n is visualised in Figure 4.6. After making use of the
same parameter values as before in the table notes, we plot the capital tax rates and the
tax rate gaps in city and hinterland as function of the number of metropolitan regions,
n. The steeper line belongs to a city and is in all of our simulations steeper than the one
for the hinterland. Moreover, the two lines intersect which means that for a low number
of external competitors, the cities have the higher capital tax rate and the higher tax
rate gap than the hinterlands, while the opposite is true for a high number of n, as then
hinterlands rely more strongly on capital taxation.
4.5.5 Discussion and conclusion
In our theoretical analysis we have demonstrated that two different effects interact in
our model of local tax competition. The first is the pure size effect which is well-
known from the literature of asymmetric tax competition. This suggests that the smaller
jurisdictions rely less on capital taxation than bigger ones. Second, this effect is offset
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Figure 4.6: Simulation results. Parameters: k¯=1, b=1, eˆ=0.5, s=0.2, m=3
through external competition from cities in other metropolitan regions. Since cities
react stronger to external competition than hinterlands, an increase in the number of
competitors, as indicated by an increasing n, implies a stronger shift to the use of
immobile tax bases in the cities than in the hinterlands. Consequently, given a sufficient
large number of competitors, the cities might make actually less use of capital taxation
than their hinterlands.
We now check the plausibility of our theoretical predictions by describing actual taxes
set in the state of Baden-Württemberg, the state on which our survey in section 4.4.2
was based. This requires a slight reinterpretation of our theoretical model, as the most
important autonomous tax instruments (and revenue sources) for jurisdictions in Baden-
Württemberg are the local business tax rate (“Gewerbesteuer”) and a land tax (“Grund-
steuer B”). The former matches well the capital tax rate in our theoretical model.25 The
latter, however, differs obviously from the labour tax that we assumed in section 4.5.1
(local jurisdictions in Baden-Württemberg do not control an own income or labour tax).
The land tax is qualitatively similar to the labour tax though in that it is likely to be less
distortionary than the local business tax.26 To sustain the applicability of the model,
and in particular the nature of the political equilibrium, we would also need to assume a
monotonic relationship between the size of land and its population. While this may be
considered unrealistic in a narrow sense, we feel that our theoretical model captures the
qualitative setting in Baden-Württemberg well: There are two tax instruments available,
one on a mobile factor and another less distortionary tax on a fixed factor.
The upper graph in Figure 4.7 presents the development of the collection rates (“Hebe-
sätze”) of the local business tax for jurisdictions of different size (groups). We view the
period from 1990 to 2008 as one where external competition increased due to global-
25Buettner (2003) argues that the business tax can be regarded as a capital income tax since the
definition of taxable business earnings does not only include profits but also a major part of interest
payments.
26Note that in real world the German land tax is also levied on business land so that it theoretically
also affects the capital allocation. But quantitatively the land tax mainly affects private land owners
so that it is much less relevant for location decisions of firms than the local business tax.
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Figure 4.7: Development of taxes in Baden-Württemberg
isation in general and the Eastern enlargement of the EU and German unification in
particular. Figure 4.7 shows that local business tax rates in small communities grew
over the last twelve years, while they were fairly stable in the top 20 largest cities. The
finding of rising business taxes is neither consistent with our Proposition 2 which shows
that capital tax rates are monotonically decreasing in n, nor with the empirical literature
cited above which suggests a race to the bottom of capital tax rates due to increasing
competition and spatial interactions. However, we believe that other reasons, such as
mandated shifts of responsibilities from higher level governments to local communities
for social welfare policies or an offset for lower corporate tax rates at the national level,
is the reason for an increasing need of financial resources (and, hence, an increase of
all types of taxes). Consequently, we believe that the tax rate gap – expressed as the
collection rate of the business tax minus the collection rate of the land tax – is the more
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meaningful measure for comparison.
In the lower graph of Figure 4.7, the trends for the tax rate gaps are depicted. Over
the observation period, the tax gap decreased in all size classes, that is, the business
tax rates were lowered in relation to the land taxes.27 This drop is in line with re-
ductions in corporate tax rates at national levels which arises from increasing external
competition (see, e.g., Slemrod, 2004). In the light of our model, globalisation-related
changes – such as reduction in transport costs and institutional openings of markets
to other countries such as the Eastern enlargement of the EU – allowed for the entry
of more-distant jurisdictions in the competition for capital. Consequently, competitive
pressures on cities in Germany increased and forced local decision-makers to resort more
to non-distortionary land taxes.28 Most notably, the development of the tax gaps in the
beginning and mid-1990s is remarkable. At that time, German cities were confronted
with the emergence of a huge number of new competitors after the fall of the iron curtain
and German reunification (the negative impact of the former on international corporate
tax levels is documented by Overesch and Rincke, 2009). Consequently, the sharp drop
in local tax gaps coincides with the view that the competition with external competitors
– expressed as the number of regions in our model – increased especially in the 1990s.
However, different types of jurisdictions were unequally affected by this development.
Initially the tax gaps were rather similar in urban centres and rural areas. Yet in the
course of time this pattern changed markedly. In particular the biggest cities – as well
as urban centres from the first size decile – tended to decrease their business tax rates
relative to the land tax rates much stronger than the smaller jurisdictions. This graph is
well in line with the theoretical predictions made above (see Figure 4.6): the increasing
pressure from external competition pushes down the ratio of capital to land taxes in all
jurisdictions, but this effect is much stronger for urban centres.
These findings give support to our theoretical predictions – big cities might actually
rely less on corporate taxation – which are in contrast to research that has shown that
smaller countries and countries on the periphery have lower corporate tax rates than
large countries or regions in the core (Baldwin and Krugman, 2004; Haufler et al.,
2009; Haufler and Wooton, 2010). This discrepancy to the earlier literature has to be
explained with some special characteristics of local tax competition, which in our view
is that competition between geographically close jurisdictions is qualitatively different
from competition among countries or states. At the local level, but not the country or
state level, it is relatively easy for a firm to benefit from the agglomeration benefits and
27The interpretation of the levels of the measure needs to be done with care as the two tax bases are
not directly comparable. Rather we view this gap as a qualitative measure for shifts from one tax base
to the other.
28Part of the common drop can also be explained by institutional characteristics of the two taxes,
since the tax base of the land tax is levied on predetermined land prices which are adjusted very little
over time. Since the revenues of the business tax tend to increase in nominal terms over time, the rate
of the land tax has to be raised regularly in order to keep the revenue ratio constant.
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infrastructure of a city centre even in smaller jurisdictions, as long as they are located
within a reasonable distance to the urban centre.
We conclude by emphasising the importance of considering asymmetries, in particular
concerning the structure of competition in local tax competition. Not all jurisdictions
are identical, and consequently the perceived pressures from competition differ between
jurisdictions, as we have demonstrated. This has important implications for the the-
oretical modelling of tax competition. We believe that accounting for differences in a
jurisdiction’s involvement in levels of competition is an important innovation compared
to the existing theoretical literature on local tax competition. Clearly, much work needs
to be done to understand better the structure of local tax competition.
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4.6 Appendix
4.6.1 Data
Table 4.5: Means of respondents and non-respondents
Variable Mean: Respondents Mean: Non-respondents t-test for equal mean
(p-value)
Neighbour State Border 0.076 0.066 0.576
State Border Distance 50.871 52.938 0.378
Neighbour International Border 0.051 0.072 0.165
Neighbour Int. Border: FRA 0.025 0.035 0.405
Neighbour Int. Border: SUI 0.025 0.041 0.176
Int. Border Distance 61.268 61.074 0.940
Int. Border Distance: FRA 80.708 86.778 0.044
Int. Border Distance: SUI 101.664 92.393 0.013
Int. Border Distance: AUT 138.882 129.812 0.006
Log(Population) 8.710 8.357 0.000
Unemployment rate 0.019 0.018 0.010
Population working-age 0.655 0.657 0.284
Left-wing 0.185 0.158 0.008
Free voters 0.465 0.534 0.001
Fiscal Capacity: low 0.389 0.465 0.022
Fiscal Capacity: medium 0.518 0.475 0.198
Regional centre 0.020 0.006 0.109
Secondary centre 0.103 0.069 0.088
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Table 4.6: Variable definitions
















Survey response, question 3 -1.91 2.42 -4 4 own survey






Share of registered unemployed in
total population
0.019 0.006 0.006 0.040 SOBW
Population
working-age
Share of population aged between
15 and 65 years
0.655 0.021 0.571 0.742 SOBW
Left-wing Seat share of left-wing parties in
local council
0.185 0.150 0 0.571 SOBW
Free voters Seat share of free voter unions
(“Freie Wählervereinigungen”) in
local council
0.465 0.297 0 1 SOBW
Fiscal Capac-
ity: low
Dummy = 1 if fiscal capacity is
smaller than 0.6; highest trans-
fers from the local system of fiscal
equalisation
0.389 0.488 0 1 SOBW
Fiscal Capac-
ity: medium
Dummy = 1 if fiscal capacity is be-
tween 0.6 and 1.0; moderate trans-
fers from the local system of fiscal
equalisation
0.518 0.500 0 1 SOBW
Regional centre Dummy = 1 if classified as regional
centre (‘Oberzentrum’), highest
category of centrality in German
spatial planning policy





Dummy = 1 if classified as sec-
ondary centre (‘Mittelzentrum’),
second highest category of central-
ity in German spatial planning pol-
icy
0.103 0.304 0 1 Wirtschaftsminis-
terium Baden-
Württemberg
Mayor Dummy = 1 if response directly
from mayor
0.475 0.500 0 1 own survey
State border Dummy = 1 if municipality shares
border with another German state
0.07 0.26 0 1 own calculations
Country bor-
der
Dummy = 1 if municipality shares
border with another country
0.05 0.21 0 1 own calculations
120 CHAPTER 4. FISCAL INTERACTIONS AT THE LOCAL LEVEL
4.6.2 The simultaneous game
The simultaneous game consists of two stages only. In the first stage governments from
cities and hinterlands simultaneously choose their tax policy, where in each jurisdiction
tax policy must be a majority voting equilibrium for a given fiscal policy in all other
regions. In the second stage, capital is allocated between all cities and all hinterlands
depending on the respective capital tax rates of all jurisdictions {tc,i, th,ij}. We use the











kh,ij = nk¯ (A1)
In equilibrium the net return to capital, ρ = f ′(k) − t, has to be the same across all
cities, and across any city and its hinterlands:
ρ = a− bkc,i − tc,i = a− bkc,l − tc,l = a− bkh,ij − th,ij, (A2)
for all i, l = 1, ..., n and j = 1, ...,m. Solving (A2) for kc,l and kh,ij, respectively, and
then substituting in the capital market equilibrium condition (A1) gives






























where T is the sum of all cities’ capital tax rates and T−i = T − tc,i. It is easy to see
that a jurisdiction’s capital stock is declining in its own tax rate
dkc,i
dtc,i









Furthermore dρ/dtc,i = −b · dkc,i/dtc,i − 1, and similar for a change in a hinterland’s
capital tax rate.
In a symmetric equilibrium where all hinterlands choose the same tax, and all cities
choose the same tax, (A4) and (A5) simplify to




kh = k¯ +




We now move to the analysis of the first stage. The reaction function of a typical
hinterland jurisdiction and a typical city can be determined in a similar fashion as in
stages 1 and 3 of the sequential game. For example, the two first order conditions for






















u′(gh,ij)− (1 + ê) = 0
The same qualitative conditions hold for a city.
Substituting (A3) into (A8), imposing symmetry among hinterlands, as well as symmetry
among cities (so that (A6) and (A7) apply), and using comparative statics reported in
(A4) and (A5), we obtain the equilibrium tax rate for the city and hinterland as
tc =
2nmêbk¯(1− s)











where th contains tc to write the hinterland’s tax more compactly.
We now characterise properties of the equilibrium tax policy in the simultaneous game,
similar in nature to the results presented for the sequential model in section 4.5. First,
the city tax rate converges towards zero when n goes to infinity because the numerator
in (A9) is linear in n, while the denominator is quadratic in n. This is in line with
Prop. 4.1. A difference arises for hinterland communities. When n goes to infinity, th
converges to zero because tc goes to zero and the denominator in round brackets goes to
infinity.
We next consider how the difference in capital tax rates, tc − th, responds to changes
in n. In the sequential game we know from Prop. 4.2 that this derivative is negative.
In the simultaneous game, however, this derivative can be positive or negative. To
obtain more insights, write the city and hinterland capital tax rates more compactly as
tc = A1 ≥ 0 and th = A2 + A3tc ≥ 0, where A2 ≡ 2êbk¯s/((1 + ê)(nm − s2) ≥ 0 and










Note that the derivatives in the second and third term of (A11) are negative, so that
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the sum of these two effects is positive. By contrast, the city’s tax rate is typically
declining in n, and 1−A3 = (nm− s)/(nm− s2) > 0, so that the first effect is negative.
Numerical simulations (not reported) show that the net effect can be positive or negative.
The case of a positive derivative is most easily seen when s converges towards 1, as then
dA1/dn and dA3/dn go to zero, while dA2/dn is bounded above zero. While such a high
value of the hinterlands’ population share may seem unrealistic, it nevertheless points
to an important difference to the sequential model. Moreover, numerical simulations
(not reported) show also that regardless of the sign of (A11) the derivative is small in
absolute value and small in comparison to the sequential model. This becomes clear
when examining the terms A1, A2, A3 and their derivatives with respect to n, which
both have a higher order of n (or a product of n and m) in the denominator than in
the numerator, so that even for “reasonable” parameter values of m and n the derivative
(A11) becomes small in absolute value.
Chapter 5
Regional Transfers and Public Support
for the EU
5.1 Introduction
Can politicians ‘buy’ the support of citizens by means of regional transfers? This is an
important question when it comes to the relevance of many theoretical models focusing
on the interaction of electoral incentives and public spending. The related theoretical
literature implies that upper-tier governments might have an incentive to strategically al-
locate regional transfers in order to manipulate the electorate’s opinion. But an essential
element of this literature is the assumption that citizens in targeted regions automati-
cally become aware of this intended benefit and that they reward the benefactor for it.
Until now, the reaction of the citizens has not found much consideration in the empirical
literature. In this chapter, we focus on the regional policy of the European Union (EU)
as a special case of a regional transfer policy with targeted benefits. In this policy area
the European institutions, in particular the Commission, act as benefactor. In addition
to reducing the economic disparities between European regions, which is the main ob-
jective of this policy, these institutions apparently also intend to make the benefitted
citizens aware of this preferential treatment in order to increase the public support for
European integration. Consequently, Begg (2008: 297) says “that the visibility of cohe-
sion policy plays a valuable role in fostering support for EU regional policy and, indeed,
the EU generally.” In this chapter, we study the effect of targeted transfers in the EU on
the public support for the EU by combining a rich data set on the regional allocation of
structural funds payments with opinion survey data. Our results confirm that regional
transfers show the expected effect, and that it is sizeable: an increase of transfers by
100 Euros per capita increases the citizens’ probability of being supportive of the EU by
approximately 5% to 15%.
For several reasons, EU regional policy is a particularly interesting issue for the analysis
123
124 CHAPTER 5. REGIONAL TRANSFERS AND PUBLIC SUPPORT
of a popularity effect of regional transfers. Primarily, its scope is immense and much
larger than the scope of most national programmes. In 2009, its budget amounted to
almost 50 billion Euros, which was more than 0.4 % of the overall European GDP, and
which was mainly dedicated to the poorest European regions. In addition to its pure
size, it meets many requirements to be highly visible to the citizens. Many projects
are financed that benefit a wide range of citizens, such as infrastructure, and since
the European institutions are highly concerned with their public image, they actively
promote the visibility of their regional activities. Concerning this objective, European
institutions are not that different from upper-layer governments at the national level
which act as benefactors of regional transfers in order to obtain an electoral advantage.
European institutions are the benefactors of EU structural funds and intend to get the
citizens on their side in order to overcome obstacles for deeper integration and to solidify
their position in the European federal system against national actors.
The study of this institutionally special case of regional transfers offers empirical advan-
tages over the study of national systems of regional transfers. In particular, it alleviates
methodological problems inherent to the analysis of the popularity effect of regional
transfers in national federal systems. There, the allocation of transfers usually has to be
regarded as endogenous since the benefactor has incentives to strategically favour cer-
tain regions. Contrary to this, the allocation of EU regional transfers can be regarded
as exogenous as will be shown in this chapter. In brief, most of the funds are allocated
according to transparent criteria, such as a GDP per capita below the threshold of 75%
of the EU average which determines those regions which receive the highest aid inten-
sity. For this reason, no relation between regional allocations and electoral motives can
be expected. Consequently, we have an interesting situation: the structural funds are
allocated to the regions independently from strategic considerations, yet the European
institutions have strong incentives to make these predetermined transfers visible to the
citizens in order to improve the public opinion of the EU.
Moreover, in this chapter we use an innovative strategy for the measurement of the
opinion of the citizens. In related works it is standard to measure the public support by
means of voting equations, i.e., election results at the regional level. Obviously, for the
EU this is hardly possible, since the EU is only irregularly the subject of elections, such
as the referendums concerning the Constitution for Europe. In contrast, we refer to the
direct statement of support for the EU in opinion surveys. This data source offers the
advantage that it allows us to control for many further influences on the opinion at the
individual level. In this regard, we can resort to a broad literature provided by political
science which studies the determinants of the public opinion towards the EU.
Our empirical evidence will have important implications for the literature on vote buying:
as the EU structural funds are larger in size and more visible to the citizens than most
kinds of intergovernmental grants at the national level, we should expect a sizeable
impact on the attitudes of the citizens in benefited European regions. Moreover, we
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are the first to be able to study the whole chain of causation which leads from regional
transfers to public opinion in a more detailed way. In particular, we scrutinise the
relevance of public awareness in this process. As will be shown in detail, it is too
simplified to assume a simple and homogenous effect of local transfers on public support.
In particular, the awareness of being a recipient of transfers is highly dependent on
individual characteristics, such as education, and the information source that causes
awareness has a major effect on the individual assessment.
The chapter is structured as follows. In section 5.2, the theoretical literature and related
empirical works focusing on vote purchasing at the national level are presented. In
section 5.3, we motivate the application to EU regional policy and present institutional
characteristics of EU regional policy. The data sources and our empirical approach are
presented in section 5.4. In section 5.5, the results are presented and discussed, and the
final section 5.6 concludes.
5.2 Theoretical background and related empirical work
A number of theoretical political economic models predict that in situations where upper-
layer governments have leeway in the distribution of funds, a politically biased allocation
to jurisdictions or social groups should take place, which comes under the term of ‘vote
purchasing’. One prediction is based on the theoretical framework originating from the
seminal models by Lindbeck and Weibull (1987, 1993) and Dixit and Londregan (1996,
1998). Their main insights can be summarised as follows: office-seeking parties which are
in power at the central level tend to use their leeway in the allocation of regional grants
to benefit those jurisdictions in which the number of swing voters is relatively high.
This strategy increases the benefactor’s share of votes, since the money spent in these
regions yields a higher return of votes than money spent in other regions. Even more
so, this kind of economic vote buying is assumed to play an important role in plurality
voting systems. There, incumbents have an incentive to increase their probability of
re-election by concentrating funds to those jurisdictions where a close election result can
be expected (e.g., ‘swing states’ in US politics; see Wright, 1974). Recent evidence that
politicians at higher tiers of government invest excessively in those municipalities with
a higher electoral benefit, e.g., because of the occurrence of many swing voters, comes
from Dahlberg and Johansson (2002) and Johansson (2003) for intergovernmental grants
in Sweden and Castells and Solé-Ollé (2005) for infrastructure investments in Spain, as
well as Helland and Sørensen (2009) for Norwegian road investments.
An alternative prediction originates from the model of Cox and McCubbins (1986).
Under the assumption that politicians are risk-averse, the model derives the expec-
tation that incumbents excessively target funds towards their core supporters. Simi-
larly, benefiting the core voters might also be vote maximising since it improves turnout
among the incumbent’s core supporters (see Nichter, 2008). In a similar vein, Solé-Ollé
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and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) argue that upper-layer decision-makers have an interest in
favouring jurisdictions which are governed by the same government, since only then the
benefactor is able to gain the whole credit for the grant. Recent research finds some
empirical evidence for these predictions: Leigh (2008) shows for Australia that juris-
dictions held by the governing coalition received a larger share of discretionary funding,
and Ansolabehere and Snyder (2006) provide similar evidence for transfers of U.S. states
to counties. Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) show for Spanish municipalities that
aligned municipalities receive more intergovernmental grants. Finally, Arulampalam et
al. (2009) find evidence that for transfers from the Indian central government to states
both mechanisms are at work: transfers increase both with alignment and with being a
swing state.
However, while this empirical evidence confirms the expectations of a link existing be-
tween the allocation of regional transfers and the expected political gains for the incum-
bent, it is not sufficient evidence for the effectiveness of vote purchasing since it does not
consider the reaction of the voters. As Stein and Bickers (1994) note, three conditions
have to be fulfilled to establish a causal chain which runs from the expected gains from
strategically targeting funds to an actual increase in the incumbent’s vote share at the
ballot box: (i) legislators can impact the distribution of funds, (ii) constituents in the
districts become aware of these benefits, and (iii) constituents reward the benefactor for
the benefits. Consequently, in order to complete the story, the reaction of the voters has
to be considered. However, in this regard the existing literature is limited, and the very
few existing works only rely on studying the overall effect of spending allocations on
election results. Hence, these papers abstract from public awareness of the transfers and
study the effect of fund allocation on public awareness and support jointly. Evidence
comes from Levitt and Snyder (1997) who show for the members of US Congress that an
increase in spending at the district level by 100 Dollar per capita increases the incum-
bents’ votes by 2%. Moreover, Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008) show for Spanish
municipalities that only grants to jurisdictions held by the same party as the central
level can generate a positive effect at elections. They estimate a quantitatively similar
effect. Only the early work by Stein and Bickers (1994) refers explicitly to the public
awareness of fund allocation and shows that the awareness of being funded impacts on
public support in elections of the U.S. Congress.
Such analyses of the voters’ reaction at the ballot box confronts the researcher with a
number of serious empirical problems: as discussed above, theory and evidence suggest
that politicians have strong incentives to bias the distribution of funds due to electoral
motives, so that the allocation to jurisdictions cannot be regarded as exogenous. More-
over, it can be assumed that incumbents also influence the opinions of the electorate in
the benefited regions in other ways due to the high electoral returns they can expect from
these jurisdictions. This might be more intensive campaigning in pivotal jurisdictions,
which would lead to an omitted variable bias in the regressions and, consequently to an
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overestimation of the impact of regional transfers. In the related works, these severe en-
dogeneity problems are therefore tackled with more sophisticated empirical approaches.
In the works by Levitt and Snyder (1997) and Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro (2008), it is
done by applying an instrumental variable estimation, in which the intensity of transfers
to municipalities is instrumented with the transfers to neighbouring municipalities.
However, in light of this rather scarce evidence in favour of an effect of regional spending
on the popularity of the benefactor, it can be concluded that there are good reasons to
challenge the claim that targeted transfers necessarily impact public support. One de-
cisive necessity for generating a positive effect is public awareness, so that voters know
whether their municipality has or has not been granted. As these targeted transfers
usually come about in the form of public investments, a low visibility towards the citi-
zens might marginalise the impact on the electorate’s opinion if the benefactor fails to
make the citizens aware of being funded. Moreover, as Solé-Ollé and Sorribas-Navarro
(2008) emphasise, a positive effect can only be expected in cases where the citizens
can attribute the additional spending to the incumbent party, which is in federal states
usually only the case when central government and the executing local government are
ruled by the same party. Finally, an intended preferential treatment of a specific region
might not be recognised as such by the respective electorate and instead perceived as a
general extension of public activity for which the local voters have to pay with their tax
spending. This could even have an adverse effect on the citizens’ support. Consequently,
it is of interest not only to study whether targeted spending affects the opinion of the
citizens, but also scrutinise the components of the transmission process, i.e., to study
the determinants of the awareness of the citizens, and to identify how the awareness
of being funded actually translates into the individual’s opinion. Since the existence of
these two effects is a necessary condition for the working of the mechanism sketched
above, this analysis is required to confirm the causality between regional transfers and
the public opinion.
5.3 Background European Union
5.3.1 Political implications
In this contribution, we transfer the analysis of the popularity effect of regional transfers
from the national level to the supranational level, in particular to the EU regional policy.
Our claim is that EU regional policy has – despite obvious institutional differences –
very similar implications with respect to the theory as presented above. This needs
some clarifications.
Of major importance is the observation that the European institutions in Brussels, in
particular the Commission, are highly interested in increasing the public support for
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European integration. In this regard, they resemble national upper-layer governments
that intend to increase their public support in order to increase their votes at the ballot
box. This claim is at the bottom of neofunctionalism, the most enduring grand theory
of European integration (see Hix, 2005), which suggests that these European institu-
tions are a major driving force for European integration and the expansion of power
of European supranational institutions. Following this objective, European institutions
have a major interest in striving for an increase of the public acceptance of European
integration. Opposition by the general public has been one of the major drawbacks for
the integration process in the past. This became manifest only recently in a number of
negative referendums such as those concerning the the Constitution for Europe or the
Treaty of Lisbon. Moreover, public support for the EU is an important prerequisite for a
further centralisation of policies at the European level. As Lubbers and Scheepers (2005)
state, “(t)hough few countries have held referenda over which policies should be decided
at the European level, it is easy to imagine that legitimating the European Union in
the long run stands or falls on the extent to which the European population supports
decision-making processes at this supranational level.” Hence, increasing the European
citizens’ support for integration can be regarded as a crucial goal for the European in-
stitutions which should guide their actions to a certain degree, and which is, inter alia,
promoted by the regional policy as will be discussed below.
In the related works discussed in section 5.2, public support is studied by means of vote
equations. This means that the incumbents’ vote shares at the subnational level are
explained with the transfers of intergovernmental funds plus a number of region-specific
control variables. Obviously, such an approach is not feasible in our setting, since the EU
itself and the European integration process are only sporadically subject of elections,
such as the constitution referendums. These are of minor usefulness for our purpose
since they were only conducted in a limited number of countries and their outcomes
were regularly overshadowed by political issues of the national level. Consequently, we
choose a different path and measure public approval by means of opinion survey data.
As will become clear in the following subsections, our research design offers some major
advantages over earlier approaches. First, the main problem of related studies – the
endogeneity of the funds allocation – is not much of a problem in the case of the EU
structural policies. EU funds are allocated according to principles which are presented
in the following. This allocation of European funds is exogenous in the sense that there
is no relationship between the level of regional transfers and the European institutions’
intention to manipulate the public support. Second, the quantity of EU structural
spending is immense and the European institutions promote it actively, so that its
analysis seems to be promising concerning the visibility by the people. Third, the use
of survey data allows us to control for a multiplicity of further determinants of public
opinion.
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5.3.2 EU regional policy
The structural funds of the European Union (EU) constitute a large-scale regional pol-
icy. From 2007 until 2013, a total amount of about 350 billion Euro, corresponding to
approximately 0.4% of the total EU GDP, will be allocated. Its purpose is to enhance
cohesion and to reduce welfare disparities among the EU regions. Consequently, the
bulk of the spending, about 80% of it, is allocated to the poorest European regions in
order to promote their social or economic convergence.
The EU regional policy in its current form was founded in 1988, when most of the
principles which have since then determined this policy area were defined, in particular
the geographical concentration of the funds.1 Before this, European regional policy was
limited to single projects, and its scope was rather small. In 1988, the overall amount
available to regional policy was for the first time defined in a multi-annual Community
budget for the years 1989-1993. Since then, it has become custom to conduct regional
policy over multi-annual programming periods, with the subsequent ones covering the
periods 1994-1999 and 2000-2006. At the beginning of each programming period, the
maximum funds available to each region (allocations) are defined for the whole period
according to specified criteria. Moreover, the spending priorities are stipulated for later
concretion in regional programmes.2
For the purpose of structural policies, regions are defined according to the Nomenclature
of Territorial Units for Statistics (NUTS) of Eurostat, the statistical office of the EU.
The NUTS 2 level which comprises regions with a size of usually between 800,000 and
3 million inhabitants is of highest relevance for the conduct of regional policy.3 In
some cases the relevant regions match national administrative boundaries (such as the
Länder in Germany or Comunidades Autónomas in Spain), whereas in other member
states artificial regions are used, e.g., in the UK. Actual payments to regions are then
made within the ceilings of the multi-annual framework, i.e., the commitments can
be called up by the regions within a certain period. Regions can become eligible for
transfers from different “objectives”. In quantitative terms, the transfers to the Objective
1 regions (after 2007 renamed as Convergence objective) has always been the dominating
objective.
Objective 1 is dedicated to promote the development of regions whose development is
lagging behind; these are NUTS 2 regions with a GDP per capita of less than 75% of
the EU average4. Such a region receives transfers which are approximately 10 times
higher than the support a region receives which exceeds this threshold only marginally.
1More details on the history of EU regional policy can be found e.g. in European Commission (2008)
or Allen (2005).
2Detailed information on accepted programmes are available from the web page of DG Regio:
http://ec.europa.eu/regional_policy/atlas2007/index_en.htm.
3An exception is Germany, where EU regional policy is conducted at the NUTS 1 level.
4The eligibility of a region for an objective is decided prior to the start of a programme period and
stays constant over the whole period.
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Moreover, further objectives which target regions that are not eligible for objective 1
have always existed; eligibility is then determined based on several different indicators.
These objectives address regions that suffer from other structural problems, such as
industrial decline, high unemployment or a location in the periphery, and also involved
considerable transfers to many richer regions.5 This set of instruments contributes to
a high variation in the per capita level of transfers which is allocated to the European
regions, hence creating differences between and within countries. The resulting map of
eligible regions for the programme period 1994-1999 can be found in Figure 5.2 in the
appendix.
The large scale of EU regional policy has already motivated a lot of economic research,
especially concerning the impact of structural spending on national and regional GDP
growth performance. The results of these studies have sometimes been inconclusive in
the past (see Mohl and Hagen (2011) for an overview), but most recent evidence by
Becker et al. (2009) and Mohl and Hagen (2010) suggests that a significantly positive
growth effect exists, in particular for Objective 1 spending. Their finding is of high
importance for our analysis, since it confirms that EU structural policy is indeed a
regional policy with perceptible benefits for selected European regions, and it is not
designed as a national transfer programme.
Another important aspect of EU regional policy for our purpose is the fact that it meets
all demands to be very visible to the European citizens, probably much more than com-
parable national programmes. First, as mentioned above, the amounts allocated to the
main beneficiary regions are very high and a major share contributes to the financing of
large-scale projects within these regions such as infrastructure projects (like motorways
or public transport) through the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF); fur-
ther activities are environmental projects, direct aid to enterprises and human resources
through the European Social Fund (ESF). Second, the Commission is aware of the capa-
bility of this policy area to improve the public opinion towards the European institutions
and the citizens’ support for European integration (see Begg, 2008), and therefore the
responsible institutions actively promote the visibility of these funds. This activity is
particularly motivated by the fact that structural spending is the only major spending
category of the European budget which can reach broad levels of the population, while
most other policies, such as agriculture policy, are focused on small groups only.
This intended promotion of regional policy is fixed in the Commission’s regulations and
takes different forms. One important channel is the media. It is explicitly stated in
the Council regulations that the managing authorities have to actively resort to the
media in order to make the citizens aware of the transfers they receive.6 Moreover,
5There existed 5 further objectives in the period 1994-1999, and 2 from 2000-2006. For more details,
see European Commission (2008).
6In Regulation No 1159/2000, it is stated that “in order to make the public more aware of the part
played by the European Union in the assistance packages concerned and the results they achieve, the
designated managing authority shall inform the media in the most appropriate way about the structural
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Figure 5.1: Information signs. Sources: own material; DG Regio
regulations demand that investments which are funded by EU structural funds have to
be labelled extensively with the symbols of the EU, both on construction signs (such
as those shown in Figure 5.1) as well as with emblems on the finished projects (see,
e.g., European Commission, 2000; 2006). Consequently, the EU is omnipresent in the
benefiting regions, with the symbol of the flag of Europe visible in all supported regions,
ranging from public buses in Athens to wastebaskets in Santiago de Compostela.
5.3.3 Support for European integration
For the measurement of public opinion, we will resort to the support for the EU and its
institutions at the individual level as expressed in public opinion surveys. Our approach
differs from most of the related literature that measures aggregate public support at the
subnational level by using election results. To our knowledge, Manacorda et al. (2011)
is the only related paper that applies a similar survey-based approach for Uruguay,
but their work has its focus on personal transfers instead of regional transfers.7 Simi-
larly, Chen (2008) and Pop-Eleches and Pop-Eleches (2009) show that targeted personal
transfers can buy political support.
The use of survey data offers several advantages over the use of vote equations. Election
results only give a crude picture of the public opinion since votes are only available
for individual electoral districts at an aggregate level. In vote equations many further
determinants of electoral outcomes are unobservable or have to be appraised, such as
the ideological positions or other socio-economic characteristics of the inhabitants of a
assistance part-financed by the Union. [...] Steps shall be taken, at the time of the original launch of
assistance following approval by the Commission and of the main phases of implementation, to alert the
national and regional media (press, radio and television) as appropriate; such steps may include press
releases, the placing of articles, supplements in the most suitable newspapers and site visits.”
7In particular, approval for the current government (surveyed in the Latinobarómetro public opinion)
is explained by transfers within a large anti-poverty program.
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municipality. In contrast, survey data allows to control for many of these variables by
means of the individual characteristics that are available from the respondents. More-
over, the usually higher availability of public opinion polls provides more observations
than votes which are only conducted irregularly and may be influenced by campaigning
activities. Finally, direct statements of public support in surveys exclude the possibility
that strategic voting motives might interfere with the “true” opinion of the citizens.
Concerning the public support for the European Union, a voluminous literature from
political science already exists which has mainly been published on the basis of Euro-
barometer survey data. From these studies, much is known about further determinants
of citizens’ attitudes towards European integration. These will enter our analysis as con-
trol variables and will be presented in the following section. This facilitates us to isolate
the pure effect of the intensity of structural funds spending on the citizens’ support from
a variety of other influences.
5.4 Data and empirical approach
5.4.1 Data
The data for EU structural funds payments at the regional level has been generated
from the Annual Report on the Structural Funds reports published by the European
Commission. In these reports, spending is recorded according to regional programmes,
which allows the calculation of overall transfers at the regional level. However, the data
available is very limited, which restricts the scope of our analysis to the programme
period 1994-1999. Since 2000, payments are not published in Commission publications
anymore, so that it is the only period where the amount of funds spent in the regions
is reliably available on an annual basis. For the period at hand we can use a detailed
annual data base.8 This goes far beyond the data which is usually applied in the growth
literature, which is often only the overall payments in the whole programme period.
Moreover, many works apply the amount of commitments to the regions instead of the
payment figures. Commitments are the maximum amount available which can be called
up by the national authorities. These are, however, inappropriate for our analysis, since
they are usually only spent in the region at a indeterminate point in time some years
after they have been committed. Moreover, in many cases commitments are not paid
at all, since they are only available for a period of 2 years and expire after that period
(N+2 rule).
We apply the data in form of the annual regional transfers at a per capita base; the
descriptive statistics are presented in Table 5.5 in the appendix. As can be expected
from the allocation principles presented above, these per capita transfers vary a lot
8More detailed information on the data can be found in Mohl and Hagen (2010).
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between, but also within countries. The highest average per capita levels can be found
for the countries which are entirely eligible for Objective 1, i.e., Ireland, Portugal and
Greece. These are up to 10 times higher than those of countries without any Objective
1 regions. The highest within variation can be found for Spain, Germany and Italy.
These are countries that consist of both rather poor and very rich regions. Note that
even single regions in many rich countries, such as Austria or the Netherlands, exhibit
a very high level of transfers. In detail, the average per capita transfer for Objective
1 regions amounts to 148.24 Euros, for the other regions this average only amounts to
16.75 Euros.
The public attitude towards the EU is measured with survey data from the Eurobarome-
ter opinion survey. It has been conducted since 1973 on behalf of the European Commis-
sion for a representative sample in all member states (usually about 1,000 participants
per country and edition) and performed at least twice a year. Although the composi-
tion of questions changes continuously over time, some questions appear regularly in the
questionnaires. In particular, we refer to the following question as indicator for public
support of the EU: “Generally speaking, do you think that your country’s membership of
the European Union is a good thing, bad thing or neither good nor bad?”. The possible
answers are coded as follows: 1 for a ‘good thing’, 2 for ‘neither good nor bad’, 3 for
a ‘bad thing’. The scale is, thus, ordinal, and for illustrative reasons we rescale it so
that the values increase with increasing support for the EU (consequently, 1 denotes
‘a bad thing’, and 3 ‘a good thing’). For our estimations, we refer to all editions of
the Eurobarometer survey between 1995 (EB 43.0) and 1999 (EB 52.1) which contain
this question.9 The graphic representation in Figure 5.3 in the appendix shows that the
respondents tended to have a positive attitude towards the EU, with a mean of 2.4. For
each respondent, his regional origin is recorded in the data sample at a subnational level,
which can in most cases be traced back to NUTS 2 level or an even lower level. After
merging the data on structural funds transfers and the Eurobarometer surveys at the
same geographical level, it is possible to attribute each individual participant’s stated
opinion to the transfers spent in his region (expressed in Euros per capita).
In addition to that, we will later refer supplementary to the Eurobarometer issue 43.1bis
from 1995. This was a special issue of Eurobarometer which additionally contained some
further questions related to the regional policy of the EU. By means of these questions
which will be presented at the respective position of the empirical section, we are able
to extend the analyses that are conducted based on the large sample by adding further
questions focusing on the respondents’ awareness of regional policy.
Finally, a number of control variables are used which are listed in Table 5.6 in the
appendix. These follow closely the existing political science literature which study the
determinants of the public opinion towards the EU. Hooghe and Marks (2005) give an
overview of the different theoretical approaches and empirical findings which they classify
9The data has been obtained from the Mannheim Eurobarometer Trendfile.
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into three groups: (i) economic models, (ii) identity and (iii) political cues. Obviously,
our approach has to be classified into the group of economic models which explain the
people’s support by the benefits they derive from European integration. Important
examples for further related factors are education, occupation and personal income,
since mainly citizens with a high level of human capital can be regarded as beneficiaries
from market integration in Europe. These socio-economic controls are also provided
by the Eurobarometer survey. National benefits from integration mainly accrue from a
high degree of intra-EU openness. Moreover, some papers add national net positions
as regressor to control for budgetary benefits from the EU budget. However, this data
is not very illustrative for our purpose, since the national net position is inter alia
determined by the average of structural funds transfers and the data itself is usually
regarded as a bad proxy for economic benefits in the literature (see LeCacheux (2005)
for a criticism of this indicator). The other main determinant of net positions is the
amount of agricultural subsidies which, however, only benefit farmers. We control for
this effect in our regressions. The financing of these gross transfers does not impact the
net positions (which are commonly expressed as national share of GDP) significantly.
Financing takes place from the pool of EU revenues which are raised from the national
budgets in form of contributions. These are roughly proportional to their overall GNI
and VAT revenues, so that all countries contribute according to the size of their economy
(see Heinemann et al. (2008) for an overview). Consequently, the economic implication
at the aggregate level is similar to that of a tax on GDP, but the individual incidence
additionally depends on the characteristics of the national tax system which finances
the contributions to the EU.10 Identity comprises aspects related to group loyalty (such
as nationalism or multiculturalism). It is relevant since European integration interferes
with national sovereignty. One important aspect is the socialisation of citizens with the
EU, which is usually found to increase with the length of membership. Finally, cue
theory emphasises the importance of individual interests and values. These comprise,
inter alia, the ideological position of the individuals. In the Eurobarometer survey,
individuals are asked to locate themselves on an ideology scale ranging from +1 (left) to
+10 (right). In order to account for extreme positions, we added the variable Ideology
Extreme, which yields the absolute deviation of the Ideology value from a centrist position
(5.5). Moreover, the literature emphasises the relevance of individual post-materialist
attitudes, which are usually proxied by their age (see Hix (2005) for a more detailed
overview of the literature).
Most of the existing empirical literature focuses on determinants of EU support at the
individual and the national level. We extend these existing approaches by adding a
number of regional control variables to our variable of main interest which is also mea-
sured at the regional level. Lubbers and Scheepers (2005) show that EU support varies
significantly across the regions within the European countries. Consequently, controls
10This impact on the individual cost-benefit analysis is captured in our regressions as far as possible
by the inclusion of individual income as well as other economic control variables.
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at the regional level are necessary since we have to rule out that other region-specific
factors interfere with the impact of the regional intensity of support. These are derived
from the three different approaches given above and follow the variables that are usually
applied in the related political science literature as far as possible.11 Several of these
variables capture the industrial structure of a region or account for the economic situa-
tion, such as the unemployment rate. The variable rural is measured at the individual
level since it is based on the self-assessment of the respondents concerning their home
town and takes the value of 1 if it is characterised as rural. The dummy for regions that
share a border with another member state (border) and the centrality index address
region-specific benefits from European integration through trade. The latter is based on
the regional typology of the ESPON (European Spatial Planning Observation Network)
data set (ESPON (2005)) which characterises the regions from 0 (very peripheral) to +5
(very central).12
5.4.2 Empirical method
The data subsection has shown that the data which is used has a hierarchical structure,
since it comprises information from three different levels. Consequently, individuals i
from the same region r or country c share common influences when the individual level
of EU support is explained in our regressions. This can be seen from equation 1 which
represents the basic model as a latent response model.






c,tβ5 +µt + ηc + irc,t (5.1)
X1irc,t,X2rc,t andX3c,t are sets of covariates that are available at the individual, regional and
national level, respectively. The variable of our main interest is RegionalPaymentsrc,t,
which is the intensity of regional policy payments a region r of country c receives in year
t. Hence, an individual i who was surveyed in year t gets the value of the per capita
payments in his region of that year.13 Moreover, since the respondents were surveyed
at different points of time, the model contains a set of year dummies, µt, which capture
time trends in EU support. A set of location dummies ηc is added in some regressions
that control for country-specific influences which can not be captured by the region and
country-specific controls, but we will later also present an alternative model that allows
11Note that some variables, mainly concerning identity, cannot be included due to lack of availability
for our sample.
12In particular, it is based on a time based, multimodal accessibility-indicator, calculated for the year
2001. It can be regarded as an indicator of the size of market areas for suppliers of high-level business
services. See Vickerman et al. (1999) for the methodology.
13Note that this structure implicitly allows for a lag in the effect of transfers on public support, since
the payments in our data are recorded towards the completion of a project. There is a lag in the EU
statistics to the commitments which are already recorded some time (usually several years) earlier at
the point of time when the project is decided and the implementation starts. Consequently, even before
t the projects are visible to the citizens.
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us to study within-country and between-country effects more explicitly.14 irc,t is the
individual error component.
The simple estimation of the given model with the dependent variable measured at
the individual level and explanatory variables mainly available at a higher level would
suffer from econometric problems, since the assumption of independent observations
(and independent errors) is violated because observations are “duplicated” (see, e.g.,
Steenbergen and Jones (2002)). As a consequence, the application of OLS or probit
without a correction underestimates the standard errors and inflates the test statistics.
In the following, we will compute clustered standard errors which correct for potential
correlation of the error term across observations that are contained within the same
cross-sectional unit (i.e., the same NUTS 2 region).15
Depending on the survey question which is examined, the model is either estimated
by probit analysis (for questions with bivariate answer categories) or by ordered probit
analysis (for questions with ranked answer options).
5.4.3 Discussion of potential endogeneity
The study of the causal effect of regional transfers on elections generally suffers from
severe methodological problems which we discussed in the literature overview in greater
detail. The allocation of funds to regions cannot be regarded as exogenous in cases where
politicians use them in order to manipulate the electorate’s opinion. In the case of EU
regional policy, this problem is of minor importance. Although the European institu-
tions are highly interested in increasing the overall public support of the citizens, it does
not imply that they are interested in excessively benefiting single regions. Moreover, this
would not even be possible, since the bulk of the funds is allocated according to rules
based on objective figures, such as the 75% threshold, a high level of unemployment or a
low population density. The distribution of funds within countries is furthermore partly
managed by national authorities, which can neither be assumed to be biased by the
support of the citizens for the EU in their decisions. The exogeneity of funds allocation
with respect to the attitude of the citizens towards the EU is moreover documented
by Bouvet and Dall’erba (2010), who study the determinants of the structural funds
allocation. According to their work, EU scepticism is not found to significantly affect
the national allocation of funds. Concerning the regional allocation, the distribution
of Objective 1 spending, and thus the bulk of structural funds, as well as the distri-
bution of Objective 5 spending are neither found to be affected by the attitude of the
14Since the annual regional aid intensity is largely constant during a programme period, the use of
region dummies is not meaningful in this context.
15See Arceneaux and Nickerson (2009) for an overview on the different methods that allow for cluster-
ing of error terms. They show analytically and empirically that if the number of clusters is above 20 (as
it is in our case), clustered standard errors are equally adequate for precision estimates of group-level
effects than hierarchical linear models or random effects models.
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citizens’ towards the EU. The effects for the further smaller categories, Objective 2 and
3&4 spending, are significant but contradictory, since they point to different directions.
However, in both cases the quantitative effect on the funds allocation is negligible, and
other economic and political factors are found to have a much stronger effect on the
allocation.16 Consequently, our research design offers the advantage that we can treat
the allocation of funds to regions as exogenous with respect to the level of EU support.
However, the dominance of the allocation criteria gives rise to concerns that an omitted
variable problem might be existent, since structural funds are to a large extent allocated
based on data on the regional prosperity, which is measured as GDP per capita. Al-
though the existing theoretical and empirical literature on EU support does not consider
a direct causal impact of regional prosperity on the public opinion, we take this problem
seriously in our empirical approach. First, we control for personal income, as well as for
the personal economic situation (profession, unemployment status) of the respondents.
Second, we control for regional characteristics which affect prosperity and might be as-
sumed to affect public opinion directly (e.g., unemployment rate, industrial structure or
peripheral location).
Nevertheless, there are arguments which militate against the existence of a major prob-
lem due to omitted variables. Annual regional policy payments are not as highly cor-
related with regional prosperity as it appears at first glance. The allocation of funds is
determined several years before the beginning of the multi-annual programme period,
and based on regional GDP figures which are also only available with the delay of several
years. Consequently, the regional GDP figures which underly the regional allocation of
funds at a given point of time can have an age of up to 15 years (see Mohl and Hagen
(2011)). This procedure has regularly led to perverse outcomes, most notably in the case
of Ireland. Ireland was the biggest recipient of transfers in per capita terms in the time
which is considered (as demonstrated in Table 5.5) although in 1999 it already belonged
to the richest countries in Europe, with a GDP per capita at level of 110% of the EU-15
average.
Finally, even if there was an omitted-variable bias, it would rather bias downward the
estimates for the effect of regional policy spending. The political science literature cited
above stresses that mainly richer and well-educated citizens benefit from integration
and, thus, tend to support the EU. Moreover, mainly citizens from regions with higher
openness perceive a benefit from European integration. These regions are, however,
almost exclusively located in Europe’s core and belong to the richest regions, and thus
do not receive high transfers from Brussels. Consequently, a potential omitted-variable
bias would lead to an underestimation of the effect of transfers on public support, so
16Bouvet and Dall’erba (2010) as well as Bodenstein and Kemmerling (2008) find that the economic
criteria explain most of the variation in allocated funds, but they also find weak evidence that political
factors, such as electoral competition in the regions, impact the distribution at the subnational level.
This finding, however, mainly affects the distribution of the small fraction of Objective 2 funds, and
does not have a relation to the EU support in the regions.
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that our results have to be regarded as rather conservative.
Likewise important is to discuss a potential bias which could arise if the perceived
or expected national gains generated by different aspects of European integration were
correlated with the national prosperity. At the stage of integration that will be regarded,
which is the end of the 1990s, it mainly affected economic integration. Consequently, a
first glance at the national attitudes towards liberalisation in general should be helpful.
Figure 5.4 in the appendix shows the correlation of the member states level of GDP
per capita and the impact of liberalisation on the personal financial situation that is
expected by the citizens.17 This correlation is slightly positive, which indicates that the
citizens in the richer countries tended to have a more positive attitude towards the effect
of liberalisation than those in poorer countries.
This finding is also in line with the political science literature that discusses a “com-
pensatory” function of the EU budget (see, e.g., Carrubba (1997) and Axt (2000)).
Accordingly, the major expansions of the EU regional and cohesion funds in the 1990s
can be explained by the intention to compensate the “losers” of integration, as which
the poorer member states at that time were considered, in order to abstain from a veto
against further integration steps such as the Internal market or EMU which were prop-
agated by the pro-integrationist central European (and richer) member states.18 This
again indicates that a possible omitted variable problem would rather deflate our results,
and we will return to this issue after presenting the results in section 5.5.1.
5.5 Empirical results
In this section the empirical results will be presented. In the first subsection, we study
the overall impact of the regional transfers on public support for the EU by using the
complete data sample presented above. In the second subsection, we restrict to a fraction
of the data sample that comprises a special issue of the Euobarometer survey. It provides
more detailed information, and we can carry out more detailed analyses. These allow us
to study the different steps of our chain of causality individually so that we can study
the causality of the relationship between transfers and public opinion.
17We use data from Eurobarometer 55.1 from 2001 which is shortly after the end of our period
of study. Unfortunately, attitudes towards liberalisation and related issues were not inserted in the
Eurobarometer survey before that issue.
18For instance, Molle (2007):142 states that in 1993 “(t)he fear of the southern member states to lose
out under the influence of the creation of the Monetary Union has been taken away by a package deal
that increased the size of the SF [structural funds]”.
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5.5.1 Effect of transfers on EU support
We start with the presentation of the estimation of equation (5.1) as a pooled model
that contains all control variables presented in section 5.3 (column 1 of Table 5.1) as
well as year dummies. The variable of main interest is the per capita level of regional
policy payments spent in a certain region. This variable shows a positive effect on the
individual support for the EU, which is statistically significant and quantitatively size-
able as indicated by the marginal effects: an increase of per capita transfers by 100
Euro increases the probability of being supportive of the EU to the extent of 11% (the
marginal effects are in all cases reported for the highest answer category which is 3, and
which represents a positive opinion on the EU). Moreover, a number of control variables
are highly significant in our model – as well as in the subsequent regressions. These
results are well in line with the predictions of the existing political science literature
stated above. In particular, a higher degree of education as well as higher income ex-
hibit a positive impact on EU support. Ideology shows an inverse U-curve effect, with
the strongest support given by people who locate themselves at the centre of the political
spectrum. The coefficients for the dummies for professions also show the expected direc-
tions, but one effect is of particular interest in our context: farmers show a significantly
lower support for the EU. However, this population group is the main recipient of EU
transfers through the Common Agriculture Policy, but obviously it is not possible to
disentangle the transfer effect from personal characteristics specific to farmers, as well
as their negative attitude towards a perceived overregulation of agricultural markets.
Finally, the location (measured by the centrality index) seems to be important, and
people from countries with a longer membership are more supportive.
In column 2, we add country dummies to the regression. Their inclusion has an effect on
the impact of regional policy transfers: the variable still exhibits a significant positive
effect on the public opinion, but the quantitative impact declines a lot compared to
the previous approach. This observation deserves further investigation: in Figure 5.5
in the appendix we plot the estimated coefficients for the country dummies against the
averaged national transfers. Visual inspection indicates that great proportion of the
size of the country fixed effects can be explained by the national differences in received
transfers. This effect of the national support level is partially absorbed by the use of
country dummies, in particular in those countries which only consist of one region (such
as Ireland or Luxembourg). Consequently, this approach doesn’t seem to be meaningful
when we want to inspect the overall effects of EU regional transfers.
In the following, we propose a different approach which allows us to disentangle the
between-country from the within-country effect of the regional policy transfer variable.
In column 3, the per capita structural funds payments at the regional level
(RegionalPaymentsrc,t in column 1 & 2) are decomposed into the average national
transfers NationalPaymentsc,t (which is the population-weighted average per capita
transfer to all regions within a country) and the deviation of the regional per capita level
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Table 5.1: Regression results: support for EU membership – ordered probit
(1) (2) (3)
Variable Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff. Coeff. Marg. eff.
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0029*** 0.0011 0.0006** 0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0003)
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0014*** 0.0005
-National Paymentsc,t (0.0004)
National Paymentsc,t 0.0038*** 0.0015
(0.0004)
Male 0.098*** 0.038 0.092*** 0.036 0.098*** 0.038
(0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Age -0.006 -0.002 -0.006 -0.002 -0.005 -0.002
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Ideology -0.029*** -0.011 -0.028** -0.011 -0.028*** -0.011
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Ideology extreme -0.028*** -0.011 -0.038*** -0.015 -0.029*** -0.011
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006)
Income 0.085*** 0.033 0.076*** 0.030 0.081*** 0.032
(0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
Education: high 0.353*** 0.135 0.401*** 0.152 0.378*** 0.144
(0.030) (0.022) (0.026)
Education: medium 0.101*** 0.039 0.157*** 0.061 0.124*** 0.048
(0.020) (0.015) (0.017)
Education: study 0.457*** 0.169 0.472*** 0.173 0.478*** 0.176
(0.036) (0.034) (0.033)
Profession: farmer -0.194*** -0.077 -0.160*** -0.063 -0.209*** -0.083
(0.055) (0.056) 0.054
Profession: manual -0.131*** -0.053 -0.093*** -0.037 -0.130*** -0.051
(0.018) (0.018) (0.017)
Profession: professional 0.202*** 0.077 0.178*** 0.068 0.203*** 0.078
(0.035) (0.038) (0.035)
Profession: executive 0.137*** 0.053 0.207*** 0.079 0.149*** 0.058
(0.051) (0.048) (0.050)
Profession: unemployed -0.105*** -0.042 -0.092*** -0.036 -0.095*** -0.038
(0.024) (0.022) (0.024)
Profession: retired -0.028* -0.011 -0.014 -0.006 -0.021 -0.008
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016)
Rural -0.020 -0.008 -0.028* -0.011 -0.012 -0.005
(0.025) (0.016) (0.025)
Unemployment rate 0.002 0.001 -0.003 -0.001 0.005 0.002
(0.004) (0.002) (0.004)
Share agriculture 1.501*** 0.588 0.541 0.212 1.233*** 0.483
(0.389) (0.355) (0.400)
Share services -0.068 -0.027 0.089 0.035 -0.252 -0.099
(0.323) (0.261) (0.331)
Density -0.010 -0.004 0.011 0.004 0.002 0.001
(0.037) (0.017) (0.035)
Border 0.062 0.024 0.031 0.012 0.026 0.010
(0.055) (0.037) (0.052)
Centrality 0.122*** 0.048 0.045** 0.017 0.105*** 0.041
(0.041) (0.021) (0.038)
Intra-EU Trade 0.249 0.098 0.036 0.014 0.365 0.143
(0.316) (0.733) (0.291)
Years of Membership 0.015*** 0.006 0.003 0.001 0.016*** 0.006
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
year dummies yes yes yes
country dummies no yes no
N 141,356 141,356 141,356
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors allowing for clustering at the regional level in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Marginal effects are calculated for answer class 3 (membership in the EU is a good think). Sample
weights were applied to produce representative estimates.
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from the average per capita level of transfers to the country, RegionalPaymentsrc,t −
NationalPaymentsc,t. The latter term is greater than zero for regions which receive
higher per capita payments than the national average, and smaller otherwise. Conse-
quently, the first term represents the between-country effect of structural funds pay-
ments, and the second term the within country-effect. These two effects are due to their
construction practically uncorrelated. If it is assumed that both effects are equal (which
is usually done in fixed effects analysis), both coefficients should have the same value
(see Rabe-Hesketh and Skrondal (2008) for this approach). This decomposition leads to
the following new representation of equation (5.1):
y∗irc,t = β1 + β2NationalPaymentsc,t + β3(RegionalPaymentsrc,t
−NationalPaymentsc,t) +X1irc,tβ4 +X2rc,tβ5 +X3c,tβ6 + µt + irc,t (5.2)
The results in column 3 indicate that the between-country effect is significantly higher
than the within-country effect (p-value: 0.000). An extra (per capita) Euro paid to
each region of a country (between-country effect) generates a higher popularity effect
than one extra (per capita) Euro paid only to the respondent’s home region (within-
country effect). The smaller within effect relative to the between effect corresponds to
the lower impact of transfer intensity in the regression that applies country dummies.
This observation allows two different explanations. Empirically, one might argue that
the initial regression suffers from an omitted variables problem, since an unobservable
effect interferes with the average national level of transfers, and which also impacts
average national support for the EU directly. However, given the battery of control
variables as well as the fact that the related political science literature dismisses such an
effect (and usually estimates without using country dummies), we prefer an economic
explanation. It it very plausible that the impact of transfers on public opinion does not
only depend on the level of transfers that a particular region receives, but the level of
transfers that the other regions of the home country receive seems to play a role as well.
Such an effect can be explained by the fact that nationwide media or politicians tend
to focus on national benefits, and these figures are reported widely when discussing EU
policies. Consequently, one may conjecture that structural funds spent in other regions
of a country spill over on the public opinion. However, the results also confirm that the
regional differences in transfer levels within a country are still important to explain the
EU support of the individual citizens. This is demonstrated by the positive coefficient of
the within effect. Quantitatively this result indicates that a citizen who lives in a region
that receives per capita transfers that are 100 Euro higher than the national average has
a higher probability of being supportive of the EU which amounts to 5%.
Coming back to the discussion of potential omitted variable problems in section 5.4.2,
some further conclusions can be made based on the results. The variables that proxy
further benefits from European integration, such as central location and years of mem-
bership, both indicate that, ceteris paribus, citizens in the old and already well inte-
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grated countries tended to have a higher opinion of the EU. Moreover, the fact that the
within-country effect is significant and sizeable also contradicts the presumption that the
positive effect of regional transfers on the citizens’ attitudes is mainly driven by further
unobservable national benefits from integration.
In the following subsection, we will focus on the causality which is implied by the assumed
mechanism. If differences in the individual levels of EU support are in fact caused by
different intensities of regional transfers, the two following effects have to measurable:
(i) a positive effect of the regional level of transfers on the individual probability of
being aware of being a beneficiary, and (ii) a positive effect of being aware of being a
beneficiary on the individual support for the EU.
5.5.2 Studying the awareness of the citizens
Until now, we have only studied the overall impact of targeted funds on public support
in the EU and abstracted from the role of public awareness of being a beneficiary in this
process. In contrast to earlier papers, our data allows us to scrutinise the relevance of the
awareness of the European citizens concerning the impact of regional transfers on public
support. In the Eurobarometer edition 43.1bis from 1995, some additional questions
concerning the degree of information with respect to regional policy were asked. In
particular, we refer to the following question (Q41): “The European Union has, among
others, a regional development fund (the ERDF) to give aid to less favoured regions in
the European Union. Have you become aware of the activities of this European Union
Regional Fund (the ERDF) in (OUR COUNTRY) ?”, which offered the answer options
of yes (1 in the following) and no (0). A positive answer was given by 32.6% of the
respondents, a negative one by 67.4%.19
First, we study the individual determinants of being aware of being a beneficiary of EU
funds. In Table 5.2, we show the regression results for this question, applying the same
empirical model as used in the preceding subsection. Of particular interest is again the
regional transfer intensity (column 1), which is also decomposed in between-country and
within-country effect as before (column 2). Both effects are significant, and the t-test for
equal coefficients cannot be rejected at conventional significance levels (p-value: 0.72).
The quantitative effects are quite substantial: an increase of the per capita spending
of structural funds by an amount of 100 Euros increases the probability of being aware
of being benefited by regional policy by about 13%. This indicates that the visibility
of EU regional policy indeed increases with the amount which is spent within a region.
However, a number of further socio-economic characteristics seem to impact the visibility
as well, and these particularly refer to the educational background. This is not a very
surprising result, as it may be assumed that higher educated people are better informed
about EU policies, notwithstanding the amount spent in the respective jurisdiction.
19Note that these values are unweighted for country sizes, and thus not representative averages.
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Table 5.2: Regression results: awareness of EU transfers – probit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeff. Marg.eff. Coeff. Marg.eff. Coeff. Marg.eff. Coeff. Marg.eff.
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0037*** 0.0013 0.0024*** 0.0086 -0.0009 -0.0003
(0.0005) (0.00067) (0.00116)
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0041*** 0.0015
-National Paymentsc,t (0.0011)
National Paymentsc,t 0.0037*** 0.0013
(0.0006)
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0036*** 0.0013 0.0038*** 0.0014
× Education: high (0.0006) (0.0006)
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0015** 0.0005 0.0017*** 0.0006
× Education: medium (0.0007) (0.0006)
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0021** 0.0007 0.0022** 0.0008
× Education: study (0.0010) (0.0010)
Male 0.326*** 0.116 0.326*** 0.116 0.327*** 0.116 0.341*** 0.120
(0.036) (0.036) (0.036) (0.035)
Age 0.067*** 0.024 0.067*** 0.024 0.068*** 0.024 0.070*** 0.025
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Ideology -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008 -0.003 -0.011 -0.004
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Ideology extreme 0.009 0.003 0.009 0.003 0.010 0.004 0.019 0.007
(0.013) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014)
Income 0.105*** 0.038 0.106*** 0.038 0.104*** 0.037 0.105*** 0.037
(0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015)
Education: high 0.394*** 0.145 0.391*** 0.144 0.216*** 0.079 0.247*** 0.090
(0.054) (0.053) (0.062) (0.053)
Education: medium 0.197*** 0.071 0.195*** 0.070 0.093* 0.033 0.090* 0.032
(0.045) (0.044) (0.049) (0.049)
Education: study 0.248*** 0.092 0.246*** 0.091 0.117 0.043 0.148* 0.054
(0.067) (0.066) (0.082) (0.087)
Profession: farmer 0.061 0.022 0.062 0.022 0.086 0.031 0.111 0.040
(0.111) (0.109) (0.109) (0.100)
Profession: manual -0.051 -0.018 -0.052 -0.018 -0.051 -0.018 -0.078 -0.027
(0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.048)
Profession: professional 0.047 0.017 0.047 0.017 0.037 0.013 0.028 0.010
(0.089) (0.089) (0.091) (0.099)
Profession: executive 0.173* 0.064 0.173* 0.064 0.177** 0.066 0.226** 0.084
(0.089) (0.089) (0.090) (0.091)
Profession: unemployed 0.030 0.011 0.028 0.010 0.031 0.011 0.015 0.005
(0.066) (0.065) (0.066) (0.065)
Profession: retired -0.109** -0.038 -0.109** -0.038 -0.122** -0.043 -0.150*** -0.052
(0.051) (0.051) (0.052) (0.050)
Rural -0.056 -0.020 -0.057 -0.020 -0.060 -0.021 -0.079** -0.028
(0.041) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038)
Unemployment rate -0.018*** -0.006 -0.018*** -0.006 -0.019*** -0.007 0.002 0.001
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Share agriculture -1.570*** -0.560 -1.548*** -0.553 -1.646*** -0.588 1.030 0.366
(0.444) (0.462) (0.469) (0.782)
Share services 0.726* 0.259 0.746* 0.266 0.805* 0.287 1.142** 0.406
(0.441) (0.442) (0.443) (0.447)
Density 0.093*** 0.033 0.093*** 0.033 0.097*** 0.035 0.008 0.003
(0.026) (0.026) (0.026) (0.008)
Border 0.053 0.019 0.054 0.019 0.069 0.025 -0.078 -0.028
(0.055) (0.054) (0.054) (0.063)
Centrality -0.083 -0.030 -0.083 -0.030 -0.089* -0.032 -0.057 -0.020
(0.054) (0.054) (0.054) (0.051)
Years of Membership -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.002 -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
Constant -1.260*** -1.263*** -1.172*** -1.909***
(0.279) (0.278) (0.280) (0.295)
country dummies no no no yes
N 10,266 10,266 10,266 10,266
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors allowing for clustering at the regional level in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level.
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In column 3, we take a closer look at the effect of education on the awareness of being
a beneficiary of EU funds. We interact the education dummies with the regional aid
intensity and find that the responsiveness of the individual’s awareness to the aid inten-
sity increases with the level of education (it is highest for the group of highly educated
people, and lowest for the least educated which serve as the baseline category). From
this finding an interesting conclusion can be drawn: the individual’s awareness of being
a beneficiary of EU structural funds generally increases with the aid intensity, but this
effect is highly heterogenous and crucially depends on his education level. This finding
is also robust to the inclusion of a full set of country dummies (column 4); however,
in this regression the overall positive effect of transfers on awareness disappears for the
low-educated citizens, whereas it stays robust for the highly educated.
In the second step, we want to study whether the stated awareness of the citizen of being
a beneficiary of transfers actually leads to an increase of his EU support. In column 1 of
Table 5.3, we build on the baseline estimation from section 5.5.1 and replace the regional
payments with the survey data for the individual’s awareness of being a beneficiary of
EU regional funds. The dummy takes the value of one in cases where the respondent is
aware of EU regional policy transfers in his country. The dummy shows the predicted
positive sign at the 5% significance level: the awareness of being funded by EU regional
policy increases the probability of a positive attitude towards the EU by about 4%.
This result is also robust to the inclusion of the full set of country dummies (column
2). This finding verifies the existence of the mechanism sketched above: the regional
aid intensity positively affects the citizens awareness’ of being benefited, which in turn
positively affects their attitude towards the EU.
Then, we study the information channels underlying this effect. We are able to de-
compose the awareness variable with respect to the information source which made the
respondent aware of being benefited. This decomposition is available from a further
question of the survey. Participants were asked how they became aware of receiving
transfers from regional policy, and five different sources were offered in the questionnaire
(see Table 5.4 for descriptive statistics): (i) have read about it in press, (ii) have heard
about it on television or radio, (iii) have seen information on signs, (iv) have personally
received help, employment or advice, (v) know someone who received help, employment
or advice. These different channels impacted very differently on public awareness: the
strongest impact came from media, whereas very few citizens encountered regional policy
by personally receiving transfers. The information signs also turn out to have a rather
small effect on public awareness, despite their high visibility which is assumed by the
European institutions.
In column 3 of Table 5.3, we replace the awareness dummy with its components (the
dummies have the value of one in cases where the respondent became aware by means
of the respective information source). These results show very different impacts on EU
support depending on the sources of information. A highly significant positive impact
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Table 5.3: Regression results: support for EU membership – ordered probit (EB 43.1
only)
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Variable Coeff. Marg.eff. Coeff. Marg.eff. Coeff. Marg.eff. Coeff. Marg.eff.
Informed 0.101** 0.039 0.080** 0.031
(0.044) (0.032)
Informed: press 0.043 0.017
(0.050)
Informed: tv 0.097** 0.037
(0.043)
Informed: signs 0.098 0.038
(0.073)
Informed: ownexp 0.363*** 0.131
(0.135)
Informed: othexp -0.135* -0.053
(0.074)
Regional Paymentsrc,t 0.0036*** 0.0014
-National Payments c,t (0.0012)
National Paymentsc,t 0.0025*** 0.0010
(0.0006)
Male 0.110*** 0.043 0.117*** 0.045 0.105*** 0.041 0.114** 0.044
(0.039) (0.042) (0.040) (0.046)
Age -0.020* -0.008 -0.016 -0.006 0.021* 0.008 0.020 0.008
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.015)
Ideology 0.043** 0.017 0.044** 0.017 0.043** 0.017 0.033 0.013
(0.022) (0.022) (0.022) (0.021)
Ideology extreme -0.038*** -0.015 -0.036*** -0.014 -0.038*** -0.015 -0.039*** -0.015
(0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.013)
Income 0.075*** 0.029 0.064*** 0.025 0.073*** 0.028 0.077*** 0.030
(0.015) (0.013) (0.014) (0.015)
Education: high 0.210*** 0.080 0.301*** 0.113 0.208*** 0.079 0.253*** 0.097
(0.079) (0.043) (0.077) (0.061)
Education: medium 0.081* 0.031 0.106*** 0.040 0.082* 0.031 0.074 0.027
(0.045) (0.036) (0.044) (0.045)
Education: study 0.268*** 0.100 0.338*** 0.124 0.267*** 0.099 0.305*** 0.115
(0.084) (0.061) (0.082) (0.084)
Profession: farmer -0.263** -0.104 -0.280** -0.110 -0.262** -0.104 -0.235 -0.093
(0.123) (0.126) (0.125) (0.145)
Profession: manual -0.135*** -0.053 -0.102** -0.040 -0.132*** -0.051 -0.171*** -0.067
(0.037) (0.045) (0.037) (0.048)
Profession: professional 0.089 0.034 0.025 0.010 0.086 0.033 0.067 0.026
(0.096) (0.099) (0.097) (0.122)
Profession: executive 0.111 0.042 0.054 0.021 0.102 0.039 0.138 0.053
(0.152) (0.155) (0.154) (0.167)
Profession: unemployed -0.073 -0.028 -0.105* -0.041 -0.074 -0.029 -0.087 -0.034
(0.066) (0.059) (0.067) (0.065)
Profession: retired -0.033 -0.013 -0.024 -0.009 -0.032 -0.012 -0.044 -0.017
(0.038) (0.037) (0.037) (0.052)
Rural 0.060 0.023 -0.070* -0.027 0.059 0.023 0.072 0.028
(0.040) (0.037) (0.040) (0.045)
Unemployment rate -0.003 -0.001 -0.010** -0.004 -0.003 -0.001 -0.008 -0.003
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Share agriculture 1.657*** 0.640 0.178 -0.069 1.662*** 0.642 0.653 0.255
(0.522) (0.610) (0.523) (0.510)
Share services -0.965 -0.373 0.226 0.087 -0.949 -0.367 -0.474 -0.185
(0.651) (0.466) (0.647) (0.654)
Density 0.039 0.015 0.014 0.005 0.042 0.016 0.064 0.025
(0.039) (0.023) (0.038) (0.042)
Border -0.076 -0.029 0.022 0.009 -0.075 -0.029 -0.024 -0.010
(0.106) (0.054) (0.106) (0.107)
Centrality 0.110 0.042 0.037 0.014 0.108 0.042 0.108 0.042
(0.074) (0.037) (0.074) (0.084)
Years of Membership 0.018*** 0.007 -0.003 -0.001 0.019*** 0.007 0.020*** 0.008
(0.003) (0.004) (0.003) (0.003)
country dummies no yes no no
N 9,831 9,831 10,266 6,553
Prob > chi2 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Robust standard errors allowing for clustering at the regional level in parentheses: * Significant at the 10% level. ** Significant at the 5%
level. *** Significant at the 1% level. Marginal effects are calculated for answer class 3 (membership in the EU is a good thing).
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Table 5.4: Information sources
Press TV or Information Recipient Knows
radio signs recipient
Share of 0.21 0.23 0.05 0.02 0.04
responses
Total: 13,607 observations.
can be detected for citizens who directly received EU funds, and the quantitative impact
is very strong: being a direct recipient of structural funds increases the probability of
supporting the EU by 13.2%. A significant positive impact can besides only be measured
for TV, but the marginal effect is much smaller in size (3.7%). Information by local
press or through information signs, which are both very transparent indicators of a local
benefit, show a positive impact on EU support which, however, does not turn out to be
significantly different from zero. Interestingly enough, the knowledge that other people
received structural funds even has a negative impact on the respondents’ support. One
might speculate that in these cases the non-recipients evaluate regional transfers just like
personal transfers from which they do not benefit, which inevitably leads to a negative
cost-benefit analysis from their point of view.
Summing up, it can be concluded that the final link of our argumentation chain presented
above can be confirmed, which implies that the awareness of being benefited by EU
regional policy positively impacts on the opinion towards the EU. However, just like
the awareness itself, this effect is also highly heterogenous and crucially depends on the
source of information which makes the citizen aware of being a beneficiary.
Finally, we study whether the positive effect of transfers on EU support is limited to those
citizens who state that they are aware of ERDF. The relative small share of those who
affirm this (less than one third) suggests that much of the effect might be transmitted
indirectly. Possible indirect channels are social interactions with people who are aware of
EU transfers (and, consequently, more EU-friendly), more positive media coverage of the
EU in benefited regions or a more EU-friendly sentiment of local politics.20 In column
4 of Table 5.3, the sample is limited to those respondents who negate the awareness
of being supported. The results again indicate a positive impact of transfers on EU
support, thus implying that transfers also might affect public support indirectly.
20Moreover, it cannot be excluded that some people who were actually aware of EU regional policy




The European institutions have a high interest in increasing the public opinion towards
European integration. As we have shown, the transfers targeted to the European regions
in the framework of the structural policy indeed show a positive impact on the public
support of the EU. The impact of these transfers over the period 1995-1999 turned out
to be significant and sizeable. However, this positive effect on the public opinion was
not restricted to benefited regions, since spill-over within the countries seem to be at
work. The results indicate that citizens mainly take transfers to their own region into
account, but to a smaller extent also transfers to other regions of their home country.
This chapter also provides more general evidence concerning the relevance of vote pur-
chasing approaches. As we presented above, it is important to disentangle two aspects
when studying the impact of regional transfers on public opinion. First, citizens have to
be aware of being benefited, and second, their knowledge has to be reflected in higher
support by the citizens, i.e., the benefactor has to get a reward for the transfers. In this
regard, our contribution is the first to present evidence for this complete transmission
process. We found evidence that both steps tend to work as predicted. However, these
processes are far from having homogenous effects across all citizens. First, the awareness
of being a beneficiary of transfers is conditional on a number of further socio-economic
characteristics. Primarily, education seems to play an important role, since higher ed-
ucated people do not only show the higher unconditional awareness of being benefited,
but they also react stronger to regional transfers than lower educated people. Second,
the awareness of being benefited is generally reflected in higher public support of the
EU, but this effect is also heterogenous. In particular, it is the channel of information
which is important. As demonstrated, a positive awareness can even lead to a negative
assessment of regional policy in cases where other people are direct recipients of funds.
The chapter has demonstrated that some predictions which underlie the vote purchasing
literature can be confirmed for EU regional policy. However, one should be reluctant to
generalise the implications to all kinds of national transfer policies that are conducted by
higher-tier governments of national federal systems. In particular, the observed effects
require a high level of transfers and a high visibility to the citizens, two preconditions
which are apparently met by EU regional policy, but not necessarily for short-term
programs issued by the incumbents at the national level prior to elections. Even more so,
personal transfers turned out to have a much higher impact on the individual’s opinion.
Consequently, it should be the more relevant instrument concerning the purchasing of
votes, which is also supported by the study of Manacorda et al. (2011) for electoral
effects of personal transfer policies.
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5.7 Appendix
Table 5.5: Regional Policy: Payments per capita
Country Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max
France 21.25 14.60 5.44 126.93
Belgium 21.62 27.14 4.78 133.13
Netherlands 15.89 13.13 3.07 166.40
Germany 63.42 63.24 1.66 243.58
Italy 36.52 46.01 0.00 296.93
Luxembourg 14.66 6.06 9.42 24.08
Denmark 13.37 3.57 9.97 18.60
Ireland 244.65 18.76 214.20 289.29
United Kingdom 20.47 17.71 0.00 93.14
Greece 162.58 43.76 116.62 306.33
Spain 121.56 72.37 16.42 365.71
Portugal 207.07 33.76 152.94 283.62
Finland 33.07 17.45 12.30 68.02
Sweden 15.45 11.05 3.07 48.87
Austria 20.78 15.24 4.04 160.59
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics




EU Support Answer to the survey question:
“Generally speaking, do you think
that your country’s membership
of the European Union is a good
thing, bad thing or neither good
nor bad?”; good: 1, neither good
or bad: 2, bad: 3
1.61 0.76 1 3 Mannheim Euro-
barometer Trend File
(METF)
Male Dummy variable for male 0.51 0.50 0 1 METF
Age Age groups: 1 for age < 25, 2 for
< 35, 3 for < 45, 4 for < 55, 5 for
< 65, 6 for >= 65
3.61 1.70 1 6 METF
Ideology Ideological position stated by the
survey respondent, ranging from 1
(left) to 10 (right)
5.23 2.02 1 10 METF
Ideology ex-
treme
Absolute difference of stated ideol-
ogy from center
1.64 1.21 0.5 4.5 own calculations
based on METF
Income Personal income based on income
quartiles




Dummy variable for respondents
who stopped full-time education at
the age of 20 or older
0.28 0.45 0 1 METF
Education:
medium
Dummy variable for respondents
who stopped full-time education
between the age of 16 and 19
0.37 0.48 0 1 METF
Education:
study
Dummy variable for respondents
who are still studying
0.08 0.29 0 1 METF
Profession:
farmer
Dummy variable for farmers 0.02 0.13 0 1 METF
Profession:
manual
Dummy variable for manual work-
ers
0.14 0.34 0 1 METF
Profession:
professional
Dummy variable for professionals 0.03 0.18 0 1 METF
Profession:
executive
Dummy variable for executive po-
sitions
0.02 0.12 0 1 METF
Profession:
unemployed
Dummy variable for unemployed
people
0.06 0.24 0 1 METF
Profession:
retired
Dummy variable for retired people 0.21 0.41 0 1 METF
Rural Dummy variable for rural commu-
nities





Regional policy payments in Euros
per capita
61.41 76.53 0 365.71 own calculations
based on various
issues of the An-




UnemploymentUnemployment rate 8.91 5.98 2.29 39.1 European Regional
Database, Cambridge
Econometrics
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Table 5.6: Descriptive Statistics (continued)





Share of agriculture in total em-
ployment

















Border Dummy for regions sharing a bor-
der with other member state
0.39 0.40 0 1 own calculations
Centrality Index for the accessibility of re-
gions, ranging from 1 (very periph-
eral) to 5 (very central)









Years of membership in the EU 20.62 14.97 0 41 own calculations
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Figure 5.2: Map of eligible regions. Source: DG Regio
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Figure 5.3: Development of EU support
Figure 5.4: Correlation of national prosperity and expected benefits from trade liber-
alisation. The reported question is Q35 from Eurobarometer 55.1: “Do you think that
your personal financial situation will benefit from this liberalisation?”
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Figure 5.5: Correlation of country dummies and par capita transfers
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